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SYNOPSIS 
The project management triangle, also referred to as the “triple constraint” or the 
“iron triangle”1 is a model of the constraints of project management. The triangle is 
used to illustrate that the success of project management is measured by the project 
team’s ability to manage the project so that the expected results are produced while 
managing time and cost. Events or circumstances may occur during construction 
contracts which may delay or disrupt the execution of the works or cause loss of 
productivity. 
All modern standard-form contracts provide for extending the date for completion 
under certain defined circumstances, but few contracts, if any, adequately address 
the question of on what basis exactly the extension of time is to be determined. This 
uncertainty and inconsistency creates numerous problems for the contractors in 
planning their work prospectively, and consequent delays may result in severe 
financial penalties, loss and expenses. This uncertainty and inconsistency may even 
have the completely opposite effect of relieving the contractor of his obligation to pay 
penalties and leaving the employer with the unexpected consequence of being 
obliged to prove its damages.  
Where the contract does not make express provision for an eventuality or the 
allocation of risk, the circumstance will be governed by common law. In other words, 
if the contract is silent on some of above common issues, the parties will be obliged 
to revert to common law for the outcome of their dispute. The main source of 
common law in relation to construction law is case law, of which there is a relative 
dearth in South Africa on the many issues that arise from the interpretation of 
contractual provisions dealing with delay and disruption in construction projects. It is 
therefore important for contracts to provide expressly for risk allocation pertaining to 
possible delaying events and to determine the distinction between time risk and cost 
risk events. Delay and disruption matters, which may inter alia include issues 
involving extensions of time, penalties, critical path, ownership of float, concurrent 
delay, delay analysis methods, global claims, and time at large, among other factors, 
1
 William T Cradock ‘How Business Excellence Models Contribute to Project Sustainability and Project Success’ 
in Silvius Gilbert Sustainability Integration for Effective Project Management (2013) at page 10. 
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all too often become disputes that have to be decided by third parties, including inter 
alia mediators, adjudicators, dispute review boards, arbitrators, and judges.  
The number of such cases could be substantially reduced by the introduction of an 
unambiguous and consistent approach. This thesis will address the above concepts 
by analysing the applicable legal principles involved. This will be done through an 
analysis of case law and legal writings, and a comparison of different standard 
contracts from South Africa, England, and, to a lesser extent, other foreign 
jurisdictions.  
This analysis will be applied and compared to the newly published JBCC suite of 
contracts (Edition 6.1 March 2014). Provisions of the JBCC extension of time 
regimen that are inconsistent and conflicting and may create ambiguity will be 
identified, and the thesis will propose amendments. Furthermore, provisions which 
are susceptible to time-at-large arguments will be analysed and appropriate 
amendments will be proposed. Finally, the thesis will endeavour to introduce Best 
Practice Project and Risk Management principles through its proposed amendments. 
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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
1.1 Introduction 
The construction industry operates in a multifaceted and largely project-specific 
environment impacted on by a variety of regulations, legislation, and forms of 
contracts and subcontracts.2 Owing to the industry’s dynamic nature, which is such 
that every project involves the assembly of a new combination of resources and role 
players, the industry is not static. The instability is further compounded by the fact 
that the industry is competitive and involves high risk for both the client and the 
contractor.3 In light of this, the government in 1999 published the White Paper on 
‘Creating an Enabling Environment for Reconstruction, Growth and Development in 
the Construction Industry’ (the White Paper),4 paving the way for establishment of 
the Construction Industry Development Board (CIDB) through an Act of Parliament.5 
The CIDB was established to provide leadership to stakeholders and to stimulate 
sustainable growth, reform and improvement of the construction sector for effective 
delivery and an enhanced role for the industry in the country’s economy.6 Prior to the 
establishment of the CIDB, different forms of contracts were being used, resulting in 
increased costs and claims due to the inconsistent interpretation of the varied 
approaches that were used to establish risks, liabilities and obligations of the parties 
to contracts and the associated administration procedures.7 The CIDB is among 
other things mandated to promote and improve industry performance,8 and to 
endorse uniform and ethical standards that ‘regulate the actions, practices and 
procedures of parties engaged in construction contracts’.9 In line with its mandate 
and in declaring procurement best practices, the CIDB recommends the following 
forms of Standard Construction Contracts to be used by the public sector: 
                                               
2
 The White Paper ‘Creating an Enabling Environment for Reconstruction, Growth and Development in the 




 The White Paper op cit note 2. 
5




 CIDB ‘ Best Practice Guidelines #C2: Choosing an Appropriate Form of Contract for Engineering and 
Construction Works’ (2005) at 2. 
8
 Section 4(c) of Act 38 of 2000. 
9
 Section 4(f) of Act 38 of 2000.
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FIDIC’s suite of books dealing with specific types of contract (‘FIDIC’ is the French 
acronym for ‘International Federation of Consulting Engineers’) (Short contract 
(1999a), and Red Book (1999b), Yellow Book (1999c) and Silver Book (1999d)); 
General Conditions of Contract for Construction Works (GCC) 2015; JBCC Series 
2000 (Principal Building Agreement and Minor Works Agreement) and the New 
Engineering Contract (NEC3) (Engineering and Construction Contract and 
Engineering and Construction Short Contract).  
1.2 Scope of study and methodology 
Standard Construction Contracts are important as they provide a ready-made set of 
terms as to the allocation of risks and responsibilities, remedies and administrative 
practices; make the negotiation and tender process more efficient and less costly; 
and spell out the relationships between the different parties involved in a project.10 Of 
the CIBD approved Standard Construction Contracts, this thesis focuses on the Joint 
Building Contracts Committee (JBCC) Edition 6.1 March 2014 Suite of Contracts 
(JBCC 2014 Suite) consisting of the Main Contract, the JBCC Principal Building 
Agreement Edition 6.1 March 2014 (JBCC PBA) and Subcontracts, the JBCC® 
Nominated/Selected Subcontract Agreement Edition 6.1 March 2014 (JBCC NSSA) 
as published by the Joint Building Contracts Committee (the Committee). This thesis 
specifically deals with the JBCC PBA. As a result, it is to be noted that any reference 
in this thesis to a Clause without the specification of a different Conditions of 
Contract, will mean that the Clause is in terms of the JBCC PBA.  
The Committee was established in 1984 and published the first edition of the 
JBCC Principal Building Agreement in 1991.11 In 1998 a revised Principal 
Agreement and suite of documents, designated Suite 2000, was published in the 
hope that the documents would meet the needs of all facets of the building 
industry with little or no amendments.12 But like every aspect of modern life, the 
construction industry is dynamic. In the next few years the JBCC published further 
editions 2000, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2013 (published but recalled after a few 
                                               
10
 Justin Sweet ‘Standard Construction Contracts: Some Advice to Construction Lawyers’ 40 S.C.L Rev 823 
(1988) at 823. 
11
 Eyvind Finsen ‘The Building Contract: A commentary on the JBCC Agreements’ (2005) at v. 
12
 Ibid. 
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months), and finally 2014, to deal with changing circumstances.13 This thesis 
focuses on the JBCC PBA rather than the other standard forms of contract 
because it is one of the South African drafted contracts, together with the GCC. 
The GCC is, however, largely drafted in conformity with the Society for 
Construction Law’s Delay and Disruption Protocol.14 This makes it less prone to 
disputes in comparison with the JBCC PBA, which is not in line with the Protocol. 
The JBCC can therefore be improved in this regard, as will be discussed in more 
detail in the following chapters. In addition, the JBCC it is widely used in South 
Africa, and its widespread acceptance has made it an industry standard for 
construction procurement in the country.15 This makes it very relevant to the 
Construction industry in South Africa for a diverse range of construction projects. 
The envisaged research is qualitative in nature and desk research was the chosen 
methodology. The study relied on primary sources in the form of various relevant 
standard forms of contract, case law and legislation. The majority of the case law 
relied on is from the English courts. Because of the lack of South African case law 
on certain construction law matters and the fact that South African Law is a so-
called mixed legal system, comprising a foundation of Roman-Dutch Law with 
strong English influences, especially in the areas of commercial and construction 
law,16 it is accepted that English law enjoys considerable relevance and persuasive 
value when it comes to the development, interpretation and application of South 
African law relating to construction contracts. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court, 
from its very first judgment in S v Zuma and Others,17considered and cited over 25 
foreign precedents. Furthermore, in Fose v Minister of Safety and Security,18 Justice 
O’Reagan stated the following: 
  




 Society for Construction Law, Delay and Disruption Protocol (October 2004 reprint) available at 
www.eotprotocol.com 
15
 Peter Richards, Paul Bowen et al ‘Client Strategic Objectives: The Impact of Choice of Construction Contract 
on Project Delivery’ Construction Law Journal 7 (2005) 21 at page 4. 
16
 See, eg, CG van der Merwe, JE du Plessis and MJ de Waal “Report 2 – South Africa” in VV Palmer (ed) Mixed 
Jurisdictions Worlswide – The Third Legal Family (2001, Oxford University Press). 
17
 S v Zuma and Others 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC). 
18
 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security (CCT14/96) [1997] ZACC 6; 1997 (7) BCLR 851; 1997 (3) SA 786 (5 June 
1997) at 35. 
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“It would seem unduly parochial to consider that no guidance, whether positive 
or negative, could be drawn from other legal systems grappling with issues 
similar to those with which we are confronted. Consideration of the responses 
of other legal systems may enlighten us in analysing our own law, and assist us 
in developing it further”.  
Owing to the strong historical linkage with England, and the aforementioned 
constitutional imperative, the law as applied and developed in the English courts has 
persuasive value in the development and application of the law in South Africa, 
especially where there is no clear directive in South African law on a specific matter. 
This approach is enunciated in the following terms by Van Rhyn J in Colin v De Giusti 
and another;19 
“Contemporary South African and English Law are mainly founded on the same 
legal principles pertaining to construction agreements, to such a degree that 
legal authorities are referred to with the same ease”.  
Textbooks and law journals are used as secondary sources of information. 
1.3 Research justification and problem 
My analysis of the JBCC® Principal Building Agreement Edition 6.1 March 2014 
(JBCC PBA) revealed numerous instances of incorrect clause referencing,20 
conflicting provisions, and omissions from the contract data, emphasising the need 
for a revised edition or amendments in the form of contract supplements to remedy 
these problems. Contract Supplements should have the objectives of removing any 
conflicting or obvious errors in a Standard Contract; eliminating any ambiguity or 
uncertainty; and introducing Best Practices. The introduction of contractual 
supplements to amplify the Standard Conditions of Contract is not without criticism, 
however. The major argument against the adoption of such a course is that the 
addition to already huge volumes of text will make the contracts even more complex 
                                               
19
 Colin v De Giusti and Another 1975 4 All SA 319 (NC). 
20
For general incorrect clause references refer, for example, to: Clause 15.2.2, which incorrectly references 
clause 15.1.5 instead of clause 11.4.1; and Clause 21.1, which incorrectly makes reference to clause 21.4.1 
instead of 21.6.1, among others. It should be noted that the thesis will not be dealing with all incorrect clause 
referencing in the JBCC, but will limit the discussion only to references that are relevant to the scope of the 
thesis, those being the ones that impact on delay and disruption claims in construction projects.  
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than they are.21 The Joint Building Contracts Committee’s22 resistance to any 
modifications is also evident in the Warning note23 in the Preface of the JBCC 
Agreements against the dangers inherent in modifying any part of the JBCC 
documents.  
However, in analysing the JBCC PBA, one finds that there is an obvious need to 
address certain problem areas and difficulties, some of which will be identified and 
analysed in the following chapters. While standard contracts are intended to provide 
certainty, the JBCC PBA is fraught with clauses that result in ambiguity. As a result, 
it is submitted that the JBCC PBA needs revision to address these defects. It is 
furthermore submitted that the JBCC in its revision should take cognisance of the 
Society of Construction Law’s Delay and Disruption Protocol (the “Protocol”), 
published in 2002,24 in order to determine and pave the way for the incorporation of 
best practice. The Protocol recognises that construction contracts must provide the 
mechanisms to manage change.25 Although all the common standard forms of 
contract provide for the assessment of delay and compensation for prolongation, 
they do not all do so completely, or in exactly the same way.26 The Protocol’s 
objective is to provide guidance on some of the common issues that arise in 
construction contracts.27 It must, however, be noted that the Protocol itself states that 
although it is not a contract document and does not purport to take precedence over 
express terms of a contract, it represents a scheme of dealing with delay and 
disruption issues that is balanced.28 The aim of the Protocol is that in time, most 
contracts will adopt its guidance as the best way to deal with delay and disruption 
issues.29  
                                               
21
 Peter Aeberli, “The PFE Change Management Supplements: Are they what the industry wants?”(December 
2005) page 4.  
22
 The preface of the JBCC 2014 describes the committee as representative of building owners and developers, 
professional consultants and general and specialist contractors who contribute their knowledge and 
experience to the compilation of the JBCC documents. 
23
 “Experience has shown that changes drafted by others, including members of the building profession, often  
have results different from these intended that may be prejudicial to either, or both, parties.”  
24
 SCL Protocol op cit note 14  
25




SCL Protocol op cit note 14 at page 3.
 
28
 SCL Protocol op cit note 14 at 3 
29
 SCL Protocol op cite note 14page3.  
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The benefit to the employer of using a contract which conforms to the Protocol is that 
it enables him to manage his own delay risks of change during the construction 
period.30 This is opposed to having to depend on the contractor to either manage the 
delay risk for him under the aegis of a contractual provision requiring the contractor 
for example to “prevent delay in the progress of the works howsoever caused”,31 or 
any other similar provision.32 Alternatively, the employer’s delay risks are not 
managed at all during the construction period with the resultant inevitable overrun, 
compensation claims and the disputes that usually follow.33 A benefit to the 
contractor is that he will be better able to manage the works and his own delay risk, 
and he will be able to secure speedy resolution of issues of extension of time and 
compensation, with the result that he is better able to manage the future works and 
improve his cash flow.34 
It is the contention of this thesis that the use and application of some of the JBCC 
PBA provisions is problematic. This thesis therefore discusses the problematic 
provisions and provides recommendations on how the provisions can be revised to 
remove conflicting and obvious drafting errors, eliminate or reduce ambiguity and 
uncertainty and be aligned with best practices. This thesis through an analysis of the 
JBCC PBA contributes to the area of construction management, highlighting the 
shortcomings of the contract; this can help mitigate the potential conflicts and 
disputes that can arise between Parties as they will be aware of potential problem 
areas beforehand. It further provides recommendations which if implemented will 
allow Employers, Contractors and other industry professionals to avoid unnecessary 
disputes and inevitably complete their projects more efficiently while saving on costs 
that would otherwise result from said disputes.  
  
                                               
30
 Pickavance Consulting, Fenwick Elliot ‘The PFE Change Management Supplement for use with JCT98 
Standard Form of Building Contract, Private Edition, With Quantities Incorporating Amendments 1–4’ (2003) at 
page 2. 
31
 JCT98 clause 25.3.4.1 
32
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It should be noted that throughout the thesis, where amendment is recommended, 
clauses indicated with an asterisk (*) show proposed amended clauses to replace 
the standard JBCC PBA provisions. 
  






The law governing the various aspects of building contracts in South Africa is in 
general the common law of contracts and in Roman-Dutch law this type of contract 
falls into the category of letting and hiring.35 As a general principle, a basic obligation 
of a contractor under a building or engineering contract is to complete the works on 
time.36 This obligation may be expressed by stipulating in the contract an actual date 
by which completion is required.37 It may alternatively stipulate a period for 
performance required to carry out the works, such period to run from whenever the 
Contractor is permitted and required to commence work or also defined as the 
commencement date.38 In either event, failure by the Contractor to comply with this 
obligation is a breach of contract, carrying with it the liability to pay damages or 
penalties to the employer.39  
Consequently, the date for completion is of outmost importance as it may, and most 
probably will, have a telling impact on the monetary aspect of the project.40 
Notwithstanding this importance, there is unnecessary confusion surrounding the 
concepts of date for completion (contractual completion date) and date of completion 
(construction completion date).41 In practice the term “Completion Date” is used often 
but without a clear definition as to clarify the exact meaning thereof. Some use it to 
indicate the expiry of the time by which the Contractor has to fulfil the requirements 
of the contract, or the expiry of the “window of opportunity” within which he has to 
perform the work (contractual completion date), while others use it to indicate the 
expiry of the time the contractor actually used or even, in view of the contractor’s 
                                               
35
 H.S McKenzie and G.B Shapiro The Law of Building Contracts and Arbitration in South Africa (2014) at page 1. 
36








 See KNS Construction (Pty) Ltd v Genesis on Fairmount & Another 21 August 2009 03/21585 [2009] ZAGPJHC 
39 where the court found that by failing to achieve Practical Completion of the residential section by a 
specified date the contractor was in material breach of contract which entitled the employer to terminate the 
contract. 
41
 Ferdinand Fourie ‘Time-for Versus Time-of Performance’ (2003) AACE International Transactions CDR.21 at 
CDR.21.1. 
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construction programme, intended to use to complete the work (construction 
completion date).  
Uncertainty and even ignorance of the difference between these concepts and the 
failure to define them properly in standard contract provisions result in confusion 
between employers and contractors. Often the contractual completion date and 
construction completion date are treated as if they have the same meaning. This can 
lead to uncertainty which may result in conflict, disagreements and disputes, which 
could have been avoided had the parties understood the basic and fundamental 
differences between these concepts. On most projects the contractor schedules the 
construction completion date to coincide with the contractual completion date. This 
blurs the distinction between these two separate concepts even further. 
The JBCC PBA contract contributes to the confusion by not defining the terms 
unambiguously and by not applying them consistently. The distinction between these 
two terms is vital for determining penalties, extensions of time and expense and/or 
loss. This chapter analyses the various provisions of the JBCC PBA which deal with 
“Completion Dates” in different application areas and address the various issues that 
may arise. 
2.2 JBCC contractual and construction completion dates 
The JBCC PBA uses the terms “date for Practical Completion” and “date of Practical 
Completion” in a number of its provisions. The concepts “are unfortunately not dealt 
with in the JBCC PBA Definition Clause 1.1 and their meanings must therefore be 
inferred from the context in which they are used and the specific application areas in 
the Agreement. The JBCC PBA is, however, not as consistent with the use of these 
terms as the preceding Suites of 2005 and 2007 were.42 On a reading of the 
contract, it becomes apparent that these terms are used interchangeably in a 
number of contexts.  
This thesis argues that despite the JBCC PBA’s own apparent oversight in failing to 
define the terms, a thorough examination of the contract reveals that these two terms 
are not interchangeable but refer to different concepts. It is submitted that “date for 
                                               
42
 2005 and 2007 used the date for Practical Completion as the contractual completion date and the date of 
Practical Completion as the construction completion date, and did not use the terms interchangeably. 
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Practical Completion” refers to the contractual completion date, which is the date by 
which the Contractor has to perform by completing the work. It is usually expressly 
stipulated in the contract. It therefore determines when an Employer would be able to 
recover penalties or liquidated damages should the Contractor fail to perform in a 
timely manner. The term “date of Practical Completion”, on the other hand, refers to 
the construction completion date as initially intended or planned and finally the actual 
date on which the Contractor planned to or actually completed the work. Despite the 
failure to define the terms and in some cases to make a distinction between them by 
using them interchangeably, the JBCC PBA itself provides support for the argument 
that these concepts or definitions are distinct and have different meanings and 
consequences. Refer to Annexure A: Figures 1 to 3 “Contract Dates” for an 
illustration of the abovementioned concepts. The “date of Practical Completion” may 
be programmed to be achieved before the “date for Practical Completion” (Figure 1), 
on the “date for Practical Completion” (Figure 2) or after the “date for Practical 
Completion” (Figure 3). The first scenario in Figure 1 illustrates a planned early 
completion and the third scenario in Figure 3 illustrates the situation where the 
Contractor is late in achieving Practical Completion. The second scenario, where the 
“date of Practical Completion” and the “date for Practical Completion” coincide. 
represents the default position and will most of the time reflect the Contractor’s 
programming method.  
2.3 Consistent application of concepts 
This part of the thesis analyses the JBCC PBA provisions which support the 
contention that “date of Practical Completion” and “date for Practical Completion” are 
separate and distinct concepts. 
2.3.1  Penalty provisions 
A reading of Clause 24 together with the definition of Practical Completion as found 
in the JBCC PBA Definition Clause 1.1 illustrates the meaning of and the distinction 
between “date of Practical Completion” and “date for Practical Completion”. Refer to 
the JBC PBA Clauses and definitions below (own emphasis). 
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24.1  “Where the contractor fails to bring the works or a section thereof [CD]43 
to practical completion by the date for practical completion [CD], or the 
revised date for practical completion, the contractor shall be liable to the 
employer for the penalty [CD]” 
24.2 “Where the employer elects to levy such penalty, on notice thereof to the 
contractor, the principal agent shall determine the amount due from the 
later of the date for practical completion [CD], or the revised date for 
practical completion up to and including the earlier of:” 
24.2.1 “The actual or deemed date of practical completion of the works [23.7.1] 
or a section thereof” 
24.2.2 “The date of termination [29.0]” 
Clause 24.1 makes it clear that the “date for Practical Completion” is the date stated 
in the Contract Data44 on or before which the Contractor is obliged to complete the 
Works to the extent that Practical Completion has been achieved, failing which the 
Contractor will be in culpable delay and Penalties will be levied against it. Clause 
24.2 suggests that the Penalties will be levied for the amount of days expired from 
the “date for Practical Completion” until the “date of Practical Completion” for such 
period of culpable delay. On the other hand the meaning of “date of Practical 
Completion” definition can be deduced from the definitions of Practical Completion 
and Certificate of Practical Completion in Clause 1.1 as quoted below. 
1.1 “PRACTICAL COMPLETION: The stage of completion as certified by the 
principal agent where the works or a section thereof has been completed 
free of patent defects other than minor defects identified in the list for 
completion and can be used for the intended purpose [CD]”  
From the above it follows that, practical completion is not a date; it is a stage or 
status45 to be achieved before the due date, the “date for Practical Completion”. 
 
                                               
43
 [CD] is the notation used where project specific information is recorded in the Contract Data.  
44
 The Contract Data is the document listing the contract variables. 
45
 The same concept is illustrated in relation to the NEC. See Bronwyn Mitchell and Barry Trebes ‘Managing 
Reality: Book Three Managing the Contract ‘(2005) at page 26. 
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1.1 “CERTIFICATE OF PRACTICAL COMPLETION: A certificate issued by 
the principal agent to the contractor with a copy to the employer stating 
that the date on which practical completion of the works, or of a section 
thereof, was achieved.”  
Accordingly the Principal Agent will issue a Certificate of Practical Completion once 
the construction status as defined by the phrase “Practical Completion” has been 
reached. Refer to Annexure A: Figure 4 “Culpable Delay” for an illustration of the 
abovementioned concept. 
From a reading of these provisions it is clear that “date of Practical Completion” and 
“date for Practical Completion” are not and cannot be construed as bearing the same 
meaning. Penalties can only be calculated once the Contractor has passed the 
contractual completion date or the “date for Practical Completion” and these 
Penalties will be calculated as the amount of days expired from that date until the 
date when the construction of the Works has actually been and certified as Practical 
Completion in the Certificate of Practical Completion, which denotes the construction 
completion date or the “date of Practical Completion”.  
Simply put, in terms of the JBCC PBA terminology, Penalties will be calculated from 
the “date for Practical Completion” (due date) as included in the Contract Data or the 
revised “date for Practical Completion” if so extended in terms of the Agreement, 
until the “date of Practical Completion” as certified in the Certificate of Practical 
Completion (stage or status achieved).  
2.3.2 Revision of the date for practical completion 
The distinction between the “date for Practical Completion” and “date of Practical 
Completion” is further illustrated below in relation to the determination of extension of 
time and the resultant revision of the “date for Practical Completion”. The 
Contractor’s entitlement to a revision of the “date for Practical Completion” is 
governed by Clauses 23.1 to 3 as quoted below (own emphasis): 
23.1  “The contractor is entitled to a revision of the date for practical 
completion by the principal agent without an adjustment to the contract 
value for a delay to practical completion caused by one or more of the 
following events: …” 
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23.2  “The contractor is entitled to a revision of the date for practical 
completion by the principal agent with an adjustment of the contract 
value [26.0], for a delay to practical completion caused by one or more of 
the following events: …” 
23.3  “Further circumstances for which the contractor may be entitled to a 
revision of the date for practical completion and an adjustment of the 
contract value are delays to practical completion due to any other cause 
beyond the contractor’s reasonable control and could not have reasonably 
been anticipated and provided for. The principal agent shall adjust the 
contract value where such delay is due to the employer and/or 
agents …” 
In terms of Clauses 23.1 to 3 the Contractor is entitled to a revision of the “date for 
Practical Completion” (contractual completion date) for a delay caused to Practical 
Completion (construction completion date) by a Relevant Event.46 Accordingly, if the 
construction completion date is delayed, the Contractor is entitled to a revision of the 
contractual completion date.  
It is clear from the above that after actual Practical Completion has been achieved, 
the “date of Practical Completion” has the meaning of the date that has been 
certified in the Certificate of Practical Completion. However, before actual Practical 
Completion has been achieved, the “date of Practical Completion”, represents the 
planned or anticipated date on which the Contractor programmes to complete the 
Works in order to achieve Practical Completion. The “date of Practical Completion” 
may be programmed earlier than the “date for Practical Completion” when the 
Contractor plans to complete the Works in order to achieve Practical Completion 
earlier than the “date for Practical Completion”.47 The “date of Practical Completion” 
may also be programmed later than the “date for Practical Completion” when the 
Programme is behind schedule and the Contractor is in culpable delay. It is 
accordingly possible that at any given time during the project, the Programme may 
                                               
46
 A Relevant Event refers to an event that causes delay to the date for Practical Completion. In terms of the 
JBCC PBA terminology it refers to any event or circumstance in terms of Clause 23.1 to 3 and recognised by the 
contract to entitle the Contractor to an extension of time.  
47
 See Annexure A – Figure 1 for illustration. 
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indicate the “date of Practical Completion” to be before, on48 or after49 the “date for 
Practical Completion”.  
These possible scenarios in turn create unnecessary confusion and uncertainty in 
practice as to how to deal with extension of time. However, this thesis argues that 
these possible scenarios do not affect the Contractor’s entitlement to a revision of 
the “date for Practical Completion” in terms of Clauses 23.1, 2 and 3 and should not 
raise any confusion or uncertainty when applied correctly. The Contractor’s 
entitlement to a revision of the “date for Practical Completion” depends solely on 
whether a Relevant Event delays Practical Completion. The Contractor will inter alia 
need to prove that the event impacted on the critical path50 delaying the planned 
“date of Practical Completion” on the Programme irrespective of whether the “date 
for Practical Completion” is earlier, later or on the same date. The current “date for 
Practical Completion” at the time of the delay has accordingly no relevance to 
whether a Contractor is entitled to extension of time or not. 
The “date for Practical Completion” is a contractual date in the Contract Data (or as 
subsequently revised) and is unrelated to the critical path of a Programme. Any 
argument or perception that the “date for Practical Completion” should be impacted 
or delayed by a Relevant Event for same to be revised does not have any legal 
basis. This misconception arises from the JCT contract Clause 25.3 as below (own 
emphasis): 
25.3.1 “If in the opinion of the Architect, upon receipt of any notice, particulars and 
estimate under clauses 25.2.1.1, 25.2.2. and 25.2.3 
25.3.1.1 any of the events which are stated by the Contractor to be the cause of the 
delay is a Relevant Event and  
25.3.1.2 the completion of the Works is likely to be delayed thereby beyond the 
Completion date 
                                               
48
 See Annexure A-Figure 2 for illustration. 
49
 See Annexure A – Figure 3 for illustration. 
50
 Keith Pickavance Delay and Disruption in Construction Contracts (2005) at page 7 the critical path as the 
longest path on the contractor’s programme from notice to proceed to project completion, or the path with 
the least amount of slack or float. See also SCL op cit note 14 at page 54 which defines the critical path as “The 
sequence of activities through a project network from start to finish, the sum of whose duration determines 
the overall project duration.” 
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The Architect shall in writing to the Contractor give an extension of time by 
fixing such later date as the Completion date as he then estimates to be fair 
and reasonable. The Architect shall, in fixing the new Completion date, 
state …” 
The above requirement in terms of Clause 25.3.1 implies that not only the 
construction completion date must be delayed but incorporates a further requirement 
that same must be delayed past the contractual completion date in order to be 
entitled to an extension of time. However, none of the standard contracts 
recommended by the CIDB has a similar requirement that the construction 
completion date needs to be delayed past the contractual completion date in order to 
have an entitlement to an extension of time.  
The NEC ECC Clause 63.3 is perhaps the clearest illustration of this principle. 
Clause 63.3 stipulates that “A delay to the Completion Date51 is assessed as the 
length of time that, due to the Compensation Event52, planned Completion is later 
than planned Completion as shown in the Accepted Programme”. The NEC manual 
further explains that terminal float53 is retained by the Contractor, as stated in 63.3 
above, where any delay to the Completion Date due to a Compensation Event is 
assessed as the length of time that planned Completion is later than planned 
Completion on the Accepted Programme.54 The NEC manual additionally states that 
the Completion Date for the contract is something different from Completion.55 
Completion is submitted to be a status that is achieved when the Contractor has 
fulfilled his duties as described in the contract and can thus be achieved on, before 
or after the Completion Date. 
It is accordingly submitted that the planned Completion, as defined by the NEC, can 
be equated to the JBCC PBA planned date of Practical Completion as programmed 
and that the NEC Completion Date be equated to the JBCC PBA “date for Practical 
                                               
51
 Clause 11.3 of the NEC states: “The Completion Date is the completion date unless later changed in the 
accordance with this contract.” The Construction Completion Date has the same meaning as the Contract 
Completion date and Completion has the same meaning as Practical Completion in terms of the JBCC PBA. 
52
 Compensation Event in this context has the same meaning as Relevant Event. 
53
 The period between planned Completion on the Programme and the Completion Date. 
54
 Mitchell and Trebes op cit note 50 at page 26. 
55
 Ibid. 
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Completion”. Refer to Annexure A: Figure 5 “Float” and Figure 6 “Extension of Time” 
for an illustration of the above concepts. 
2.3.3 Application areas 
The JBCC PBA has in addition to the provisions discussed above various other 
application areas where the concepts of “date for Practical Completion” and “date of 
Practical Completion” are used consistently. Refer to the JBCC PBA Clauses below 
(own emphasis): 
19.1 “The principal agent shall: 
19.1.1  “Inspect the works at appropriate intervals to give the contractor 
interpretations and direction on the standard of work and the state of 
completion of the works required of the contractor to achieve practical 
completion [CD]’’ 
The above process is consistent with the interpretation that Practical Completion is a 
status or state of completion to be achieved in order for the Principal Agent to issue 
a Certificate of Practical Completion. 
8.1 “The contractor shall take full responsibility for the works from the date on 
which possession of the site is given to the contractor and up to the date 
of issue of the certificate of practical completion or deemed achievement 
of practical completion for a section or the works as a whole. Thereafter 
responsibility for the works shall pass to the employer 
8.2 The contractor shall make good physical loss and repair damage to the 
works caused by or arising from: 
8.2.1 Any cause before the date of practical completion [19.0] 
8.2.2 Any act or omission of the contractor in the course of any work carried out 
in pursuance of the contractor’s obligations after the date of practical 
completion” 
In the above Clauses the “date of Practical Completion” is used to denote the 
“construction completion date” when the Works achieved Practical Completion as 
certified in a Certificate of Practical Completion when the risk will accordingly revert 
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to the Employer. The “date of Practical Completion” is defined in Clause 8.2.1 is also 
cross referencing Clause 19 to define it as the “state of completion” 
21.1 “The defects liability period for the works shall commence on the calendar 
day following the date of practical completion and end at midnight (00:00) 
ninety (90) calendar days from the date of practical completion [CD] or 
when work on the list for final completion has been satisfactorily 
completed [21.4.1], whichever is the later” 
The “date of Practical Completion” triggers the commencement of the Defects 
Liability Period in terms of Clause 21.1 which is linked to the “state” of Practical 
Completion and not only the “due date” for Practical Completion. Refer to Annexure 
A: Figure 7 “Defects Liability Period” for an illustration of the concept. 
17.4 “The contractor shall not be obliged to execute contract instructions or 
additional work issued after the certified date of practical completion” 
The above provision stipulates that the Contractor is not obliged to execute a 
Contract Instruction for additional work issued after the certified “date of Practical 
Completion”. This may, however, be after the “date for Practical Completion” where 
the Contractor is in culpable delay. This approach is also consistent with the other 
applicable principles. This provision implies that the Employer may issue orders for 
Variations to the Works at any time before the Contractor achieves Practical 
Completion. The Contractor is obliged to perform such Contract Instructions and will 
be in breach if it refuses to perform them. The Contractor will, however, be entitled to 
an adjustment to the Contract Value and for a revision of the date for Practical 
Completion in view of the effect of such instructions. 
2.4 Inconsistent application of concepts  
In light of the conclusion that the “date of Practical Completion” or the contract 
completion date and the “date for Practical Completion” or the construction 
completion date are separate and distinct concepts, this section of the thesis 
analyses the JBCC PBA provisions where the concepts are used interchangeably or 
applied incorrectly without taking into account their distinct meanings. The various 
seemingly unintended and unsatisfactory consequences which may result will be 
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illustrated, and amendments proposed, to align the concepts in order to create 
certainty.  
2.4.1  Extension of time 
Undoubtedly the most important area where certainty as to the concepts of “date for 
Practical Completion” and “date of Practical Completion” is required is in respect of 
the determination of delays, extensions of time and penalties. JBCC PBA Clause 23 
deals with the Contractor’s entitlement to a revision of the “date for Practical 
Completion” in certain circumstances or the occurrence of certain Relevant Events. 
This “date for Practical Completion” is initially the date as included in the Contract 
Data under section “19/20/24 Practical Completion/Penalty for late completion”.56 
The Contract Data makes provision to include a “date for Practical Completion” for 
the Works as a whole or for the Works in Sections. There is also a provision to 
include a “Penalty Amount per Calendar day” next to the “date for Practical 
Completion”. 
Clauses 23.1 to 3 list certain events or circumstances which when they cause a 
delay to Practical Completion, will entitle the Contractor to a revision of the “date for 
Practical Completion”. As contended above, the delay to Practical Completion 
denotes the stage of construction completion or a status. The “date of Practical 
Completion” will be evident and conclusive after being certified in a Certificate of 
Practical Completion, but up and until then, the “date of Practical Completion” will 
only be evident if properly indicated on a planned Programme.  
In order to evaluate Clause 23 it is necessary to consider its application in three 
different scenarios where the “date of Practical Completion” is either before, on or 
after the “date for Practical Completion”. As previously mentioned, it is possible for 
the anticipated or planned “date of Practical Completion” on the Programme to 
coincide with the contractual “date for Practical Completion” as included in the 
Contract Data or as subsequently revised. Clause 23.7 makes provision for the 
Principal Agent to revise the “date for Practical Completion” where the Contractor 
proves its entitlement under Clauses 23.1 to 3 for an appropriate extension of time. 
This scenario, where the two dates coincide will not pose any problems because 
                                               
56
 The heading in the Contract Data of “Penalty for late completion” itself is not accurately defined as discussed 
in the previous section. 
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incorrect reference to a date, whether “date of Practical Completion” or “date for 
Practical Completion” will automatically be corrected because it refers to the same 
date or point in time.  
However, in relation to the second scenario, where the Contractor plans to complete 
the Works earlier than the contractual “date for Practical Completion”, an incorrect 
reference to “date of Practical Completion” and “date for Practical Completion” will 
have unanticipated and undesired consequences. There is much debate surrounding 
this scenario of early completion and the outcome thereof depends to a great extent 
on the status of the Programme which will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter 3. 
The same unanticipated and undesirable consequences may occur in the third 
scenario where the Contractor is in culpable delay and where it is not possible to 
accelerate its Programme to meet the contractual “date for Practical Completion” 
when referencing to the concepts of “date for Practical Completion” and “date of 
Practical Completion” is incorrect. In practice most Contractors in such situations 
provide unrealistic Programmes showing the planned “date of Practical Completion” 
as meeting the anticipated or contractual “date for Practical Completion” even where 
there is no chance of completing the Contract on time. This should be discouraged 
because of the importance of a realistic Programme in order for both parties to 
manage their responsibilities. 
In order for an extension of time mechanism of a contract to function properly, its 
provisions should be able to function and have proper application in all these 
scenarios including where the Contractor is in culpable delay and the planned “date 
of Practical Completion” is later than the contractual “date for Practical Completion”. 
As mentioned above, no problem is anticipated for scenario one when the “date for 
Practical Completion” and “date of Practical Completion” coincide. The second 
scenario, where an early completion is anticipated will depend solely on the status of 
the Programme and this will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter 3. Therefore, for 
the remainder of this chapter the thesis will focus on the third scenario. 
The JBCC extension of time contractual mechanism entails three requirements that 
need to be complied with in order for the Contractor to be successful with a claim. 
The first requirement is the contractual entitlement as provided by Clause 23.1 to 3. 
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The second requirement is to comply with all procedural and other conditions 
precedent including notices for a valid claim. Non-compliance with such prerequisites 
are often fatal to a successful claim as these elements are intended as time bars to 
the Contractor’s right to claim. The third requirement is for the Contractor to prove 
the quantum of the claim, both in terms of time and money. 
The purpose of the stringent procedural notice requirements is based on Risk 
Management best practice in order to identify risk early. By identifying risk early, the 
Parties can be proactive in managing it effectively by taking steps to avoid, mitigate 
or transferring it. 
Clauses 23.4 to 7 deal with the procedural requirements including the aforesaid early 
warning notices to be met in order for the Contractor to enforce its entitlements. 
Refer to the JBCC PBA Clauses below (own emphasis): 
3.4 “Should a listed circumstance occur [23.1-3] which could cause a delay to 
the date for practical completion, the contractor shall: 
23.4.1 Take reasonable steps to avoid or reduce such delay 
23.4.2  Within twenty (20) working days of becoming aware of such delay, give 
notice to the principal agent of the intention to submit a claim for revision 
to the date of practical completion, failing which the contractor shall 
forfeit such claim 
23.5  The contractor shall submit a claim for the revision of the date of practical 
completion to the principal agent within forty (40) working days, or such 
extended period the principal agent may allow, from when the contractor 
is able to quantify the delay in terms of the programme 
23.6  Where the contractor requests a revision of the date for practical 
completion the claim shall in respect of each circumstance separately 
state:  
23.6.1  The relevant clause [23.1-3] on which the contractor relies 
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23.6.2  The cause and effect of the delay on the current date for practical 
completion, where appropriate, illustrated by a change to the critical path 
on the current programme 
23.6.3 The extension period claimed in working days and the calculation thereof 
23.7 The principal agent shall, within twenty (20) working days of receipt of 
the claim, grant in full, reduce or refuse the working days claimed, and: 
23.7.1 Determine the revised date for practical completion as a result of the 
working days granted, where applicable 
23.7.2 Identify each event and the reference clause for each revision granted or 
amended 
23.7.3 Give reasons where such claim is refused or reduced” 
Clause 23.4 refers to the first requirement as stated above, which requires an 
occurrence of a Relevant Event which triggers the contractor’s entitlement to 
extension of time. However, on one hand Clauses 23.1 to 3 stipulate that the 
Relevant Event should cause delay to Practical Completion or “date of Practical 
Completion”. Clause 23.4 on the other hand stipulates that the procedure set out in 
Clause 23.4.1 and 2 needs to be complied with a Relevant Event which causes a 
delay to the “date for Practical Completion”. 
This thesis submits that the above error or confusion with the concepts is further 
exacerbated by the incorrect reference to “date of Practical Completion” in Clause 
23.4.2. The requirement to issue a notice of intention to submit a claim should be a 
condition precedent to a revision to the “date for Practical Completion” based on the 
entitlement provided by Clauses 23.1 to 3. The current Clause 23.4.2 makes the 
requirement to issue a notice of intention to submit a claim a requirement for a 
revision to the “date of Practical Completion” which is not relevant. Clause 23.4 
should require the procedures included in Clause 23.4.2 and 23.5 to be followed 
should there be a delay to Practical Completion, which confers entitlements in terms 
of Clauses 23.1. The current Clause 23.4 lays down the procedures to be followed 
should the circumstances referred to in Clauses 23.1 to 3 cause a delay to the “date 
for Practical Completion”. The “date for Practical Completion” is a contractual date 
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which should be revised if a delay to the “date of Practical Completion” occurs. It is 
not possible for the “date for Practical Completion” to be delayed by an event. It is 
the “date of Practical Completion” which will be delayed through a delaying event 
impacting on an activity on the critical path and as a consequence delays the end of 
the last activity on the critical path, the “date of Practical Completion”. 
Clause 23.5 requires the claim for the revision of the “date of Practical Completion” 
to be submitted within forty working days. Clause 23.1 to 3 provide for a revision of 
the “date for Practical Completion” where Practical Completion is delayed and not for 
a revision of the “date of Practical Completion” which is a state of completion which 
is programmed to be achieved at a specific point in time. It therefore stands to 
reason that the forty working days do not apply as a condition precedent to enforce 
entitlements in terms of Clause 23.1 to 3. 
It is this thesis’ contention that the incorrect application of the concepts of “date of 
Practical Completion” and “date for Practical Completion” as illustrated above, may 
have the effect that the intended time barring provisions for the late notices in terms 
of Clause 23.4.2 and late claim in terms of Clause 23.5 will not be enforceable 
against the Contractor.  
The South African law of contract adopts the common law principle of pacta sunt 
servanda, which dictates that agreements are binding and enforceable. Accordingly, 
time-barring provisions in a contract freely entered into by the parties are 
enforceable under South African law.57 While it is clear that time barring provisions 
are enforceable it is less clear what requirements a notice provision in a construction 
contract must meet in order to be enforceable. On this point one has to revert to 
English law where the legal principles and requirements applicable to the 
enforcement of time barring provisions in construction contracts are well established 
through various English authorities.58 In Bremer Handelsgesellschaft v Vanden 
Avenne-Izegem59 it was held that if a notice provision was to be enforced as a 
                                               
57
 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) 323 (CC). See also the South African cases Edward L Bateman Ltd V C A Brand 
Projects (Pty) Ltd 1995 (4) SA 128 (T) and Group Five Building Ltd v Minister of Public Works and Land Affairs 
1997 (3) SA 150 (C). In both cases, time-barring provisions were enforced. 
58
 See Obrascon Huarte Lain SA v Attorney General for Gilbraltar [2014] EWHC 1028 (TCC) where the court 
considered a condition precedent clause and its effect on claims for additional time and money under a FIDIC 
contract. The court made it clear that a condition precedent clause should be worded in clear language. 
59
 Bremer Handelsgesellschaft v Vanden Avenne-Izegem PVBA [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 109, HL. 
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condition precedent it should state expressly the precise time period within which the 
notice is to be served; the trigger event for the time period should be determinable; 
and it should state by express language that non-compliance will be sanctioned by 
the Contractor losing its right to claim. Clearly, time-barring provisions are likely to be 
examined closely and any ambiguity or inconsistency with other provisions is likely to 
be construed contra proferentem.60  
It is therefore argued that based on the above authorities and principles, the JBCC 
PBA extension of time procedural requirements will not stand the test in order to be 
applied as conditions precedent or time barring in the event of the Contractor failing 
to comply with them. It is further argued that the aforesaid procedural provisions 
including, Clauses 23.4 and 23.6.2, will become inoperable where the Contractor is 
in culpable delay and the Programme indicates a planned “date of Practical 
Completion” later that the “date for Practical Completion” which has already been 
passed.  
In terms of Clause 23.4 the Relevant Event delaying Practical Completion may occur 
after the “date for Practical Completion” while the Contractor is already in culpable 
delay, which will render Clause 23.4 entirely inoperable and unenforceable. The 
condition precedent or time bar purportedly contained in Clause 23.4.2 may 
therefore also yield against arguments that the time barring is not enforceable. 
Clause 23.6 correctly makes provision for the revision of the “date for Practical 
Completion”, but then confuses the concepts in Clause 23.6.2 by requiring the 
Contractor to state the cause and effect of the delay on the current “date for Practical 
Completion” rather than the “date of Practical Completion”. In terms of Clause 23.6.2 
the cause and effect or the delay caused by the event should be illustrated by the 
change to the critical path on the current Programme. However, the “date for 
Practical Completion” is not reflected on a critical path, it is the “date of Practical 
Completion” which is the time of completion of the last activity as programmed on the 
critical path that is impacted by the delay where the Contractor is in culpable delay 
and the Programme indicates a planned “date of Practical Completion” later than the 
contractual date “date for Practical Completion” 
                                               
60
 Pickavance op cit note 50 at 143.  
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The above arguments may be supported by the Court’s approach in applying a 
restrictive or narrow interpretation in relation to provisions which may have a serious 
effect on the rights of the Parties. The same rules of interpretation applicable to time 
barring and time at large (this will be discussed further in Chapter 4) should, as 
contended above, also be applicable to the construction of such provisions. 
It is accordingly submitted that the above inconsistency and confusion of two 
important concepts may lead to serious uncertainty, which may in turn lead to 
unnecessary disputes. 
In order to deal properly with the aforesaid application areas, it is proposed to 
introduce definitions for the “date of Practical Completion” and “date for Practical 
Completion”, with Clauses 23.4 to 23.6 to be amended as follows: 
DATE FOR PRACTICAL COMPLETION*: The contractual completion date or 
dates stated in the contract data or revision thereof [23.0] on or before which 
the contractor agrees to bring the works or sections thereof to practical 
completion. The contractor will be liable for the determined penalty [24.0] in 
failure to achieve practical completion on or before such date. References 
to “date for practical completion” will be included in the definitions where the 
“date for” is not bold in the standard JBCC text. 
DATE OF PRACTICAL COMPLETION*: The construction completion date or 
dates, which is initially the intended or planned date or dates to bring the 
works or sections thereof to practical completion and subsequently the 
actual or deemed date or dates on which the contractor achieved practical 
completion as stated in a certificate of practical completion. References to 
“date of practical completion” will be included in the definition where the 
“date of” is not bold in the standard JBCC text. 
23.4* Should a listed event or circumstance occur [23.1-3] which could cause a 
delay to the date of practical completion, the contractor shall: 
23.4.1 *Give the principal agent reasonable and timeous notice of such event or 
circumstance and take reasonable steps to avoid or reduce such delay 
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23.4.2 *Within ten (10) working days of becoming aware, or ought reasonably to 
have become aware of such event or circumstances, give notice to the 
principal agent of the intention to submit a claim for a revision to the date 
for practical completion, failing which the contractor shall forfeit such 
claim 
23.5* The contractor shall submit a claim for the revision of the date for 
practical completion to the principal agent within twenty (20) working 
days, or such extended period the principal agent may allow, from the 
end of the event or circumstance, failing which the contractor shall forfeit 
such claim 
23.6* Where the contractor requests a revision of the date for practical 
completion the claim shall in respect of each event or circumstance 
separately state: 
23.6.1* Particulars of such event or circumstance and the relevant clause [23.1-3] 
on which the contractor relies 
23.6.2* The cause and effect of the delaying event or circumstance on the date of 
practical completion, illustrated by the impact and/or a change to the 
critical path on the programme by performing a time impact analysis 
23.6.3*The extension period claimed in working days and the calculation thereof 
and the revised date for practical completion based on the extension of 
time period 
2.4.2 Construction period 
A further application area where the JBCC PBA is uses the concepts incorrectly with 
an attendant risk of conflict or uncertainty is in the determination of the adjustment of 
the Contract Value in relation to a successful claim to revise the “date for Practical 
Completion” in terms of Clause 23.7.  
JBCC PBA Clause 1.1 defines construction period as follows (own emphasis): 
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“CONSTRUCTION PERIOD the period commencing on the intended date 
[CD] of possession of the site by the contractor and ending on the date of 
practical completion, excluding annual industry holiday periods.”  
Clause 12.1.7 stipulates that the Employer shall “Give possession of the site to the 
contractor on the agreed date [CD]” 
The definition of Construction Period is relevant to determining the adjustment of 
Preliminaries61 in terms of Clause 26.9.4 as read with the following provision of the 
Contract Data – Option A62: 
“For the adjustment of preliminaries both the contract sum and the contract 
value (including tax) shall exclude the amount of preliminaries, all 
contingency sum(s) and any provision for Cost Price Adjustment Provisions: 
– An amount which shall not be varied 
– An amount varied in proportion to the contract value as compared to the 
contract sum 
– An amount varied in proportion to the construction period as compared 
to the initial construction period (excluding revisions to the 
construction period to which the contractor is not entitled) to 
adjustment of the contract value in terms of the agreement 
The contractor shall provide a breakdown of charges (including tax) within 
15 working days of the date of acceptance of tender and, where applicable, 
an apportionment of preliminaries per section: 
Where such information is not provided the following subdivision shall be 
deemed to apply: 
– 10% of the amount shall not be varied 
– 15% varied in proportion of the contract value to the contract sum 
                                               
61
 These are defined in 1.1 of the JBC PBA as “the priced items listed in the preliminaries document with any 
additions, alterations or modifications thereof incorporated in the contract documents” 
62
 Option A is one of the alternatives which may be selected in the Contract data for the adjustment of 
Preliminaries. 
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– 75% varied in proportion to the revised contract construction period 
compared to the initial construction period …” 
The intention of these Preliminary provisions is that the Contractor should be 
compensated for additional time related Preliminary costs to the extent that it is 
entitled to an extension of time and an adjustment to the Contract Value [26.0] in 
terms of Clause 23.2 or 3. 
However, it is the revision of the “date for Practical Completion” that should attract 
time related Preliminaries where the delay is caused by an Employer Risk Event in 
terms of Clause 23.2 or 23.3 and not the “date of Practical Completion”. The 
definition of Construction Period suggests that the period of delay under 
consideration will be determined by comparing the actual “date of Practical 
Completion” with the initial “date of Practical Completion”. The actual “date of 
Practical Completion” will be the date as certified in the Certificate of Practical 
Completion and the initial “date of Practical Completion” will be the date as planned 
and indicated on the first or baseline Programme. 
It is submitted that the revision of Construction Period is the wrong basis to 
determine the Contractor’s entitlement to an adjustment to the Contract Value. The 
initial and final Construction Period may differ because of a delay in the Programme 
caused by the Contractor’s own lack of performance without the impact of any 
Relevant Event and accordingly without the Contractor being entitled to any 
adjustment to the Contract Value. On an objective interpretation of the current Option 
A provisions, the Contractor shall be entitled to a proportional adjustment of 
Preliminaries for any delay to its Construction Period irrespective of the cause of 
delay. It is submitted that the adjustment of the Contract Value should depend on the 
revision of the “date for Practical Completion” which is independent to the “date of 
Practical Completion” and the associated definition of Construction Period. In order 
for the JBCC PBA to properly deal with the Contractor’s entitlement to an adjustment 
of the Contract Value it should amend the provisions of the Option A for 
Preliminaries in the Contract Data and introduce a definition for Contract Period to 
distinguish between the concepts of “date for Practical Completion” and “date for 
Practical Completion”. 
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It is proposed that the definition for a Contract Period should be introduced as below. 
CONTRACT PERIOD*: The period commencing on the intended date [CD] of 
possession of the site by the contractor and ending on the date for 
practical completion. 
Option A in the Contract Data should be amended as below to replace Construction 
Period with Contract Period. 
Option A* For the adjustment of preliminaries both the contract sum and the 
contract value (including tax) shall exclude the amount of preliminaries, 
all contingency sum(s) and any provision for Cost Price Adjustment 
Provisions: 
– An amount which shall not be varied 
– An amount varied in proportion to the contract value as compared to 
the contract sum 
– An amount varied in proportion to the revised contract period as 
compared to the initial contract period, excluding revisions to the 
contract period to which the contractor is not entitled to adjustment of 
the contract value [23.1] 
The contractor shall provide a breakdown of charges (including tax) 
within 15 working days of the date of acceptance of tender and, where 
applicable, an apportionment of preliminaries per section: 
Where such information is not provided the following subdivision shall 
be deemed to apply: 
– 10% of the amount shall not be varied 
– 15% varied in proportion of the contract value to the contract 
sum 
– 75% varied in proportion to the revised contract period compared 
to the initial contract period as stated above. 
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2.4.3 Practical completion 
Another application area is the procedure for the issuing of a Certificate of Practical 
Completion in terms of Clause 19 of JBCC PBA as quoted below. 
19.1  “The principal agent shall: 
19.1.1 Inspect the works at appropriate intervals to give the contractor 
interpretations and direction on the standard of work and the state of 
completion of the works required of the contractor to achieve practical 
completion 
19.1.2 Issue a contract instruction [17.1.5-10] consequent on each such 
inspection, where necessary 
19.1.3 Inspect the works within the period stated [CD] 
19.2 The contractor shall: 
19.2.1 Inspect the works in advance of the revised date for practical completion 
to confirm that the standard of work required and the state of completion of 
the works for practical completion [CD] has been achieved 
19.2.2 Give timeous notice to the principal agent of the anticipated date for the 
inspection for practical completion of the works to meet the (revised) 
date for practical completion [CD]” 
However, the JBCC PBA confuses the concepts of “date of Practical Completion” 
and “date for Practical Completion” for the greater part of the remainder of Clause 
19. The purpose of Clause 19 is to set a process for achieving Practical Completion, 
because of the outmost importance this may hold for the Contractor. Any delay in the 
process of certifying Practical Completion may cause the Contractor to sustain 
severe financial damages due to penalties that may be imposed for any delay in 
achieving Practical Completion later than the date for Practical Completion in terms 
of Clause 24 as previously discussed. The non-achievement of Practical Completion 
before the “date for Practical Completion” also constitutes grounds for termination in 
terms of Clause 29.1.2, as was decided in the KNS case.63 This approach is 
                                               
63
 KNS supra note 40. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
30 
 
amplified by the fact that the Contractor will, pursuant to Clause 19.4, be entitled to 
rely on Practical Completion being deemed to have occurred in the event of the 
Principal Agent failing to comply with the contractual procedure. 
The achievement of Practical Completion is accordingly a significant milestone which 
triggers important consequences not limited to Penalties and Termination as alluded 
to, but also includes that possession and risk for the care of the Works will revert to 
the Employer [8.1], security will be reduced [11.0], construction Instructions for 
additional work are no longer permitted [17.4] and the Defects Liability Period 
commences [21.1]  
The process to achieve Practical Completion should therefore be clear and concise. 
Clause 19.2 will be a workable procedure only for the scenario where the planned 
“date of Practical Completion” and the “date for Practical Completion” coincide. In the 
event where the Contractor plans to achieve Practical Completion earlier or where 
Practical Completion is delayed beyond the “date for Practical Completion”, Clause 
19 fails to provide an adequate procedure. 
It is proposed that Clauses 19.1 and 19.2 be revised as per below to provide an 
adequate procedure to achieve Practical Completion. 
19.1.1* Inspect the works at appropriate intervals to give the contractor 
interpretations and direction on the standard of work, the state of 
completion of the works and the documentation to be prepared and 
submitted [12.2.19-20] as the criteria for the contractor to achieve 
practical completion [CD] 
19.2.1* Inspect the works in advance of the anticipated date of practical 
completion to confirm that the standard of work required and the state of 
completion of the works has been achieved and documentation [12.2.19-
20] has been provided for practical completion [CD] to be certified 
19.2.2* Give timeous notice to the principal agent of the anticipated date of 
practical completion of the works, in order for the principal agent to 
inspect the works [19.1.3] so as to meet such date 
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It is further submitted that Clause 19.4 and 19.5 may have undesirable 
consequences where Practical Completion is deemed to be achieved. In this regard, 
reference may be made to JBCC PBA Clauses 1.2.5, 19.4 and 19.5 (own emphasis): 
1.2.5 “The word ‘deemed’ shall be conclusive that something is fact, regardless 
of the objective truth” 
19.4  “Should the principal agent not issue a list for practical completion or 
the updated list within five (5) working days after the inspection period, 
[19.3] the contractor shall give notice to the employer and the principal 
agent. Should the principal agent not issue such list within a further five 
(5) working days of receipt of such notice, practical completion shall be 
deemed to have been achieved on the intended/revised date for practical 
completion and the principal agent shall issue the certificate of 
practical completion forthwith 
19.5 On issue of the certificate of practical completion, the employer shall be 
entitled to possession of the works and the site subject to the contractor’s 
lien, where applicable.” 
From these provisions it is clear that in the event of the Principal Agent failing to 
comply with the requirements as set out therein, Practical Completion shall be 
deemed to have been achieved on the “date for Practical Completion” and the 
Principal Agent shall issue the certificate of Practical Completion forthwith. In a 
scenario where the Contractor is in culpable delay (for example for one month), and 
the Principal Agent fails to issue the required list in time as specified, it will mean that 
Practical Completion will be deemed to have been achieved on the “date for 
Practical Completion”. The Employer will accordingly be deprived from levying 
Penalties for the time (month) for which the Contractor was in culpable delay 
because the “date of Practical Completion” and the “date for Practical Completion” 
will be deemed to be on the same date. For the purpose of calculating Penalties in 
terms of Clause 24, the number of days between the “date of Practical Completion” 
and “date for Practical Completion” will be zero and no Penalties will be applicable. 
In amplification of this argument, Clause 1.2.5 stipulates that the deeming of 
Practical Completion in the present situation will be conclusive regardless of the 
objective truth. It is therefore contended that even though it was a fact that the Works 
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was not completed a month prior, it is contractually conclusive. Refer to Annexure A: 
Figure 8 “Deemed Practical Completion” for an illustration of the above concept. 
Further consequences pertaining to the aforesaid undesirable contractual position is 
that the risk will revert to the Employer in terms of Clause 8.1. The obligation to 
provide insurance is linked in terms of Clause 10.1 to the moment when the 
Contractor’s responsibility terminates. Accordingly, the risk for loss that occurs after 
the Certificate of Practical Completion has been issued in terms of this deeming 
provision and up to the actual Practical Completion of the Works will be with the 
Employer and not covered by the Contractor’s insurance. 
Another very important consequence is that the Defects Liability Period commences 
at the issuing of the Certificate of Practical Completion. The three months Defects 
Liability Period will be effectively reduced with the time which the Contractor was in 
culpable delay. The Contractor will accordingly benefit from this situation and when 
the culpable delay is more than the three month Defects Liability Period, the 
provision in relation to the issuing of the Certificate of Practical Completion will 
become inoperable. The three month Defects Liability Period may have expired 
before the actual “Practical Completion” of the Works has been achieved. This may 
in turn affect the issuing of the Final Payment Certificate, causing complete 
confusion. 
The above adverse contractual positions will apply mutatis mutandis to the deeming 
of Practical Completion in terms of Clause 19.6. In terms of this provision the 
Principal Agent is obliged to issue a Certificate of Practical Completion for the Works 
which may be the whole of the Works or a Section of it in terms of Clause 20.0 when 
the Employer takes possession of a portion of the Works. A “portion” is not a defined 
pursuant to the JBCC PBA and can accordingly mean any small part of the Works 
stretching from a storey in a building to be occupied by tenants which is not defined 
as a separate Section to only one room which the Employer may use as an office. 
The conclusive fact in terms of Clause 1.2.5 is that the whole of the Works will be 
deemed to have reached Practical Completion and the Principal Agent is obliged to 
issue a Certificate of Practical Completion on such date. In reality, the Works will not 
have reached Practical Completion, but the contractual consequences of Practical 
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Completion will be triggered as maintained above with some undesirable 
consequences. 
The thesis proposes that in terms of Clause 19.4, Practical Completion should be 
deemed to have occurred on the expiry of the date on which the Principal Agent 
should have issued the list for Practical Completion or the anticipated “date of 
Practical Completion”. It is accordingly proposed that Clause 19.4 be amended as 
follows. 
19.4* Should the principal agent not issue a list for practical completion 
[19.3.1] after the contractor’s notice [19.2.2] and the inspection period 
[19.1.3] or the updated list [19.3.2] within five (5) working days after the 
contractor’s notice requesting a follow up inspection, the contractor shall 
give a further notice to the employer and the principal agent referring 
specifically to the previous notice. Should the principal agent not issue 
such list within five (5) working days of receipt of such further notice, 
practical completion shall be deemed to have been achieved on the 
anticipated date of practical completion as notified in the previous notice 
referred to and the principal agent shall issue the certificate of practical 
completion forthwith. 
This proposition will not only limit the undesirable consequences but it is also in line 
with general principles of contract law where a party is in breach of its obligations. 
The Contractor will be placed in the position he would have been in had the Principal 
Agent complied with his obligations by achieving Practical Completion on the 
anticipated “date of Practical Completion”. Clause 19.4 has the unacceptable result 
of allowing the Contractor to benefit from its own breach and to deprive the Employer 
of penalties, reduce the Defects Liability Period and expose the Employer to the risk 
of damage to the Works in terms of Clause 8 for the Contractor’s delay or breach to 
complete on or before the “date of Practical Completion”. It is my view that the 
current position also holds a high risk for the Principal Agent who fails to issue the 
required list in time. The Employer will undoubtedly have a good prospect of 
succeeding in a claim against the Principal Agent for a neglect of duty causing such 
harm to the Employer. 
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The thesis proposes that Clause 19.6 be amended to make provision for the Parties 
to agree on a new Section as part of their agreement to allow the Employer to take 
possession of a portion of the Works. Such agreement will constitute an amendment 
to the agreement and would need to be in writing and signed by both Parties.64 The 
Principal Agent will not have authority to introduce new Sections to the Works. 
By agreeing to a new Section, the Parties take care of the undesired consequences 
in terms of Penalties, risk and insurance, and the Defects Liability Period which 
applies separately to each Section in terms of Clause 20.1 without compromising 
their rights and obligations. 
The proposed Clause 19.6 will be read with 19.8 as below. 
19.6* Where the employer takes possession of the whole or a portion of the 
works by agreement the agreement will be amended to provide for the 
works to be completed in sections [20.0] and to include all the necessary 
contractual implications, inter alia, the definition of each section, the date 
for practical completion of each section and the penalty applicable for 
each section. 
19.8* Where the works or a part thereof includes mechanical and/or electrical 
systems that are put to use for the convenience of the employer with the 
permission of the contractor, the guarantee period for such systems shall 
commence on the date of practical completion [19.0]. The aforesaid 
actions shall not constitute the taking of possession [19.6; 8.1] and the risk 
and responsibility shall accordingly not pass to the employer. 
The premature issuing of a Certificate of Practical Completion in terms of Clause 
19.6 will have the effect of reducing the Security prematurely in terms of Clause 
11.1.2 and 11.1.3 and even to extinguish it in terms of Clause 11.1.2 where, as 
stated above, the culpable delay was more than three months. 
2.4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated some shortcomings of the JBCC PBA through the 
various inconsistent and conflicting provisions. Without a revision of the provisions 
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 JBCC PBA at page 32. 
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as suggested, the JBCC PBA will continue to lead to unnecessary uncertainty and 
disagreements. 
This chapter illustrates the undesirable consequences that follow from the 
inconsistent use of “date of Practical Completion” and “date for Practical 
Completion”. The effect of such inconsistency is far reaching and affects provisions 
which constitute the root of the contract. 
As discussed, the inconsistencies may compromise the Employer’s ability to rely on 
time barring of the Contractor’s claims. The Contractor may accordingly succeed 
with claims without giving the notices required to warn the Employer or its Agents of 
possible risk events occurring. It deprives the Employer of the opportunity to take 
alternative steps and even to issue Variation Orders to mitigate or avoid the risk. 
The above situation is further exacerbated by the fact that the JBCC PBA does not 
contain a full and final settlement provision at final completion like other standard 
contracts. The lack of any contractual time limitations will therefore mean that the 
Contractor will be entitled to institute claims at any time within the next three year 
period after the cause of action arose as prescribed by the Prescription Act, 68 of 
1969. 
The inconsistency relating to the extension of time or penalty contractual regimen 
may open the possibility for time at large arguments as will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 5. 
The Agreement may be construed to afford the Contractor the right to Preliminaries 
even in situations where its delay to the Construction Period is not caused by a 
Relevant Event or other Employer risk events, but by its own risk events. 
As further illustrated, the uncertainty in the process to achieve Practical Completion 
and the date for achieving same may lead to extremely undesirable situations where 
it will impact on Penalties, Termination, Risk of damage to the Works, lack of 
Insurance and reduction in Security. 
Finally, this chapter proposed amendments to the application provisions to prevent 
the aforesaid consequences and uncertainty from occurring. 
  






The previous chapter illustrates problems that parties to the JBCC PBA may 
encounter because of conflicting provisions and inconsistency in the use of the 
important concepts “date of Practical Completion” and the “date for Practical 
Completion”. It is submitted that even if the amendments proposed to correct the use 
of these concepts in Chapter 2 were to be accepted, the uncertainty around the 
JBCC PBA programming requirements and obligations, including the status of the 
programme, may still cause difficulty and uncertainty. 
It is contended that these problems may be resolved by elevating the status of the 
Programme to the contractual level as opposed to it functioning simply as a 
management tool without contractual significance. However, before analysing the 
legal or contractual significance of a Programme, it is necessary to consider the legal 
literature, case law and other standard form contracts to determine the industry 
perceptions regarding the purpose and status of a construction Programme.  
3.2 Background 
Modern construction, which may involve more than one direct or main contractor, 
specialist subcontractors, suppliers and design consultants require the managed 
interaction and coordination of work processes. The increased complexity on site 
requires a rapid and reliable means of analysing different events and effects, so that 
the process of construction can be managed efficiently. This is usually achieved 
through a properly developed Programme, showing the sequence in which activities 
are intended to be carried out.65 It enables the Principal Agent and the Contractor to 
monitor the progress of the project and assess the delaying effects of any 
compensation event66 that may arise.67  
                                               
65
 Daniel Atkinson ‘Delay and Disruption – The Role of the Programme of Works’ available at 
http://www.atkinson-law.com/library/article.php?id=152 accessed 14 August 2015. 
66
 A compensation event is a term used by the NEC to define Relevant Events. See note 39. 
67
 Mitchell and Trebes op cit note 45 at page 22. 
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A properly developed Programme also enables the Principal Agent to establish the 
time effects of any instruction he may want to give to the Contractor, and also assist 
him to determine when he should issue Construction Information68 necessary for the 
works.69 One of the most important aspects of a Programme is that it provides 
evidence that can be used by the Contractor to prove delays in legal proceedings.70 
In addition, a Programme is relevant for determining a Contractor’s entitlement to 
additional time, entitlement to payment for delay or disruption and payment for 
instructed acceleration.71 For the Employer, the Programme serves to determine his 
right to deduct liquidated damages for a Contractor’s failure to complete works on 
time and his right to terminate a contract for a Contractor’s failure to comply with the 
obligation to progress the works.72 The Employer should also use the Construction 
Programme as a baseline for its Consultants which are appointed in terms of its 
Professional Services Contracts73 to develop a Documentation Programme.74 
3.2.1 South African case law 
In considering South African case law on the issue of Programming there are two 
important cases that are relevant. However, before going into the discussion on 
South African case law it is necessary to discuss the concept of mora as the concept 
provides a clear background of the arguments in the cases and of this thesis. Mora 
refers to when party to a contract fails to perform their obligations on time.75 For a 
debtor to be in mora, performance must be due, the debtor must be aware or 
deemed to be aware of the performance required of them, the fact that it is due, and 
they must have no valid excuse for their failure to perform.76 The concept of mora is 
employed when the consequences of a failure to perform a contractual obligation 
                                               
68
 Define in Clause 1.1 of JBCC PBA as “All information issued by the principal agent and/or agents including 
the contract documents, specifications, drawings, schedules, notices and contract instructions required for 
the execution of the works” 
69
 Mitchell and Trebes op cit note 50 at page 22. 
70
 Mitchell and Trebes op cit note 50 at page 29. 
71
 Roger Gibson ‘Extension of Time and Prolongation Claims’ (2008) at page 42. 
72
 Gibson op cit note 71 at 42. See also KNS case supra note 40. 
73
 The most suitable Professional Services Contract to be used with the JBCC PBA is the PROCSA (Professional 
Consultants Services Agreement Committee) Agreement. 
74
 PROCSA defines Documentation Programme as “A schedule of activities necessary to manage the production 
of construction documentation. 
75
 Phillip C Loots Construction Law and Related Issues (1995) at page 67. 
76
 Legogote Development Co (Pty) Ltd v Delta Trust and Finance Co 1970 (1) SA 584 (T) at 587. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
38 
 
within the agreed time are determined.77 The date for performance may be stipulated 
either expressly or tacitly and there must be certainty as to when it will arrive.78 Thus, 
when the contract fixes the time for performance, mora is said to arise ex re (by the 
transaction) and demand (interpellatio) is not necessary to place the debtor in 
mora.79 The fixed time, figuratively, makes the demand that would otherwise have 
had to be made by the creditor.80 In contrast where the contract does not contain an 
express or tacit stipulation in regard to the date when performance is due, a demand 
(interpellatio) becomes necessary to put the debtor in mora, this is referred to as 
mora ex persona.81 In this case the debtor does not necessarily fall into mora if he or 
she does not perform immediately or within a reasonable time but mora arises only 
upon failure by the debtor to comply with a valid demand by the creditor.82  
In light of the discussion on mora, I now turn to a discussion of the two important 
programming cases in South Africa. 
3.2.1.1 The Ovcon case 
The first case is Ovcon (Pty) Ltd v Administrator, Natal,83 which dealt with the issue 
of an Employer delay when the Contractor’s Programme indicated early completion. 
The facts of the case were that the contract provided for completion of work in fifteen 
months but the Contractor had contemplated completing the works in eleven months. 
This was captured in the Contractor’s progress chart (Programme) as required in the 
bill of quantities and was approved by the Employer.84 During the course of the work 
the Employer through its agents caused certain delays that held up the work and 
caused the Contractor to exceed its planned completion date by three months.85 
Despite the delays, the work was completed within fifteen months, but not within the 
contemplated eleven months.86 
                                               
77
RH Christie ‘The Law of Contract in South Africa’ 5 ed (2006) p 544.  
78








 Scoin Trading supra note 78 at page 6. 
83
 Ovcon (Pty) Ltd v Administrator, Natal 1991 (4) SA 71 (D). 
84




 Ovcon supra note 84 at page 73. 
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The issue before the court was whether the Contractor was entitled to claim in terms 
of the contract, expense and loss caused by the delay. In determining this, Hugo J 
stated: “[i]n the final instance it is the status of the progress chart upon which the 
plaintiff’s case must stand or fall”. This dictum establishes the importance of the 
status of a Programme in establishing the contractual entitlements of a Contractor. 
The Contractor argued that the acceptance by the Employer of the progress chart 
created an obligation on the Employer to do nothing that would prevent the 
completion of the works in the time envisaged by the Programme.87  
In determining the status of the Programme the court considered the wording of the 
contract which stated that “The form, method of setting out, etc, of the chart is to be 
approved by the Director: Works…” Based on this clause Hugo J found that the 
Employer had only approved the form of the Programme and not its content or 
sequence of work and duration of the project.88 The court dismissed the Contractor’s 
contention that the Employer’s acceptance of the Programme was an undertaking 
that it would prepare timeous drawings. The court reasoned that the objective of a 
bill of quantities was to allow the Contractor to price his tender, thus creating an 
obligation on the Contractor to prepare a progress chart and calculate a price in 
terms thereof.  
The court stated further that as a result, the bill of quantities does not create any 
obligations for the Employer and as such the acceptance of the Programme by the 
Employer did not create any obligations for it. The court concluded that the 
Contractor was therefore not entitled to any claim for delays. Additionally, the court 
highlighted that the Contractor’s claim was not one for damages but for expense and 
loss ‘beyond that provided for in or reasonably contemplated by the contract’. The 
court reasoned that the contemplation referred to in the clause is that of the contract 
not the parties with the result that if the Contractor had taken the contemplated 15 
months these expenses would have been incurred in any event.89 
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 Ovcon supra note 84 at page 74. 
88
 Ovcon supra note 84 at page 77. 
89
Ovcon supra note 84at page 78. 
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The significance of the Ovcon case when applying same to the JBCC PBA 
Programming provisions is the following:  
Firstly, it means that a Bill of Quantities even though it is a Contract Document, does 
not expressly or by inference create obligations. If it sought to impose obligations it 
would be a simple matter of stating this in the conditions of contract. The JBCC PBA 
makes use of Preliminaries to purportedly infer obligations in relation to 
Programming and Construction Information to be provided by the Principal Agent. 
The Preliminaries per definition would generally be incorporated in the Agreement by 
the Pricing Document (or Bill of Quantities). From the Ovcon case, it is evident that 
the purported obligations will not be enforceable and would not have any contractual 
status inferring obligations on the Parties. 
Secondly, it can also be inferred from the case that the “date for Practical 
Completion” cannot be amended by the approval of a Programme showing an earlier 
“date of Practical Completion”. These are two distinct concepts, as previously 
demonstrated. This implication is also relevant to the proposition that a time for 
performance cannot be fixed “ex re”, ie by the contract, by approving a Programme. 
Accordingly, in the absence of express terms to the contrary in the conditions of 
contract, the Programme will not have any legal status and will merely serve as a 
management tool without imposing any obligations. 
3.2.1.2 The McAlpine case 
The second South African case that has a bearing on a discussion on the legal 
significance of a Programme is Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal 
Provincial Administration.90 In this case the contractor argued that the Employer was 
in breach of a tacit term of their contract for failing to issue drawings or give 
instructions within a reasonable time after the obligation to do so had arisen. The 
tacit term was formulated as follows: 
“The engineer is obliged to issue such drawings and give such instructions to 
the contractor as may be reasonably required by the contractor in order to 
enable him to execute the works, as defined in the general conditions of the 
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contract. Each such drawing and instruction shall be issued or given, as the 
case may be, within a reasonable time after the obligation arises”.91  
The court, having established the existence of such a term, went on to discuss the 
issue of the time for performance. The court stated:  
“The general rule of law is that contractual obligations for the performance of 
which no definite time is specified are enforceable forthwith; but the rule is 
subject to the qualification that performance cannot be demanded 
unreasonably so as to defeat the objects of the contract or to allow an 
insufficient time for compliance. Thus, for example, in a contract of loan the 
borrower is, in the absence of express provision, allowed a reasonable time 
for repayment to enable him to have some real benefit from the transaction. 
(See generally Mackay v Naylor 1917 T.P.D. 533 at pp. 537–8; Fluxman v 
Brittain 1941 AD 273 at p. 294; Nel v Cloete 1972 (2) SA 150 (AD) at p. 169.)”  
Applying this general rule to the facts of this case, I am of the opinion that the 
obligation of the engineer to furnish drawings and instructions, though prima 
facie exigible forthwith (cf. Mackay v Naylor, supra at p. 539), could validly be 
performed within a reasonable time of the conclusion of the contract. It was 
manifestly the intention of the parties that not all such drawings, etc. would be 
required to be furnished forthwith and an insistence upon this would tend to 
defeat the objects of the contract.  
The determination of a reasonable time in any particular instance would 
depend upon a number of factors such as (the list is not intended to be in any 
way exhaustive) the contractor's programme of work and where the work to 
which the drawing or instruction related fitted into that programme; the actual 
progress of the work; the need of the contractor for reasonable advance 
knowledge of the content of the drawing or the nature of the instruction in 
order to make the necessary preparations and do the necessary pre-planning; 
the knowledge of the engineer as to the contractor's requirements; and 
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whether the drawing or instruction related to the work as originally planned or 
to a variation thereof”.92 
The Employer argued in response that even if there were such a term, the 
Contractor was barred from claiming damages because it had failed to place the 
Employer in mora and had not given timeous notice of its intention to claim relief.93 
The Contractor in turn argued that the principles of mora did not apply to modern 
engineering contracts as they could not have been contemplated by the Roman and 
Roman-Dutch sources on which the doctrine is founded.94 In considering the 
arguments the court had to consider how mora arises under South African law and 
whether it was a prerequisite for a debtor to have been placed in mora by means of 
an interpellatio. The court dismissed the Contractor’s contention that mora did not 
apply to their contract and stated “the principles of our law relating to mora are of 
general application and hold true for all obligations ex contractu.”95 
The court stated further that: 
“On the pleadings the onus was on the plaintiff to establish that the defendant 
failed to issue the required drawings or instructions timeously in each of the 
instances enumerated in annexure E to its further particulars. Under the 
implied term the defendant was obliged to issue drawings and instructions 
timeously, and to that extent the defendant was, in effect, in the position of a 
debtor under the contract. Thus, ex facie the pleadings, the plaintiff's cause of 
action appears to be based on mora debitoris”.96 
Having established that the principles of mora applied in this case the court 
submitted that in a contract where time for performance is not fixed ex re, the debtor 
must be placed in mora by interpellatio before damages can be claimed for non-
timeous performance.97 The court submitted that the position is as follows:  
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“[A] demand is required in order to let mora ex persona arise where a time for 
performance has not been previously stipulated is so obvious that it scarcely 
needs further discussion. The general rule is that, where no time for 
performance has been agreed upon, performance is due immediately on 
conclusion of the contract or as soon thereafter as is reasonably possible 
under the circumstances. Mora does not, however, arise when performance is 
not made forthwith or within a reasonable time – it arises only when the 
debtor, after a demand has been made, is still in default. The same rule 
applies when a time for performance has been stipulated but where it is too 
vague to lead to mora ex re”.98 
The court highlighted further the basic requirements for a demand as a notice which:  
“must state a certain date on or before which the debtor is required to 
perform, and it must make it clear to the debtor that the creditor insists upon 
performance by that date”.99 
It must be emphasised that the notice of demand must be unambiguous. This point 
is clearly brought by the following dictum from the judgment of Wessels JA in Nel v 
Cloete,100 which Trengove J cited with approval:  
“Indien die skuld’eiser stappe wil doen om die skuldenaar in mora te stel, is dit 
’n  vereiste dat hy ’n kennisgewing aan hom rig waarin hy die skuldenaar op 
ondubbelsinnige wyse maan dat hy op of voor ’n bepaalde dag moet presteer. 
Hierdie aanmaning is egter nie op ontbinding van die kontrak gerig nie, maar 
is slegs bedoel om ’n datum vir prestasie van ’n opeisbare vordering met 
sekerheid te bepaal, waar dit in die kontrak nòg uitdruklik nòg stilswyend 
beding is. Waar die tydperk wat gegun is, redelik blyk te wees, verkeer die 
skuldenaar in mora indien hy by verstryking daarvan in gebreke bly. (De Wet 
en Yeats, op. cit., bl. 109.) Tensy andersins in die kontrak bepaal is, kan 
hierdie aanmaning te enige tyd na kontraksluiting aan die skuldenaar gerig 
word, mits die vordering dan opeisbaar is, en ’n redelike tydperk vir vervulling 
toegelaat word.”  
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The court proceeded to state that  
“[a] demand or interpellatio is a call made by the creditor on the debtor to 
perform and serves to fix the time for performance with a sufficient degree of 
precision, where this has not been done in the contract itself, to give rise to 
mora ex persona if performance does not take place by the time mentioned”. 
101 
As a result, the question the court had to answer was whether the Employer had 
been placed in mora by means of a demand in respect of the alleged breaches of 
contract.102 The Contractor submitted that the programme of works submitted to the 
engineer in compliance with the contract as well as the fortnightly, weekly and daily 
programmes subsequently provided had served the purpose and fulfilled the function 
of demands for the drawings and instructions in question.103 
In this regard it was held that:  
“[t]he obvious purpose of such a programme is for the employer and the 
engineer to see that the contractor intends to execute the work at a sufficient 
rate or speed to complete the contract within the allotted time shown in the 
programme. Generally speaking, it is not intended to serve as an interpellatio. 
However, such a construction programme, depending on the details it 
contains and the way in which it is phrased, can fulfil the function of an 
interpellatio, but, in my view, that is not the position in the present 
instance”.104 
In coming to the conclusion that the Programme in this case could not function as an 
interpellation, the court stated:  
"I have come to the conclusion that exh. G cannot be regarded as having 
served the purpose of an interpellatio for the following reasons. It was never 
intended to be an interpellatio. It is also common cause that exh. G was not a 
geographical programme. Both Mr. Pain (vol. 2, p. 99) and Mr. Ovis (vol. 11, 
p. 807) conceded that exh. G does not show where on the road the contractor 
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intended to work, nor is the information, set out in exh. G, specifically related 
to any particular drawing or instruction in respect of any of the items in 
schedule E. Thus it was not possible for the defendant to determine, with 
reference to exh. G, when exactly a particular drawing or instruction in respect 
of a particular item of work would become requisite. Moreover, the evidence 
shows that exh. G was flexible (Pain, vol. 5, p. 353, and Ovis, vol. 11, p. 807) 
and had to be adapted from time to time because variations, weather 
conditions and other unexpected circumstances affected the progress of the 
work from time to time. Thus, exh. G did not fix the time for performance of 
any of the obligations upon which schedule is based, with a sufficient degree 
of precision to satisfy the requirements of an interpellatio”.105 
Although the Contractor managed to succeed on some of his claims, it is submitted 
that these were not successful because the Programme was an interpellatio, but 
rather because the Contractor had provided other notices to the Employer that had 
placed him in mora ex persona. This is apparent from the following statement  
“The evidence shows that in December 1967 Mr. Ross called upon Mr. Evans 
to furnish the new drawings when work was resumed in the new year, and Mr. 
Evans promised to do so, as I have mentioned, by 8 January 1968. Mr. Ross' 
demand for the drawings by the new year and Mr. Evans' undertaking to 
provide them by 8 January 1968 must, in my view, be construed as a demand 
and an undertaking to provide the drawings by a fixed and stipulated date. 
Thus, in this instance, there was an interpellatio and it is common cause that 
the plans and drawings were not provided by the date stipulated”. 
The McAlpine case is therefore authority for the fact that an Employer and its Agents 
are bound to provide Construction Information within a reasonable time after a duty 
to co-operate arises. The general rule is that such a duty arises in relation to the 
original Scope of Work when the contract is entered into and in relation to Variation 
orders when they are issued. This rule is, however, subject to the qualification in 
construction contracts that in determining a reasonable time in any particular 
instance would depend on a number of factors pointed out in McAlpine as including: 
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(i) The sequence of Programme and part of Works relevant to information fits 
into the Programme.  
(iii)  The lead time needed after information is issued…………………..;  
(iv) The actual progress of the Works;  
(v) The original work or Variation Order; 
(vi) The time needed by the Engineering Team to prepare Construction 
Information.  
The general principles and concept of mora applies to modern construction contracts 
hold true for all obligations ex contractu. Where a time for performance is not fixed, 
the debtor must be put in mora by an interpellatio in order that the creditor may rely 
on mora ex persona. A demand is required in order to let mora ex persona arise 
before damages can be claimed for non-timeous performance. The onus is on the 
Contractor to establish that the Employer or its Agents failed to issue the required 
Construction Information timeously. 
The McAlpine case makes it clear furthermore, that if the debtor knows or should 
have known from the circumstances what time is reasonable for performance, it does 
not constitute mora ex re and that to the extent that the decision in Broderick 
Properties Ltd v Rood106 suggested otherwise, it dealt with the remedy of 
cancellation on the basis that “time was of the essence” of the contract and provided 
no authority for the proposition that a claim for damages may be brought without a 
proper demand where no specific time for performance has been fixed.  107 
Notwithstanding McAlpine’s suggestion that a Programme may function as 
interpellatio, it is submitted that it is unlikely that the requirements formulated in 
McAlpine in order for it to do so will ever be met in practice. 
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3.2.1.3 Summary from the cases 
The main difficulty in construing a Programme as interpellatio is its flexibility and the 
need for it to be updated because of changing circumstances. The time for 
performance will have to be adjusted constantly to still be relevant at the time of the 
alleged non-timeous performance in order to claim damages. Where the creditor 
(Contractor) falls in mora the debtor’s (Employer) obligation to perform will be 
relaxed. Accordingly, where the Contractor falls behind schedule, it will need to 
update its Programme in order to establish a new date for performance. It will not, 
however, prevent the Employer from continuously arguing in defence that the 
Contractor was behind schedule and that the time for performance should be 
relaxed, implying that a new date for performance should be demanded. The 
Employer will also be able to argue that the time set for performance is not 
reasonable by relying on the factors used by the courts to determine 
reasonableness. 
3.2.2 Other standard contracts 
The approach of many standard conditions of construction contracts to this issue is 
ambivalent from a legal perspective. It is contended that none of the South African 
CIDB recommended contracts, namely the NEC, FIDIC, GCC and JBCC make 
provision for a Programme to be incorporated as a Contract Document. However, 
McInnis expresses a different view with relation to the status of the Programme 
under the NEC contract.108 He submits that the NEC contract permits parties to 
include the Programme as one of the Contract Documents either upon acceptance of 
the tender or later, when prepared and submitted by the Contractor in the early 
stages of the work.109 
FIDIC Clause 8.3 stipulates that unless the Engineer notifies the Contractor within 21 
days stating the extent to which the Programme does not comply with the contract, 
the Contractor shall proceed in accordance with the Programme and the Employer’s 
Personnel, including the Engineer shall be entitled to rely on the Programme. The 
NEC and GCC require the Contractor to submit a Programme for approval to the 
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Employer’s Agent, either the Project Manager110 or the Engineer.111 Both the JBCC 
and the FIDIC require the Contractor to submit a Programme, but there is no 
requirement for the Principal Agent112 or the Engineer113 to approve it. 
The GCC and FIDIC Conditions of Contract acknowledge the difficulties that may be 
encountered in relying on the Programme as notice of demand or interpellatio to set 
the time for performance ex persona by introducing a separate requirement to do so. 
Clause 1.9 of FIDIC provides as quoted below (own emphasis): 
“The Contractor shall give notice to the Engineer whenever the Works are 
likely to be delayed or disrupted if any necessary drawing or instruction is not 
issued to the Contractor within a particular time, which shall be reasonable. 
The notice shall include details of the necessary drawing or instruction, details 
of why and by when it should be issued, and details of the nature and amount 
of the delay or disruption likely to be suffered if it is late. 
“If the Contractor suffers delay and/or incurs Cost as a result of the failure of 
the Engineer to issue the notified drawing or instruction within a time which is 
reasonable and is specified in the notice with supporting details, the 
Contractor shall give a further notice to the Engineer and shall be entitled 
subject to Sub-Clause 20.1 [Contractor’s Claims] to: 
(a)  An extension of time for any such delay, if completion is or will be 
delayed, under Sub-Clause 8.4 [Extension of Time for Completion], 
and 
(b) Payment of any such Cost plus reasonable profit, which shall be 
included in the Contract Price”. 
After receiving this further notice, the Engineer shall proceed in accordance 
with Sub-Clause 3.5 [Determinations] to agree to determine these matters. 
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However, if and to the extent that the Engineer’s failure was caused by an 
error or delay by the Contractor, including an error in, or delay in the 
submission of, any of the Contractor’s Documents, the Contractor shall not be 
entitled to such extension of time, Cost or profit.” 
The correlation between the above FIDIC Clause 1.9 requirements and those of an 
interpellatio is self-evident, but include the following: 
(i) Details of the necessary drawing or instruction; 
(ii) Details of why and 
(ii) By when it should be issued. 
GCC Clauses 5.9.2 to 5.9.6 provide as follows: 
5.9.2  “The Engineer shall deliver to the Contractor from time to time, during the 
progress of the Works, drawings for construction purposes or instructions 
as shall be necessary for the proper and adequate construction, completion 
and defect correction of the Works. 
5.9.3  The Contractor shall give adequate written notice to the Engineer of any 
requirements additional to that contained in the Scope of Work or drawings, 
which the Contractor may require for the execution of the Works and the 
Engineer shall deliver such instructions and/or drawings to the Contractor. 
5.9.4  The aforesaid instructions and/or drawings referred to in Clause 5.9.3 shall 
be delivered in good time taking the approved programme into account. 
5.9.5  The Contractor shall give effect to and be bound by any drawing or 
instruction given in terms of this Clause and, if such drawing or instruction 
shall require any variation of, addition to, or omission from the Works, 
Clause 6.3 shall apply. 
5.9.6  If by reason of a failure by the Engineer, after his receipt of written notice 
from the Contractor in terms of Clause 5.9.3, to comply in good time with 
the provisions of Clause 5.9.4, the Contractor suffers delay to Practical 
Completion and/or incurs proven additional cost, he shall be entitled to 
make a claim in accordance with Clause 10.1, for which purpose the time 
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limit of 28 days in Clause 10.1.1.1 shall commence to run only from the 
time when the said instructions and/or drawings have actually been 
delivered.” 
Both of these contracts introduce this additional notification requirement which is in 
line with the requirements for an interpellatio. Only after it has been established that 
the Employer fell into mora ex persona for not providing the required Construction 
Information in time, will it constitute a Relevant Event. The Relevant Event will in turn 
trigger the contractual claim procedures in terms of FIDIC Clause 20.1 or GCC 
Clause 10.1 as referred to in the “interpellatio Clauses”. 
Both these contracts therefore, make provision for the additional notices to be issued 
to establish the time for performance for the Employer to provide Construction 
Information. This is on the assumption that the Programme is not sufficient on its 
own to establish a time for performance in order to put the Employer in mora ex 
persona. 
3.3 Current position of the Programme in terms of JBCC PBA  
The common law position is that in the absence of a stipulation that the work must 
be completed by a Contractor by a certain fixed date; the work has only to be 
completed within a reasonable time.114 It is trite law that even where a certain date is 
stipulated, the Contractor is free to change the sequence, duration and timing of 
particular activities. He is, however, obliged to proceed regularly and diligently to 
meet the date as fixed in the contract. 
3.3.1 The Contractor’s obligation to complete the Works 
JBCC amends this common law position by stipulating a “date for Practical 
Completion” in the Contract Data and including a further provision in terms of JBCC 
PBA quoted below (own emphasis): 
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12.2 “The contractor shall:” 
12.2.17 “On being given possession of the site commence the works within ten 
(10) working days and proceed with due diligence, regularity, expedition, 
skill and appropriate resources to bring the works to practical completion 
and final completion.” 
The importance of the obligation to proceed with due diligence and skill is echoed in 
Clause 29.1.2 which affords the Employer the right to terminate the Agreement 
where the Contractor has failed to comply with Clause 12.2.17. Refer to JBCC PBA 
Clause 29.1.2.  
29.1.2 “Proceed with the works [12.2.17] within the period stated [CD]”.  
There is, however, no period stated in the Contract Data as specified in the above 
Clause 29.1.2, although the period of 10 working days is mentioned in Clause 
12.2.17.  
The JBCC therefore attempts to provide the Employer with more control over the 
Contractor than provided by the common law which only obliged the Contractor to 
complete within a reasonable time.115 The Contractor is furthermore obliged to submit 
and maintain a Programme, a Schedule of outstanding Construction Information and 
Progress Reports in terms of Clause 12.2.6 to 8. (Refer to the relevant JBCC PBA 
Clauses below) 
12.2.6 “Prepare and submit to the principal agent within fifteen (15) working 
days of receipt of construction information a programme for the works 
in sufficient detail to enable the principal agent to monitor the progress of 
the works 
12.2.7:  Co-ordinate the programme with subcontractors’ and direct 
contractors’ programmes 
12.2.8:  Regularly update the programme to illustrate progress of the works, and 
revise the programme where the principal agent has revised the date for 
practical completion.” 
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3.3.2 Status of the Programme 
JBCC PBA defines the Programme as: 
1.1 “A diagrammatic representation of the planned execution of units of work or 
activities indicating the dates of commencement and completion prepared 
and maintained by the contractor”.  
However, there is no obligation on the Contractor to comply with the Programme and 
no obligation on the Principal Agent to agree, approve, accept or even comment on 
the Programme as submitted or updated by the Contractor. It is submitted that 
currently, under the JBCC PBA, a Programme cannot and does not have any legal 
significance and does not infer any contractual obligations in the absence of 
agreement by the Parties to amend it. 
In light of the above it is clear that the Employer is not obliged to agree on any times 
for performance or dates to be fixed ex re in terms of its reciprocal obligations to 
provide among, other things outstanding construction information, free issue, appoint 
subcontractors and accept selected subcontractors as per Clause 23. It is the thesis 
position that if the Employer follows this passive approach of not agreeing on any 
Programmes or schedules116 provided by the Contractor, it will be difficult for the 
Contractor to prove entitlements and it will have to issue interpellationes to set times 
for performance ex persona. It will also be difficult for the Contractor to argue that the 
Employer had fallen into mora ex persona (or even mora ex re) on account of a 
failure to because of the following considerations:  
The Agreement is very specific on the procedure to amend the Standard Provisions. 
The Contract Data under “Changes made to JBCC® documentation” on page 9 
states:  
“Note: The amendments contained herein or in the single referenced 
Annexure constitute the only amendments to the standard JBCC Agreement 
that will apply. No other amendments shall be of any force or effect.” 
In addition to the above it is stipulated in the Contract Agreement as follows: 
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“No representations, terms, conditions or warranties not contained in this 
agreement shall be binding on the parties. No agreement or addendum 
varying, adding to, deleting or terminating this agreement including this clause 
shall be effective unless reduced to writing and signed by the parties”.117 
Clause 1.2.1 furthermore states: 
“In this document, unless inconsistent in the context, the words ‘accept, allow, 
appoint, approve, authorise, certify, decide, demand, designate, grant, 
instruct, issue, list, notice, notify, object, record, reduce, refuse, request, 
state’ and their derivatives require such acts to be in writing.” 
It may be open to a Contractor to argue that the Employer is obliged to act in terms 
of a Programme after de facto “approving” same, although the JBCC PBA does not 
require the Employer or its Agent to approve a Programme. 
However, it is not often the Employer itself is involved to act in terms of the 
Agreement. The Employer is represented by a Principal Agent who in terms of 
Clause 6.1 has full authority and obligation to act and bind the Employer in terms of 
the Agreement. However, this authority is qualified as the same clause states that 
the Principal Agent cannot amend the Agreement.118  
The Principal Agent’s authority is only derived from the contract itself.119 Accordingly, 
the JBCC provides the Principal Agent with authority to act and bind the employer 
with regard to approving work,120 ordering additional work,121 determining the value 
of variations to the works,122 extending the construction period,123 determining 
amounts of payment to be made under an interim124 and a final payment 
certificate.125 It is therefore submitted that it will be very unlikely that the Contractor 
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 Contract Agreement at page 32.  
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could succeed to prove any agreement by the Employer or its Principal Agent in 
order to enforce a fixed time for performance as included in a Programme. 
It is therefore contended that the Programme does not have any legal significance 
without the Parties amending the Agreement. This has serious consequences and 
creates uncertainty for both Parties when attempting to rely on purported 
entitlements.126 In the absence of an agreed Programme with contractual 
significance, no time for performance has been fixed, except for that which is 
expressly provided for in the Contract Data, i.e. the “date for Practical Completion” 
and the date for possession of the site. As a result the Parties will have to rely on 
common law and place each other in mora ex persona to enforce timeous 
performance of other obligations. 
3.3.3 Extension of time entitlements  
Perhaps the most important consequence of not having an agreed Programme with 
contractual significance to work from will be the impact it may have on the 
Contractor’s extension of time entitlements. The Contractor’s ability to succeed in 
proving any delays caused by the Relevant Events in terms of Clause 23 will be in 
jeopardy. The onus is on the Contractor to prove inter alia, the late or incorrect 
issuing of Construction Information,127 late supply of free issue,128 late appointment 
of a Subcontractor129 and late acceptance by the Principal Agent or Agents of a 
design undertaken by a selected Subcontractor.130  
There will be no contractual benchmark or agreed date for performance to prove the 
Contractor’s entitlements and it will have to rely on the possibility alluded to in the 
McAlpine131 case that the Programme served as an interpellatio. This will be the 
position even though both Parties knew that a performance would be necessary by a 
certain date in order not to delay the other party. The case of Broderick Properties 
Ltd v Rood132 which supposedly is authority for this proposition was distinguished in 
                                               
126
 Said entitlements will be discussed in more detail below. 
127
 Clause 23.2.5 
128
 Clause 23.2.6 
129
 Clause 23.2.7 
130
 Clause 23.2.8 
131
 McAlpine supra note 90. 
132
 Broderick Properties supra note 106. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
55 
 
the McAlpine133 case on the basis that the requirements for a right of cancellation 
should not be equated to those for the right to claim damages.134 The Contractor will 
have to show that the request for Construction Information, including Construction 
Instructions and drawings, was made at “reasonable times”, meaning the requests 
were made on a date “neither unreasonably distant from nor unreasonably close”135 
to the date on which each item of Construction Information was required.  
It is therefore contended that it will be a daunting and difficult task for the Contractor 
to succeed in its claim on the reliance on a Programme as basis to establish the time 
for performance with reference to the requirements of interpellatio and mora ex 
persona. 
3.3.4 Proof of cause and effect on Critical Path 
Another problem which the Contractor will face in the absence of an agreed 
Programme is to comply with the requirements laid down by Clause 23.6.1* to 3*,136 
which state as follows: 
23.6* Where the contractor requests a revision of the date for practical 
completion the claim shall in respect of each event or circumstance 
separately state: 
23.6.1*  Particulars of such event or circumstance and the relevant clause [23.1-3] 
on which the contractor relies 
23.6.2* The cause and effect of the delaying event or circumstance on the date of 
practical completion, illustrated by the impact and/or a change to the 
critical path on the programme 
23.6.3* The extension period claimed in working days and the calculation thereof 
and the revised date for practical completion based on the extension 
period claimed.” 
                                               
133
 McAlpine supra note 90. 
134
 McAlpine supra note 90 at page 296. 
135
 See London Borough of Merton v Stanley Hugh Leach Ltd (1985) 32 BLR 51 at page 88. 
136
 The thesis illustrates the impact of the absence in Programme based on the proposed amended version of 
Clause 23.6* in order to remove the initial confusion between the “date for Practical Completion” and “date of 
Practical Completion” as previously contended. 
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In terms of the above provisions it is submitted that the Contractor will need to prove 
and submit the following: 
(i)  A Relevant Event137 occurred and provide particulars of it. 
(ii)  State the relevant provisions138 that the Contractor relies on. 
(iii) Provide a “current” Programme139 that was updated and reflects actual 
progress just before the Relevant Event occurred. 
(iv) The current Programme should reflect a critical path140 leading up to an 
anticipated “date of Practical Completion”141 signifying the completion of the 
last activity on the critical path. 
(v) Provide a “claims” Programme illustrating the delaying impact or the cause 
and effect of the Relevant Event or the critical path activities and consequently 
the “date of Practical Completion”. 
(vi) The extension period claimed in working days142 calculated from the planned 
“date of Practical Completion” on the “current” Programme to the delayed 
“date of Practical Completion” on the “claims” Programme. 
(vii) Establish revised “date for Practical Completion”. 
It is submitted that if there is no agreement or a current Programme including the 
critical path and the actual progress to date to form the basis or foundation of a delay 
analysis, it will be difficult for the Contractor to prove the cause and effect of the 
delaying event allegedly entitling them to an extension of time. 
As stated in Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd v The London Borough of Lambeth,143 
the success of determining an extension of time will depend on the foundation, which 
                                               
137
 Clause 23.6 is specific that the Contractor will be prevented from submitting a Global Claim (A Global Claim 
is defined by the SCL Protocol op cit note 19 at page 56 as “one in which a Contractor seeks compensation for a 
group of Employer Risk Events but does not or cannot demonstrate a direct link between the loss incurred and 
the individual Employer Risk Events) in the phrase ‘…the claim shall in respect of each circumstance separately 
…’ ”. 
138
 Clauses 23.1 to 3. 
139






 Clause 23.6.3. 
143
 Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd v The London Borough of Lambeth [2002] (TCC) BLR 288. 
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is a proper Programme including a critical path (if capable of justification and 
substantiation to show its validity and reliability as a contractual starting point), 
maintained and revised to be able to provide a satisfactory and convincing 
demonstration of cause and effect.144 The following important issues to be taken out 
of this judgment are listed below:  
 A proper programme should be maintained during the execution of the works. 
 In determining an extension of time, the 'foundation' should be the original 
programme, and its success will similarly depend on the soundness of its 
revisions on the occurrence of every event, so as to be able to provide a 
satisfactory and convincing demonstration of cause and effect. 
 A valid critical path, or paths, should be established as it, or they, will almost 
certainly change. 
 Concurrent, or parallel, delays should be demonstrated where necessary.  
 Links between trades should be shown. 
3.3.5 The Programme as Contract Document 
While the above discussion deals with one extreme of the spectrum regarding the 
status of a non-approved Programme it is submitted that the other extreme of 
making the Programme a Contract Document is also possible in terms of the JBCC 
PBA. It is submitted that by including the Programme in the list of other documents in 
the Contract Data under B5.0 Contract Documents, will define the Programme as a 
Contract Document. This will have the consequence that all the obligations 
contained in the Programme need to be carried out to the letter. 
The majority in the literature on programming provisions argues that a programme 
should not be made a contract document.145 It is submitted that if a programme is 
made a contract document, the Contractor will on one hand be bound to start and 
finish each and every activity on the dates specified on the programme.146 On the 
other hand, the Employer will be bound to assist the Contractor in carrying out the 
work according to the Programme; in particular the Employer would have to provide 
                                               
144
 Balfour Beatty supra note 144 at para 30. 
145
 See Pickavance op cit note 50, J Roger Knowles 150 Contractual Problems and their Solutions (2005) and 
Binnington and Copeland ‘Status of the Programme’ available at http://www.bca.co.za/article/article-38-
status-of-the-programme/ 
146
 Pickavance op cit note 50 at 223 and Binnington and Copeland op cit note 135. 
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every piece of information timeously so that the Contractor will not be prevented from 
carrying out its programme obligations.147 In both instances, Pickavance submits, 
this will be a breach of contract which leaves it open to the innocent party to 
terminate the contract.148  
This thesis argues that Pickavance’s submission that the innocent party will be 
entitled to terminate is not accurate and is arguably unfounded. At common law, a 
party is only entitled to terminate at contract due to a material breach of contract.149 
Based on this authority it is contended that not every failure to meet a specific date 
on the programme or to provide information will bring an entitlement to terminate the 
contract.  
Knowles,150 in his discussion on the effect of making a Programme a Contract 
Document, submits that to do so would mean the Contractor is required to comply 
with it to the letter and that the flexibility which is key to catching up when progress is 
behind, would thus be lost.151 In support of his contention he refers to the cases 
Yorkshire Water Authority v Sir Alfred McAlpine & Son (Northern) Ltd,152 English 
Industrial Estates Corporation v Kier Construction Ltd and Others,153 and Havant 
Borough Council v South Coast Shipping Company Ltd.154 However, a reading of 
these cases cited above shows that they referred to a method statement that had 
been made a Contract Document with the result that the contractor had an obligation 
to follow it.  
Again, it seems that the warning against inclusion of the Programme as a Contract 
Document is arguably unfounded as the authority relied on for the contention refers 
not to the Programme but to the Method Statement. However, there are other civil 
construction contracts that do require the Method Statement to be part of the 
                                               
147
 Pickavance op cit note 50 at 223. 
148
 Pickavance op cit note 50 at 223. 
149
 See Erasmus v Pienaar 1984 (4) SA 9 (T). 
150




 Yorkshire Water Authority v Sir Alfred McAlpine & Son (Northern) Ltd (1985) 32 BLR 114. 
153
 English Industrial Estates Corporation v Kier Construction Ltd and Others [1991] 56 BLR 93. 
154
 Havant Borough Council v South Coast Shipping Company Ltd [1996] CILL 1146. 
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Programme.155 In this case, when the Programme is made a Contract Document, the 
Method Statement will automatically have the same status. 
It is therefore accepted that including the Method Statement as a Contract Document 
is problematic. As submitted by Pickavance, in the absence of contractual stipulation 
to the contrary, it is up to the Contractor to decide on its method of construction.156 
This contention is confirmed by AMF International v Magnet Bowling.157 Where 
included as a Contract Document, however, a Method Statement will override this 
general principle and required changes to the method specified by the Contractor 
can give rise to variations.158 It is submitted that the warnings against making a 
Method Statement a Contract Document are justified; however, the view that this 
also holds for a Programme as argued by some, is not persuasive.159 
It is submitted that although it may be an acceptable option to make the Programme 
a Contract Document, this would not be compatible with the terms of the JBCC PBA 
provisions without amendments to modify them. One of the main problems is the 
rigidity of the Programme as a Contract Document and the absence of any provision 
for the revision and approval of subsequent updates which are essential for a 
Programme to have the status of a Contract Document. This option will be discussed 
further in the following section. 
3.3.6 Summary of the current position 
The legal nature and function of the Programme under the JBCC PBA does not 
provide legal certainty and does not reflect best practice in managing the 
construction project.  
The times for performance, other than dates expressly incorporated in the 
Agreement by its inclusion in the Contract Data, are not contractually enforceable. 
                                               
155
 For example, the NEC contract. 
156
 Pickavance op cit note 50 at 242. 
157
 AMF International v Magnet Bowling [1968] 1 WLR 1028 where the court stated that an Architect had no 
right to instruct a builder on how to do his work as it is the builder’s right and duty to carry out his building 
operations as he sees fit. 
158
 Pickavance op cit note 50 at 242. Also see Holland Dredging v Dredging and Construction Company (1987) 
37 BLR 1 (CA) where a Contractor’s claim for a variation was approved on the grounds that the Method 
Statement was a contractual document 
159
 See Binnington and Copeland op cit note 145 where it is argued that the same considerations apply with 
regard to submitting a programme and/or a method statement as a contract document. They further state 
that there is no benefit to either party to make a programme or method statement contractual documents. 
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The Contract Data fixes the date for possession of the Site and the date for Practical 
Completion, and a failure to meet them will result in mora ex re (from the 
transaction). However, within the window between these two defined dates, the 
times for performance are left open, and the parties need to establish a time for 
performance ex persona by issuing a demand for performance or an interpellatio.  
As discussed above, it will be a difficult task for a Contractor to discharge its onus 
and of proving an entitlement or a Relevant Event to allow for a revision of the date 
for Practical Completion in terms of Clauses 23.2. The Contractor will need to prove 
that the Employer or his Agents failed to perform the specific obligation timeously. It 
is a daunting task for the Contractor to overcome this first obstacle without the times 
for performance being agreed upon pursuant to a Programme with contractual 
significance in order for mora to result ex re.  
The second obstacle, namely to quantify the effects of the Relevant Event in terms of 
Clause 23.6.2, will be equally difficult to overcome. As discussed above, the current 
construction of the clause leads towards ambiguity, but even based on the proposed 
amendment Clause, will not leave the Contractor without a challenge. The 
Contractor needs to prove a delay caused by a Relevant Event on the date of 
Practical Completion illustrated on the critical path on the current Programme. As 
stated in the Balfour Beatty160 case, the success of determining an extension of time 
will depend on the foundation, which is a proper Programme including a critical path 
(if capable of justification and substantiation to show its validity and reliability as a 
contractual starting point), maintained and revised to be able to provide a 
satisfactory and convincing demonstration of cause and effect.161 
It is therefore submitted that the current JBCC Programme does not fulfil this 
important role and can at best function as a management tool with evidential value in 
performing a retrospective delay analysis and developing an as-built Programme.162  
                                               
160
 Balfour Beatty supra note 144. 
161
 Balfour Beatty supra note 144 at para 30. 
162
 See SCL Protocol op cit note 14 at page 52 which defines an as built programme as “The record of the 
history of the construction project in the form of a programme. The as-built programme does not necessarily 
have any logic links. It can be merely a bar-chart record of the start and end dates of every activity that actually 
took place. ‘As-constructed programme’ has the same meaning.” 
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The current ambivalent legal position of the Programme and the corresponding 
extension of time or Penalty regimen do not only pose a risk for the Contractor who 
believes them to have contractual significance, but also for the Employer who may 
be deprived from levying Penalties. The Contractor may proceed with the contract on 
the belief, as generally is the case in the industry,163 that the Programme establishes 
times for performance and that the Contractor can rely on these to prove a lack of 
Agents’ timeous performance on part of the Employer or Principal in relation to the 
matters as set out above.  
The uncertainty created by a Programme without legal or contractual significance 
may also have a surprisingly negative effect on an Employer who wants to levy 
penalties against the Contractor who has missed the date for Practical Completion. 
There is authority for the argument by a Contractor that time is at large164 in 
situations where it has been deprived of its right of prospective certainty in terms of 
its completion requirements.165 Courts have found in similar situations that time is at 
large and that the Employer is precluded from levying liquidated damages and left 
with the onus of proving actual damages.166 This argument will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 4. 
At worst, the aforesaid uncertainty may continue for a period of three years during 
which any of the Parties are open to declare a disagreement in relation to the above 
possible misconceptions.167 The JBCC PBA does not have any time limit for raising a 
disagreement in terms of Clause 30.1. Either party may give notice of a 
disagreement to the other. Due to this lack of a time limit, it is left to the Prescription 
Act,168 which in sec 11(d) provides that debts generally prescribe after a three year 
period. The Employer or Contractor is accordingly able to raise a disagreement with 
the Agent’s ruling on any claim within the three year prescription period, after which 
the right to a claim will cease. 
                                               
163
 This generalisation comes from personal knowledge from having worked in the Construction Industry for 20 
years. 
164
 Time at large will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
165
 See Hawl-Mac Construction Ltd v District of Campbell River, British Columbia 60 B.L.R. 57. 
166
 Cases will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
167
 For example where a Principal Agent made a ruling in favour of the Contractor based on a Programme 
which the Principal Agent would have incorrectly perceived to introduce fixed times for performance to 
establish late performance in order to effect mora ex re and entitling the Contractor to a claim.  
168
 The Prescription Act 68 of 1969. 
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3.4 Proposed methodology relating to the contractual position of the 
Programme in terms of the JBCC PBA  
The absence of an approved Programme leaves an array of matters open to 
interpretation and creates immense uncertainty which, as submitted above, may lead 
to disputes. From the perspectives of both Parties, it is important to commit to certain 
agreed dates in order to co-operate and not prevent or hinder each other’s 
performance. Further, where the failure of the one party may entitle the other to 
extension of time or compensation or both, it is important to establish the time of 
performance of obligations. 
From this perspective, it is critical for the Contractor to fix the Employer’s or Principal 
Agent’s time for performance contractually without the need to have to prove that it 
complied with the common law requirements to establish the time for performance ex 
persona through the issuing of a letter of demand (interpellatio). The Contractor 
would need to perform a very complex delay analysis process to prove that the 
Employer fell into mora ex persona and this will become even more difficult if the 
Contractor contends that it planned to complete the Works before the date of 
Practical Completion. The challenge in such a case will be to establish the date of 
Practical Completion even before applying any delay analysis. 
This thesis argues that the point of departure in revising the current JBCC PBA 
position of the Programme should be to follow the basic guidelines recommended by 
the Society of Construction Law Delay and Disruption Protocol.169 The SCL also 
recommends a Model Specification Clause170 that may be of assistance in proposing 
amendments to the JBCC PBA. The Protocol recommends that a proper programme 
should be submitted by the contractor and approved by the contract administrator171 
(or principal agent). The programme should show the manner and sequence in 
which the contractor plans to carry out the works.172 While recognising that the form 
of the programme will depend upon the “type and complexity of the project", the 
                                               
169
 SCL Protocol op cit note 14. 
170
 SCL Protocol op cit note 14 at Appendix B. 
171
  The Protocol (see note 1) defines the Contract Administrator as the person responsible for administration 
of the contract, including certifying what extensions of time are due, or what additional costs or loss and 
expense is to be compensated. Depending on the form of contract the person may be referred to by such 
terms as Principal Agent – JBCC, Project Manager – NEC or the Engineer – FIDIC and GCC.  
172
 SCLProtocol (see note 1) Guidance Section 2.2 (page 35) 
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Protocol recommends that it should be prepared in the form of a critical path network 
using commercially available planning software.173  
The Protocol further recommends that, once accepted, the programme should be 
updated electronically at intervals of no longer than a month.174 Each update should 
then be saved, the purpose being "to provide good contemporaneous evidence of 
what happened on the project". This makes a number of assumptions (for example, 
as to the accuracy and veracity of the updates). Although updating programmes 
contemporaneously might well assist project management, in terms of actual 
evidence, there can be no substitute for accurate records of actual progress made 
on a daily, or weekly, basis. Indeed, as the Protocol states elsewhere, the starting 
point for any delay analysis is "to understand what work was carried out and when it 
was carried out".175  
The Protocol envisages that the updated programme will be the main tool for 
determining the duration of the extension time.176 It further envisages that the 
programme will be brought fully up to date prior to the occurrence of a relevant 
employer event and thus enable an accurate assessment of the extent of further time 
required when such an event occurs177.  
The Protocol’s aforesaid propositions were to a great measure confirmed by Judge 
Humphrey Lloyd in the Balfour Beatty178 case. There are some important guidelines 
to be taken out of this judgment, such as:  
 A proper programme should be maintained during the execution of the works.  
 In determining an extension of time, the 'foundation' should be the original 
programme, and its success will similarly depend on the soundness of its 
revisions on the occurrence of every event, so as to be able to provide a 
satisfactory and convincing demonstration of cause and effect. 
 A valid critical path, or paths, should be established as it, or they, will almost 
certainly change.  
                                               
173
 SCL Protocol (see note 1) Guidance Section 2.2.1.1 (page 35) 
174
 SCL Protocol (see note 1) Guidance Section 2.2.1.5 (page 38) 
175
 SCL Protocol op cit note 14 at page41. 
176




 Balfour Beatty op cit note 144. 
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 Concurrent, or parallel, delays should be demonstrated where necessary.  
 Links between trades. 
3.5 Proposed amendments to the JBCC PBA 2014 programming provisions 
The first category of provisions which this thesis argues is in need of amendment 
concerns primary provisions, including the definition of the Programme, the 
obligation to submit it and the requirements relating to the Programme itself. The 
second category is the secondary provisions referring to the Programme and which 
rely on the Programme to establish entitlements and cause and effect (or both) in 
order to quantify delay and damages. 
3.5.1 Primary provisions 
The obligation on the Contractor to prepare and submit a Programme is found in 
Clause 12.2.6 as quoted below. 
12.2.6 “Prepare and submit to the principal agent within fifteen (15) working 
days of receipt of construction information a programme for the works 
in sufficient detail to enable the principal agent to monitor the progress of 
the works”. 
The definition of Programme does not extensively specify the requirements to be 
included. Clause 1.1 defines Programme as below. 
“PROGRAMME: A diagrammatic representation of the planned execution of 
units of work or activities indicating the dates for commencement and 
completion prepared and maintained by the contractor”. 
Therefore, as read with Clause 12.2.6, the purpose of the Programme is merely to 
provide “sufficient details to enable the principal agent to monitor the progress of 
the works”. From the discussion above as to the importance of the contractually 
significant Programme, these provisions are extremely unsatisfactory. 
Furthermore, given the limited purpose and requirement of the Programme, the 
timing requirement for its submission is very vague. Clause 12.2.6 requires that the 
Programme should be submitted “within fifteen (15) working days of receipt of 
construction information…” 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
65 
 
JBCC Clause 1 defines Construction Information as follows (own emphasis): 
“CONSTRUCTION INFORMATION: All information issued by the principal 
agent and/or agents including the contract documents, specifications, 
drawings, schedules, notices and contract instructions required for the 
execution of the works”.  
As contended previously, the definition of Construction Information purportedly 
includes all the information issued and required for the execution of the Works. It is 
difficult to envisage how the receipt of this can trigger the fifteen working days for the 
Programme to be submitted. Construction Information is accordingly used in the 
widest sense to inter alia include all Contract Documents and Contract Instructions. 
Contract Documents are generally defined as the documents drawn up at the 
conclusion of the contract to comprise the entire contract.179 Contract Information will 
be issued during the progress of the Works to, inter alia, populate certain drawings in 
more detail as the designs were developed during the construction. It is therefore 
contended that Construction Information can only have a similar meaning as “As-
built Documentation” which can only be finalised after all the above documentation 
has been issued. 
The following amendments are proposed: 
 PROGRAMME*: A diagrammatic representation of the planned execution 
of units of work or activities indicating the dates for commencement and 
completion prepared and maintained by the contractor. The programme 
will be developed in the software as stated in the contract data or 
otherwise agreed by the parties. When reference is made to submit or 
update the programme it will mean in a soft and hard copy of it. The latest 
programme uploaded by the principal agent will supersede the previous 
programme. 
  
                                               
179
 Clause 1.1 defines contract documents as “This agreement, the contract drawings, the priced document 
and other identified documents [CD]”. 
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12.2.6*  The contractor shall prepare and submit to the principal agent within 
fifteen (15) working days of the receipt of the contract documents an 
initial programme in the detail as required below of carrying out the Works 
in order to meet the date for practical completion.  
12.2.6.1* the initial programme and all subsequent updated programmes shall 
show the sequence of the execution of the works, the reciprocal 
obligations of the employer and the other information as including but not 
limited to: 
12.2.6.1.1* the date of possession of the site and/or access to any part of the site 
or works [23.2.1] 
12.2.6.1.2* outstanding construction information [23.2.5] 
12.2.6.1.3* Free issue [23.2.6] 
12.2.6.1.4*  the appointments of subcontractors [23.2.7] 
12.2.6.1.5*  acceptance of designs of selected subcontractors [23.2.8] 
12.2.6.1.6*  date for practical completion as a whole or dates for practical 
completion in sections [CD] 
12.2.6.1.7* date of practical completion as a whole or dates of practical 
completion in sections [19.3.3] 
12.2.6.1.8*  critical path and float 
12.2.6.1.9* health and safety requirements  
12.2.6.1.10* approvals by authorities, employer or agents  
12.2.6.1.11* all contractual notices issued and claims submitted [23.0; 26.0]  
12.2.6.2*  The contractor shall program the works by taking full cognisance and 
should comply with any programming requirements in relation to, inter 
alia sequencing, key dates, milestones, restrictions or constraints as 
included in the contract data. 
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12.2.6.3*  The principal agent shall, within five (5) working days after the 
contractor has submitted an initial or updated programme, approve 
and agree on the specific dates for performance by the employer 
included in such programme or, rejecting same with reasons and 
instruct the contractor to amend such programme. Reasons for 
rejecting a programme are inter alia that it is not in accordance with 
the agreement or does not reflect the actual progress. The principal 
agent’s failure to approve or reject with reasons the submitted 
programme,  
12.2.6.3.1* shall, in the event of the submitted programme being an adjusted 
programme, be deemed to have been approved; and 
12.2.6.3.2* shall, in the event of the submitted programme being an initial 
programme, not be deemed to constitute approval. However, the 
contractor shall have the right to suspend the works [6.4]  
12.2.6.4*  The programme shall be subject to review on a monthly basis. The 
contractor shall deliver to the principal agent an updated 
programme reflecting actual progress and updated dates in 
accordance with [12.2.6.1], even though it may reflect that the planned 
date(s) of practical completion will be later than the corresponding 
date(s) for practical completion. The fact that the contractor may be 
in culpable delay does not relieve him from submitting an updated 
programme every month, and in addition; 
12.2.6.4.1* when a specific event or circumstance occurs which may cause a delay 
to the date of practical completion [23.6.2]; 
12.2.6.4.2* when a specific event or circumstance occur which may cause 
expense and/or loss or both [26.5]; 
12.2.6.4.3* with each claim [23.6.2; 26.5]; and 
12.2.6.4.4* after each assessment or ruling [23.7; 26,7] 
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12.2.6.5* where the parties fail to reach agreement on an updated programme 
within a further five (5) working days after the principal agent’s 
rejection of a programme [12.2.6.3], the programme shall be deemed 
to be a dispute [30.2] and referred to adjudication [30.6] 
These proposed increased obligations in relation to the Programming requirements 
inevitably impose more management and functions responsibility, resources and as 
a consequence cost. However, these proactive risk management functions are 
beneficial during the initial planning stage of the contract when the ability to influence 
risk is high and the cost relating low compared to the construction stage where the 
ability to influence risk is low and the cost high. During the initial stage risk can be 
mitigated or even avoided, but during the actual construction stage, claims need to 
be submitted and if rejected other expensive legal processes would need to be 
provided. As a result following this proactive programming or risk management 
process is more cost effective than employing claim consultants to perform 
retrospective delay analysis in order to prepare an as-built Programme in preparation 
for a claim. 
3.5.2 Secondary provisions 
The secondary provisions which rely on the Programme to establish entitlements 
and cause and effect or both in order to quantify delays should be amended. The 
time for performance should be contractually agreed on initially in the first 
Programme and thereafter revised in each updated Programme, without the need to 
rely on the common law position to prove mora ex persona.  
This proposal entails that the approved and agreed Programme will determine which 
obligations need to be fulfilled and at what time. The time for performance will 
accordingly be fixed and agreed on by the Parties in terms of each updated and 
agreed Programme. The Clause 23.2 Contractor entitlements for a revision of the 
date of Practical Completion and adjustment of the Contract Value will be revised 
accordingly. The Contractor’s entitlements under Clause 23.2 for the Employer’s 
failure to perform timeously will specifically be conditional to the time for performance 
set by the Programme.  
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3.5.3 Amendments to Clause 23.2 provisions 
The Clause 23.2 provisions need the following amendments to provide clarity in 
general and in order to unambiguously secure the Contractor’s entitlement based on 
the failure by the Employer to comply with its obligations as agreed in the 
Programme. 
23.2  “The contractor is entitled to a revision of the date for practical 
completion by the principal agent with an adjustment to the contract 
value [26.0], for a delay to practical completion caused by one or more of 
the following events: 
23.2.1 Delayed possession of the site [12.1.6]” 
The above Clause 23.2.1 dealing with late possession of the site should be amended 
to read as below. 
23.2.1*  Delayed possession of the site [sic 12.1.7]180 and/or access to any part of 
the site or works in terms of the programme  
This Clause needs modification to make provision for the case where the scope of 
works specifies that the Contractor will be afforded limited access at different time 
periods. This may be due to the Works being executed in different Sections. Direct 
Contractors may need to complete certain Works and hand over parts thereof at 
different times before the Contractor can execute the Works, Approvals to execute 
the Works may be forthcoming for certain parts at different time periods. 
The current Clause 23.2.3 dealing with Contract Instructions, which reads: 
23.2.3 “contract instructions [17.1-2] not occasioned by the contractor’s 
default” 
should be amended to read: 
23.2.3*:  contract instructions [17.1-2; 17.1.13] not occasioned by the contractor’s 
default 
                                               
180
 Clause 23.2.1 erroneously refers to [12.1.6] while the correct reference should be [12.1.7]. 
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Clause 23.2.3 should also include additional works executed through the Contract 
Instructions to execute budgetary allowances, prime cost amounts and provisional 
sums where adequate provision was not made in the Programme, hence the 
inclusion of a reference to [12.1.13]. The Contractor should make assumptions in its 
Programme to allow for the aforesaid items and be entitled to a revision of the date 
for Practical Completion and adjustment to the Contract Value in the event of these 
proving to be different from the assumption. 
The current Clause 23.2.5 dealing with late and incorrect Construction Information, 
reading: 
23.2.5 “Late or incorrect issue of construction information [5.5; 6.4; 13.2.3; 
17.1.1-2] 
should be amended as follows: 
23.2.5*  Incorrect issue of construction information and the late issue of 
outstanding construction information in terms of the programme [12.2.8; 
13.2.3; 17.1.1-2; 17.1.13].  
This clause reflects two different scenarios. The first scenario is the late issue of 
outstanding Construction Information in terms of the Programme. The second 
scenario is the incorrect issue of Construction Information where the mistake leads 
to a delay. The impact of the variation order itself is covered under Clause 23.2.3, 
but if it includes incorrect Construction Information, it needs to be covered under 
Clause 23.2.5 
The addition of Clause 17.1.13 is proposed as reference to include Construction 
Instructions to execute budgetary allowances, prime cost amounts and provision of 
sums. 
The current Clause 23.2.5, however, omits a reference to Clause 12.2.8 which, as 
stated previously, deals with the Contractor’s submission of outstanding information 
This is one of the major causes of delay in construction contracts and should 
accordingly be included. 
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It is further submitted that an entitlement to extension of time in the event of a delay 
caused by a breach in terms of Clause 6.4, of any Agent to act in terms of the 
Agreement, should be claimed through Clause 23.2.13: “suspension of the works”. 
Clause 6.4 should therefore be removed from the references contained in Clause 
23.2.5. 
The current Clause 23.2.6 dealing with Free Issue, reading: 
23.2.6 “Late supply of free issue, materials and goods for which the employer is 
responsible [12.1.11]”  
should be amended as follows: 
23.2.6* Late supply of free issue in terms of the agreed programme [12.1.12] 
Free issue is defined in the contract as “Materials and goods provided at no cost to 
the contractor by the employer for inclusion in the works whether stored on or off 
site or in transit [CD]”.  
Clause 23.2.6 should be amended not to repeat “materials and goods” as this is 
not additional to “free issue” but included in it. The Employer is also responsible for 
this and the reference to Clause 12.1.11 is also incorrect, it should refer to Clause 
12.1.12. 
Clause 23.2.7 refers to the “agreed Programme” which does not actually exist in 
terms of the JBCC PBA. However, the Clause is fully compatible with the proposed 
amendments which make provision for an “agreed Programme” as proposed here.  
The current Clause 23.2.8 should be amended as follows to include reference to the 
agreed Programme:  
23.2.8* Late acceptance in terms of the agreed programme by the principal 
agent and/or agents of a design undertaken by a selected subcontractor 
where the contractor’s obligations have been met 
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Clause 23.3 makes provision for “further circumstances” or Relevant Events that 
have not been included specifically under Clause 23.1 or 2. The Clause reads:  
23.3 “Further circumstances for which the contractor may be entitled to a 
revision of the date for practical completion and an adjustment of the 
contract value are delays to practical completion due to any other cause 
beyond the contractor’s reasonable control that could not have reasonably 
been anticipated and provided for. The principal agent shall adjust the 
contract value where such delay is due to the employer and/or agents…” 
This Clause is, however, not properly drafted. It should provide for an entitlement to 
a revision of the date for Practical Completion for any Relevant Event “beyond the 
Contractor’s reasonable control and could not have reasonably been anticipated or 
prepared for”. These include Neutral and Employer Risk Events which are not 
specifically included in Clauses 23.1 and 23.2 respectively. The adjustment to the 
Contract Value should only be applicable to the Clause 23.2: Type of Relevant Event 
or Employer Risk Events caused by the Employer and his Agents or both of them. It 
is not certain what is envisaged by the open ended portion and it is recommended 
that it be amended to read “Employer and/or Agent’s default”. 
Clause 23.2 should be amended to state the following: 
23.3* Further circumstances for which the contractor may be entitled to a 
revision of the date for practical completion are delays to practical 
completion due to any other cause beyond the contractor's reasonable 
control that could not have reasonably been anticipated and provided for. 
The contractor is entitled to an adjustment to the contract value [26.9.4] 
where such delay is caused by the default or prevention act of the 
employer and/or agents 
Clause 23.6.2 needs modification to ensure that the agreed Programme can be 
efficiently used for determining the cause and effect of an event once it has been 
established that it is in fact a Relevant Event in terms of Clause 23. 
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Clause 23.6.2 should be amended to state:  
23.6.2* The cause and effect of the delaying event or circumstance on the 
anticipated date of practical completion, where appropriate, illustrated by 
the impact and/or a change to the critical path on the updated and 
approved programme 
The onus will accordingly be on the Contractor to prove that the Relevant Event has 
delayed the “date of Practical Completion” (construction completion date) as agreed 
in the Programme. The amended definition of Programme accepts that the 
Programme is the last updated and approved Programme as agreed by the Parties 
in terms of Clause 12.2.6.4*. Therefore, the contractual starting point is clearly 
defined and not in dispute as might have been the case with the JBCC PBA. 
3.6 Conclusion 
The above amendments will assist the Parties to assess and determine the 
entitlement to a revision of the “date for Practical Completion” and to quantify the 
claim by proving cause and effect by utilising the Programme as a legal instrument 
and not merely a management tool. The Contractor will accordingly be relieved from 
the onerous task of proving that the Employer was placed in mora ex persona to 
establish non-timeous performance. The proposed amendments to the Programming 
provisions of JBCC PBA 2014 have as the main objective to introduce a scheme of 
contractual provisions to expressly supersede the common law provisions. The 
scheme provisions also have the objective to improve, clarify and reflect best 
practices and are premised in the following:  
(i) The updated Programme should reasonably represent the actual progress in 
site. 
(ii) The remainder of the Programme should reflect the same activities, logic of 
pre and post decessors, sequence and critical path of the previous approved 
Programme. 
(iii) The updated Programme should indicate the impact of any delays in the 
period from the previous update. 
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(iv)  It should accompany a Report including the details of all above delaying 
events. 
It should also be noted that the lack of an approved Programme does not only affect 
the Contractor. It also affects the Employer’s ability to prove certain damages or loss 
which he may incur due to the Contractor’s default or failure to meet certain defined 
dates in the Programme.  
As a result, it is of cardinal importance to introduce the above amendments to afford 
the Programme contractual significance. The contract should not be a “Contract 
Document” which is static and has the effect of each activity introducing a 
contractual obligation. It should be a legal instrument with a dynamic nature, capable 
of being updated and which only confers obligations on the Parties to the extent 
specifically provided in the Conditions of Contract. The Contractor should be 
required to provide a Programme as a contractual deliverable complying with the 
specific contractual requirements including the fixing of time for performance of the 
reciprocal obligations of the Parties to facilitate co-operation and to prevent 
hindrance or delay. It should be approved or rejected by the Employer’s Agent who 
should be authorised by the Agreement to do so, in order to agree and fix on the 
respective times for performance and fix same. 
The Programme should be updated regularly as agreed, and when a delaying event 
occurs, it should show the impact of same.  
If the Parties cannot agree on the revised Programme, they should give notice of a 








TIME AT LARGE 
4.1 Introduction 
This thesis argued in the previous chapters that because of uncertainty and 
misconceptions in the industry and the fact that Programmes lack legal or 
contractual significance create a vacuum in relation to the JBCC PBA extension of 
time mechanism which may cause confusion and lead to disputes. This 
interpretational ambiguity and uncertainty furthermore opens the possibility for the 
application of the Time at Large concept. 
The “Time at large” concept often features in contractors’ claims in England. 
Although as far as back as 1928, a Contractor succeeded with an application to 
strike out penalties on the basis of the “Prevention Principle”, this concept is 
relatively unfamiliar in the South African industry.181  
The expression ‘Time at Large’ indicates that a claimant believes that for one reason 
or another there is no enforceable date for the completion of the works.182 Therefore, 
because there is no date from which it can be calculated, the Employer’s right to 
liquidated damages is defeated.183 On this basis the Contractor’s obligation is to 
complete the works within a reasonable time.184 If the Contractor does not complete 
within such a reasonable time, the Employer may recover its losses as general 
damages at common law.185  
Before pursuing “Time at Large”-type arguments, it is necessary to consider the 
substantive law which is applicable to the contract in question.186 It is the thesis 
objective to determine whether there are legal principles on which similar legal 
outcomes can be reached in terms of South African law. The circumstances in which 
the Employer will be prevented from levying Penalties are discussed below. 
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 Kelly and Hingle’s Trustees v Union Government (Minister of Public Works) 1928 TPD 272. 
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 Keith Pickavance and Wendy MacLaughlin ‘A little of Time at Large: Proof of a Reasonable Time to Complete 








 John Bellhouse and Paul Cowen ‘Common Law “Time at Large” Arguments in a Civil Law Context’ 
Construction Law Journal Issue 8 (2007) at page 2. 
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“Time at Large” and the “Prevention Principle” are sometimes used or referred to as 
equivalent concepts. What they have in common is that both embody considerations 
which may result in the Employer being prevented from levying Penalties and the 
Contractor being exonerated therefrom. The “Prevention Principle”, however, is a 
narrower concept. Where the Employer or Agent through an “act of prevention” 
prevents the Contractor from performing, Time is rendered “at Large” in the absence 
of a provision entitling the Employer or his Agent to extend the date from which 
Penalties are exacted. The Contractor’s obligation to complete the works within the 
specified time is lost and it will be exonerated from Penalties.  
The “Prevention Principle” is one of a number of situations that may render the time 
for completion “at large”. The Employer may also be prevented from levying 
Penalties in situations where the Penalty Provisions are defective or not clearly or 
unambiguously defined which will result in the Employer becoming ineligible to exact 
Penalties.  
4.2 The Prevention Principle 
The “Prevention Principle” will apply where a Contractor is delayed by an Employer’s 
act of prevention and where the contract has no mechanism for extending the 
contractual completion dateIn such case the Employer will not be able to enforce 
Penalties on account of the Contractor’s failure to meet the contractual completion 
date.  
4.2.1 English authority 
The approach of the English courts187 in relation to the “Prevention Principle” was 
summarised in Group Five Building Ltd v Minister of Community Development188 as 
follows: 
"1 A contractor is bound to complete the work by the date stipulated in the 
contract for its completion. If he fails to do so he will be liable, if so agreed, for 
liquidated damages to the employer. 
                                               
187
 See Holme v Guppy (1838) 3 M. & W. 387 (150 E.R. 1195); Russel v Sa Da Bandeira (Viscount) (1862) 13 C.B. 
(NS) 149; James v St Johns College Oxford (1870) L.R. 6 Q.B.115; Dodd v Churton [1897] 1 Q.B. 562; Wells v 
Army & Navy Co-Operative Society [1902] 86 L.T. 764; Trollope & Colls Ltd v Northwest Metropolitan Regional 
Hospital GLC [1982] 1 W.L.R. 794 (HL); Percy Bilton Ltd v GLC [1982] 1 W.L.R. 794, HL. 
188
 Group Five Building Ltd v Minister of Community Development 1993 (3) SA 629 (A) at 650 C. 
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2 The employer will not, however, be entitled to liquidated damages if by his act 
or omission he prevented the contractor from completing the contract by the 
agreed date. As it was put by Vaughan Williams LJ in Wells' case supra at 
354: 
'[I]n the contract one finds the time limited within which the builder is to do this 
work. That means, not only that he is to do it within that time, but it means 
also that he is to have that time within which to do it.' 
Any conduct on the part of the employer or his agent, whether authorised (for 
example, the issue of variation or suspension orders) or wrongful (for 
example, the failure to deliver the building site or plans or instructions by an 
agreed date), exonerates the contractor from completing the contract by the 
contractual completion date. Time then becomes, as it is sometimes stated, at 
large. The work must then be completed within a reasonable time. 
3 The qualification of proposition 1 by proposition 2 is itself subject to the further 
qualification that the latter must yield to the express terms of the contract. One 
such express term would be the authority granted to a contractor to apply for 
an extension of time within which to complete the work, for example, where 
variation orders are issued or extra work is ordered which delay its 
completion. 
4 But where the extension clause lists specific grounds on which the contractor 
may ask for an extension of time and adds the words 'or other causes beyond 
the contractor's control' the latter phrase must be interpreted narrowly and 
eiusdem generis with the preceding categories. Wrongful conduct of the 
employer which caused delay would in particular be excluded, at any rate 
when, in terms of other provisions in the contract, the decision about extra 
time rests with the employer himself and is final (for otherwise, if not excluded, 
the employer becomes arbiter of, and gains an advantage from, his own 
wrong). Proposition 3 accordingly does not apply and proposition 2 does: 
consequently the employer would not be entitled to enforce a claim for 
liquidated damages."189 
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 Group Five supra note 188 at 650. 
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The “Prevention Principle” has long been a part of English law. One of its earliest 
recorded cases in which it was applied in the construction field was in the first half of 
the 19th century in the case of Holme v Guppy.190 In that case, the work was due to 
be completed within a specified time and liquidated damages were payable if the 
work was not completed in that time. However, there was no contractual provision for 
an extension of time of the date for completion. The work was subsequently delayed, 
by among other things the employer giving late possession and by the activities of 
others employed directly by him (commonly referred to as direct contractors). It was 
held that the employer's act of prevention excused the contractor from performing in 
accordance with the time constraints in the contract and therefore the contractor was 
not liable to pay liquidated damages.  
A series of cases followed in terms of which the decision in Holme v Guppy191 was 
upheld and applied.192 In Hansen and Schrader v Deare193 reference was made to 
this case as follows; 
"The case of Holme v Guppy is founded on principles of law common to the 
Roman-Dutch, the Civil, and the English law. If a man by his own act prevents 
the performance of what another has stipulated to perform, he cannot take 
advantage of his own wrong."  
In another case, Trollope & Colls Ltd v North West Metropolitan Regional Hospital 
Board,194 this legal principle was approved in the following passage from Lord 
Denning M.R. in the Court of Appeal: 
"...It is well settled that in building contracts – and in other contracts too – 
when there is a stipulation for work to be done in a limited time, if one party by 
his conduct – it may be quite legitimate conduct, such as ordering extra work 
– renders it impossible or impracticable for the other party to do his work 
within the stipulated time, then the one whose conduct caused the trouble can 
                                               
190




 The Court of Appeal in Dodd v Churton supra note 187 which was itself upheld by the House of Lords in 
Trollope & Colls supra note 177. 
193
 Hansen and Schrader v Deare (3 EDC 36). 
194
 Trollope & Colls supra note 177. 
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no longer insist upon strict adherence to the time stated. He cannot claim any 
penalties or liquidated damages for non-completion in that time."  
In the English case of Wells v Army and Navy Co-operative Society,195 a Contractor 
undertook to erect a building within a year unless delayed by alterations, 
subcontractors, strikes, or other causes beyond the Contractor’s control. There was 
an Extension of Time Clause in relation to which the decision of the Employer’s 
directors would be final and there was provision for Liquidated and Ascertained 
Damages if the Contractor failed to complete within a time considered reasonable by 
the directors. There was a one year delay and the directors allowed a three month 
extension of time for delays caused by subcontractors, but the main contractor 
contended that this was insufficient as there had also been delays due to late 
possession of site, late plans and alterations. The Court held that, on the evidence, 
there was substance in all these complaints, but it was impossible to say to what 
extent each one cause contributed to the delay, but held that the words, “other 
causes beyond the contractor’s control” could not include other prevention acts of 
not supplying plans or drawings in due time and not giving possession with the result 
that time was “at large” and Liquidated and Ascertained Damages could not be 
deducted. 
The Wells decision was followed in Peak Construction (Liverpool) Ltd v McKinney 
Foundation Ltd.196 In this case, the Employer issued a contract containing an 
Extension of Time clause that included “additions to the Works, strikes, force 
majeure, or other unavoidable circumstances”. As the main Contractor was about to 
erect some columns, their bases, which had been erected by Sub-contractors, were 
found to be defective, leading to a suspension of work and a reconsideration of the 
design. The Sub-contractor suggested remedial measures which were swiftly 
approved by the Engineer but there was an inordinate delay on the part of the 
Employer in instructing the remedial work. The Employer then sought to deduct 
Liquidated and Ascertained Damages for the entire period between suspension and 
recommencement. The Court held that, since the Employer was responsible for part 
of the suspension and the circumstances were not covered by the Extension of Time 
Clause, the Liquidated and Ascertained Damages could no longer be invoked and 
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 Wells case supra note 187. 
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the Employer was left to recover at common law such damages as he could prove 
over a reasonable time. Salmon J. at page 121 stated as follows: 
“If the failure to complete on time is due to the fault of both the Employer and 
the Contractor, in my view the [Liquidated and Ascertained Damages] Clause 
does not bite. I cannot see how, in the ordinary course, the Employer can 
insist on compliance with a Condition if it is partly his own fault that it cannot 
be fulfilled... I consider that ... the Employer, in the circumstances postulated, 
is left to his ordinary remedy; that is to say, to recover such damages as he 
can prove flow from the Contractor's breach... The Liquidated and Ascertained 
Damages and Extension of Time Clauses in printed forms of contract must be 
construed strictly contra proferentem. If the Employer wishes to recover 
Liquidated and Ascertained Damages for a failure by the Contractors to 
complete on time in spite of the fact that some of the delay is due to the 
Employer's own fault or Breach of Contract, any Extension of Time Clause 
should provide, expressly or by implication, for an extension on account of 
such fault or breach on the part of the Employer.” 
4.2.2 South African authority 
In the Group Five case Judge Nienaber analysed the applicable English cases by 
reducing them to four Propositions. The four Propositions include competing legal 
principles which qualify one other in some instances. The Propositions and their 
interactions with one another are summarised below and will be hereinafter be 
referred to as the “Proposition Matrix” 
Proposition 1 – Penalty 
The general rule is that a Contractor is bound to complete the Works within a fixed 
period, which expiry signifies a fixed date. When the Contractor fails to complete the 
Works within this fixed period or before this fixed date, the Contractor falls into mora 
ex re and, if so agreed, will be liable for Penalties. 
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Proposition 2 – Prevention Act 
An exception to the above general rule is that if the Employer prevents the 
Contractor from completing the Works on a fixed date time will become at large. The 
Contractor will be exonerated from completing on the fixed date and the provision  
regarding Penalties will become inoperative. The qualification of Proposition 1 by 
Proposition 2 is subject to a further qualification by Proposition 3 
 
Proposition 3 – Extension of Time 
Proposition 2 must yield to the express terms of the Contract. One such express 
term may be where the Contractor is entitled to an extension of time and the 
Engineer has the jurisdiction to fix a new date for completion. 
Proposition 3 is subject to the contract being properly drafted in terms of the rules 
laid down by Proposition 4, otherwise Proposition 3 will not apply and Proposition 2 
would apply. 
Proposition 4 – Restrictive Interpretation 
The onus will be on the Employer to frame the Extension of Time or Penalty 
Regimen in terms favourable to himself and will not be entitled to have its terms 
stretched against the Contractor in order to cover a contingency for which he has 
omitted to make express provision. 
4.2.2.1 Kelly and Hingle’s Trustees v Union Government 
In Kelly and Hingle’s it was held that “the words ‘other causes beyond the 
contractor’s control’ in clause 17 did not include delay caused by the building owner 
ordering alterations or additions under clause 3, that engineer therefore had no 
jurisdiction under clause 17 to assess delay occasioned by such causes, and that 
immediately it was proved to the Court that any such delay had occasioned the 
provision regarding liquidated damages became wholly inoperative, in as much as 
the building owner had by his own act prevented the completion of the building within 
the time provided in the contract.”197 
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This ruling is analysed by the “Proposition Matrix” as follows: 
Proposition 1 – Penalty 
The contract made provision for Penalties and had a fixed period for completion of 
24 months. 
Clause 17 “…. the said works shall be commenced and proceeded with, with all due 
diligence to the satisfaction of the engineer, and the whole shall be completed within 
twenty-four calendar months from the date of handing over the site.” 
Clause 18 “….Time shall be considered as the essence of the contract. If, therefore, 
the contractor fails to . . . complete the works in compliance with the preceding 
clause and in the manner therein stated" the building owner shall have the right "to 
allow the contractor . . . to proceed with the works and to deduct the sum of £25 per 
day for every day on which the completion of the works may be in arrear under 
clause 17.” 
Proposition 1 (the general rule) was qualified by Proposition 2 (exception to the 
general rule) stating the following: 
Proposition 2 – Prevention Act 
The Employer issued variation orders which were authorised under Clause 3, but 
which prevented the Contractor from completing on the initially fixed date for 
completion. 
Clause 3: “…without invalidating the contract, the engineer shall have the right, by 
varying the drawings, specification, and schedule of quantities, to increase or 
decrease the quantities of any item or items or to omit any item or items or to insert 
any additional item or items…” 
The qualification of Proposition 1 by Proposition 2 was subject to a further 
qualification by Proposition 3 (express provision for extension of time) in terms of 
which Proposition 2 must yield subject to the condition that Proposition 3 is properly 
drafted.  
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Proposition 3 – Extension of Time 
The contract contained the following extension of time provision: 
Clause 17: “….If the works should be delayed by reason of special inclement 
weather, combinations or strikes of workmen, or other causes beyond the 
contractor's control, the contractor must afford proof to the satisfaction of the 
engineer, whose decision as to whether extra time shall be allowed or not is final." 
However, Proposition 3 was further subject to Proposition 4 which requires that the 
Extension of Time provisions be properly drafted without any ambiguity and 
expressly authorise the engineer to revise the contractual completion date. 
Proposition 4 – Restrictive Interpretation 
In casu, the court held that “On this interpretation of the words – "other causes 
beyond the contractors' control" – the engineer has no jurisdiction under clause 17 to 
assess delay caused by the action of the building owner in ordering extras; that 
contingency is, therefore, not covered by any provision of the penalty clause, and, as 
soon as it is established that delay was caused by such action, the penalty clause 
ceases to apply, for the contractor will in that case have been deprived, owing to the 
delay caused by the execution of extra works, of part of the given period allowed (in 
this case twenty-four months from the 10th September, 1923 – the date of handing 
over the site), for the completion of the building and the clause makes no provision 
for the proportionate lengthening of that original period, or for the substitution of 
some other period, in such an eventuality. (vide Holme v Guppy, and Dodd v 
Churton, supra)”.198 
Proposition 3 accordingly did not apply and Proposition 2 applied, therefore 
rendering time at large and exonerating the Contractor from Penalties. 
4.2.2.2 Group Five Building Ltd v Minister of Community Development 
Notwithstanding the above ruling, Nienaber JA in Group Five Building Ltd v Minister 
of Community Development199 expressed doubt, albeit obiter, whether the concept of 
“time at large” is consonant with South African law. It was held that an alleged tacit 
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term could not co-exist with a contradictory express term of the contract. The 
Plaintiff’s case was founded on the premises that the express completion date was 
overtaken by a contrary tacit term that the time and date for completion would no 
longer apply and that it was accordingly entitled to damages for the overrun period. 
It is, however, contended that this conclusion in the Group Five judgment is 
distinguishable from the “Prevention Principle” issue. Group Five did not involve an 
application by the Contractor to be exonerated from Penalties. The plaintiff alleged 
that the “completion of the works was delayed beyond the extended date for 
completion by reason of breaches of contract or other acts of delay by the defendant 
which fell outside the scope of the powers of extension allowed to the engineer by 
clause 17(ii) of the contract.”200  
The plaintiff relied on three categories201 of alleged breach by the defendant: 
1. Unauthorised suspension of the works 
2. Delayed issue of variation orders which allegedly might have delayed 
completing the works by or after the extended completion date; 
3. The issue of variation orders which disrupted the progress of the works.  
 “The plaintiff attributes the delay to completion on the defendant (or its employees or 
agents). It alleges that without the interventions, the work would have been 
completed on the programmed date for completion (14 December 1984) which was 
well in advance of the extended contractual completion date. Such interventions by 
way of late variation orders and instructions and unauthorised suspension orders are 
alleged to constitute breaches of contract by the defendant and if not at the very 
least fall outside the ambit of clause 17(ii) of the conditions of contract which is the 
clause providing for extension of time.”202  
Central to all the Contractor’s claims was the proposition that the works had to be 
completed within a reasonable time as the contractual completion date had ceased 
to be of application: 
                                               
200
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“According to counsel the proposition was drafted into the present contract as 
an implied term in the sense of 'a standardised one, amounting to a rule of 
law  …' (per Corbett AJA in Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal 
Provincial Administration (supra at 532G)). The rule of law, so it was 
submitted, is derived from some English building cases (Holme v Guppy 
(1838) 3 M & W 387 (150 ER 1195); Russell v Sa da Bandeira (Viscount) 
(1862) 13 CB (NS) 149; Jones v St John's College, Oxford (1870) LR 6 QB 
115; Dodd v Churton [1897] 1 QB 562; Wells v Army & Navy Co-operative 
Society [1902] 86 LT 764 (Hudson's Building Contracts 4th ed at 346; Trollope 
& Colls Ltd v North West Metropolitan Regional Hospital Board [1973] 1 WLR 
601 (HL) ([1973] 2 All ER 260); Percy Bilton Ltd v Greater London Council 
[1982] 1 WLR 794 (HL) ([1982] 2 All ER 623), which have been echoed in 
some South African ones (Hansen and Schrader v Deare (1883) 3 EDC 36; 
Barker v Townsend (1903) 24 NLR 145 and, noticeably, Kelly and Hingle's 
Trustees v Union Government (Minister of Public Works) 1928 TPD 272).”203 
 It is important to note that as pointed out above, the plaintiff in this case is not, of 
course, facing a claim for liquidated damages. The plaintiff is merely using the 
interpretational rules applicable to time at large cases to argue that the extension of 
time claim did not cover the events delaying him and that it could therefore not be an 
embarrassment to its claim for damages. 
The real issue therefore did not turn on Proposition 2, but was whether Proposition 4 
was sound, but overridden by Proposition 3. The case revolved purely on a matter of 
interpretation and does not fit into the “Proposition Matrix” involving the competing 
principles of levying Penalties, Prevention acts, Extension of Time provisions as well 
as interpretational issues.  
It is therefore contended that the Group Five case must be distinguished and should 
not be cited as authority in relation to the “Prevention Principle”. The Contractor 
attempted to circumvent an express provision of the contract, including preconditions 
for a claim for damages. It is trite law that a party may not revert to the common law 
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or any supposed tacit term in order to bypass or circumvent the express provisions 
of a contract.204 
In casu the onus of proof should revert to the Contractor to prove on a balance of 
probabilities that the contractual Extension of Time provision, Clause 17, did not 
cover the alleged delaying event. Proposition 4, laying down the rules for Restrictive 
Interpretation in relation to the “Prevention Principle” – in which case the onus is on 
the Employer to properly draft the Extension of Time Clauses in order to preserve its 
right to levy Penalties – should therefore not apply in the present case. When 
interpreted outside of the “Proposition Matrix” and in the absence of Penalties being 
applicable, Proposition 4 should not have the same impact on Proposition 3. The 
Judge distinguishes the present case from decisions governing the application of 
Penalty Clauses and the rules taken into account in the interpretation of thereof. 
Therefore, the judge did not only find that the plaintiff’s arguments were partly 
unconvincing, but also that the principles for applying a restrictive interpretation did 
not apply for inter alia the following reasons205: 
(i) The extension of time clause provided expressly for the very eventuality which 
the plaintiff alleged occurred. The plaintiff chose not to apply for an extension 
of time; 
(ii) The extension of time clause was not ambiguous; 
(iii) The Employer would not become judge in his own cause. The decision was 
not final, however, and could be referred to a court of law; 
(iv) The Employer was not in default. The alleged “wrong” was permitted and 
contemplated by the contract and 
(v) The plaintiff’s case was founded and pleaded on the premise that an implied 
term had the effect that an express term providing for a completion date be 
disregarded. An implied term cannot, however, co-exist with a contradictory 
express term. 
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4.2.3 “Time at Large”, the “Prevention Principle” and the “Ineligibility of 
Penalties” under South African law 
From the analysis of the Group Five case it is evident that the legal principles and 
ratio of the case cannot determine the applicability of the “Prevention Principle”, 
“Time at Large” and the general ineligibility to levy Penalties in South Africa. 
Therefore, the legal criticisms alleging that these principles are not consistent with 
South African law are unfounded and the matter remains at least uncertain. In order 
for the thesis to analyse and evaluate the applicability of the “Prevention Principle” 
and “Time at Large” in South African law, the relevant legal principles from cases will 
be categorised and included in a “Proposition Matrix” as proposed below. 
4.2.3.1 Proposition 1 – Penalty 
The general rule is that a Contractor is bound to complete the works within a fixed 
period. The contract period will begin to run from the commencement date and 
expire on the fixed date for completion (also defined as a contractual completion 
date). When the Contractor fails to complete the works by this fixed date, the 
Contractor falls into mora ex re and, if so agreed, will be liable for Penalties. 
Penalties are governed by the Conventional Penalties Act206 which stipulates in 
sections 1 and 3: 
1 “Stipulations for penalties in case of breach of contract to be enforceable 
(1) “A stipulation, hereinafter referred to as a penalty stipulation, whereby it 
is provided that any person shall, in respect of an act or omission in 
conflict with a contractual obligation, be liable to pay a sum of money or 
to deliver or perform anything for the benefit of any other person, herein 
after referred to as a creditor, either by way of a penalty or as liquidated 
damages, shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be capable of 
being enforced in any competent court.” 
(2) “Any sum of money for the payment of which or anything for the 
delivery or performance of which a person may so become liable, is in 
this Act referred to as a penalty” (own emphasis). 
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3 “Reduction of excessive penalty 
“If upon the hearing of a claim for a penalty, it appears to the court that such 
penalty is out of proportion to the prejudice suffered by the creditor by reason 
of the act or omission in respect of which the penalty was stipulated, the court 
may reduce the penalty to such extent as it may consider equitable in the 
circumstances: Provided that in determining the extent of such prejudice the 
court shall take into consideration not only the creditor’s proprietary interest, 
but every other rightful interest which may be affected by the act or omission 
in question” (own emphasis). 
4.2.3.2 Proposition 2 – Prevention Act 
An exception to the above general rule of Proposition 1 is that if the Employer 
prevents the Contractor from completing the Works on a date fixed by the contract 
(ex re), the Contractor will be exonerated from completing on the fixed date and the 
provision regarding Penalties will become inoperative. There will no longer be a fixed 
date in the Contract and the time will become “at large”. 
In the Wells case207 Vaugh Williams LJ stated as follows: “In the contract one finds 
the time limited within which the builder is to do his work. That means, not only that 
he has to do it within that time, but it means also that he is to have that time within 
which to do it.”208 Most standard contracts contain express terms which provide for 
the time for performance and the scope of the works to be performed.  
In the case Alyne Bingham Price v Horace Mann Life Insurance Company209 it was 
stated that this maxim of English law is well entrenched and defines an extent of time 
a party to a contract has before the other party (i.e owner) would be able to exercise 
its remedies for late performance.210 This is the ‘window of opportunity’ in which the 
contractor can perform without consequence.211 It is the period that the owner must 
allow the Contractor for completion and as such the contractor has the legal right to 
this time.212 It would be unreasonable to arrive at an interpretation of a contract 
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 Wells case supra note 187 at page 354. 
209
 Alyne Bingham Price v Horace Mann Life Insurance Company, 590 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). 
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where the employer is the drafter of the contract which stipulates that it contains a 
penalty provision for lateness and then the employer itself can increase the scope of 
the work without increasing the time for performance. The same proposition will 
apply if the employer unilaterally reduced the time for performance by for example 
handing over the site to the contractor late without extending the contract completion 
date or not providing the contractor with a right to claim extension of time. 
In the Kelly and Hingle’s case it was found that the court was not entitled to deduct 
the total time saved from the time lost because the Penalty provision became wholly 
inoperative.213 The contract did not make provision for a proportionate lengthening of 
the contract period.214 
In Hansen and Schrader v Deare,215 the court refers to the Holme and Guppy216 
case as follows: "The case of Holme v Guppy is founded on principles of law 
common to the Roman-Dutch, the Civil, and the English law. If a man by his own act 
prevents the performance of what another has stipulated to perform, he cannot take 
advantage of his own wrong." 
Kelly and Hingle’s217 is authority for the principle that if an Employer impacts on the 
time required to complete the work, he is thereby disentitled to claim Penalties for 
non-completion provided for by the contract because an unreasonable burden would 
be imposed on the Contractor. 
Nienaber JA expressed reservations regarding aspects of Proposition 2 in so far as 
South African law is concerned in the following terms in the Group Five case: 
“When parties agree that a contract is to be implemented by a fixed date, 
conduct by the employer which is authorised by the contract (for example, 
issuing variation orders, ordering extra work) surely cannot alter or nullify the 
agreed date for completion. It is for that very reason that building contracts 
nowadays almost invariably contain express provisions making allowance for 
extensions of time. When, on the other hand, the conduct of the employer is 
unlawful (and constitutes a breach of contract) the position may be different, 
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for it stands to reason that a debtor is excused from performing an obligation 
on time if his creditor wrongfully prevented him from doing so (cf Van der 
Merwe, Van Huyssteen and Others Contract at 271). So, for example, it has 
been held that a building owner cannot enforce a penalty clause if the delay 
complained of was caused by his or his agent's default (cf Hansen and 
Schrader v Deare (supra at 45); Cullinan v The Bettelheim Building Co (1890) 
3 SAR 235; Hendricks and Soeker v Atkins (1903) 20 SC 310). The 
contractor, in addition, will retain his common-law remedies, especially his 
claim for damages, unless this is expressly excluded.”218  
Although Nienaber JA expressed reservation about certain aspects of Proposition 2, 
it seems that he is in agreement with the principle that the Employer will not be able 
to enforce a Penalty clause where he himself is unlawfully delaying the Contractor or 
effectively in breach of contract. 
It seems that the reservations were pertaining to the situation where the employer’s 
“prevention act” was authorised by the contract. The learned judge was of the view 
that lawful conduct such as the issuing of variation orders or the ordering of extra 
work could not alter or nullify the agreed date for completion or in this context, set 
time at large.219 
The position of the above proposition is indeed not certain under South African law, 
but some arguments that may be put forward by a Contractor in an attempt to be 
relieved from Penalties may include the argument that the Employer was estopped 
from relying on the Penalty provision. The Contractor may also attempt to argue that 
the Employer unilaterally, through the conduct of his agent, waived its right to 
Penalties. 
However, it is contended that the application area of the aforesaid scenario is very 
limited in terms of the JBCC PBA. Most of the potential “prevention acts” which are 
authorised by the contract are covered by the provisions entitling the Contractor to 
extension of time and should accordingly not pose any real problems or threats for 
the Employer in relation to being deprived from levying Penalties. 
                                               
218
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It may also be argued that conduct which is authorised, that is; the issuing of 
Variation Orders is not per se unlawful but once it impacts on the Contractor’s 
express right to the extent of time available to perform the works, it may become 
unlawful.220 An example may be where the Employer has the right in terms of the 
contract to issue or vary the scope of work to be included in a provisional sum, but it 
will become a breach of contract when the information is issued late in terms of the 
Programme. 
In the event that a party has failed to perform timeously, that party is said to be in 
mora according to Roman-Dutch law. However, for a party to be in mora, there are 
requirements to be met. These include that the performance has to be due, the party 
(debtor) must be aware of the performance required of it and the fact that it is due 
and it must have no valid excuse for its non-performance. Whether the performance 
is due will depend on the contract specifying a fixed or determined time for 
performance. If the time for performance is fixed or determined in the contract itself, 
then failure to comply with it will result in mora and the latter is said to arise ex re 
(from the transaction).221 Accordingly, he (the debtor) will be in breach of his 
contractual obligations, mora debitoris. On the other hand, when the contract does 
not state a time for performance, performance must be rendered within a reasonable 
time, failing which the innocent party must place the defaulting party in mora by a 
proper notice to this effect.222 
Mora debitoris or a so-called negative malperformance therefore occurs where a 
contractor fails to complete the works within the time for performance.  
For the purposes of this thesis, it is also important to note that as a result of the 
nature of the construction contract as reciprocal, the employer, can in its capacity as 
creditor, also be guilty of breach in the form of mora creditoris in the event that it fails 
to co-operate with the debtor (contractor) to enable it to perform. 223  
                                               
220
 See Patrick M.M Lane ‘Disruption and Delay: Fair Entitlement and Regulation of Risk’ Construction Law 
Journal (2006) at page 4 where he refers to the English case of Southern Foundries (1926) v Shirlaw [1940] A.C 
701 as being authoritative in holding the position that it is a positive rule of contract that conduct of either the 
promissor, or promise which prevents the other from performing is itself in breach of contract. 
221
 P.C Loots op cit note 75at page 67. 
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A leading decision in this regard is that of Martin Harris & Seuns Ovs (Edms) Bpk V 
Qwa Qwa Regeringsdiens224 where it was held:  
“Mora creditoris kom te pas waar die skuldenaar nie sonder die medewerking 
van die skuldeiser kan presteer nie. Vir die bestaan van mora creditoris is dit 
nodig dat die skuldeiser deur die skuldenaar opgeroep of aangespreek moet 
word om die verlangde medewerking te verleen. (’n Sodanige oproep is egter 
nie nodig waar óf die ooreenkoms óf die skuldeiser self ’n tyd vir prestasie 
deur die skuldenaar – en dus ’n tyd vir medewerking deur die skuldeiser – 
voorgeskryf het nie).” 
For the purposes of this thesis the concept of mora creditoris finds application in the 
construction context where the contractor’s performance as debtor is dependent on 
the performance of the employer as creditor and in particular the latter’s duty to co-
operate to enable the contractor to comply with its obligations. Thus, if the employer 
fails to perform its obligations and that causes a delay to the contractor’s completion 
of the works, mora creditoris can occur. An example of this will be where the 
Employer does not supply the construction information to the contractor to enable 
him to proceed with the works. Mora may exist ex re if a predetermined time is set 
for the supply of such information. However, mora creditoris may come about where 
there is not merely a failure to perform by the employer, but the employer actively 
prevents or hinders the performance of the contractor.  
In the case where a contractor fails to complete the works by the specified time as a 
result of the failure of the Employer to co-operate, the law, on the authority of 
Erasmus v Pienaar,225 dictates that a debtor and a creditor cannot simultaneously be 
in mora and that mora debitoris on the part of the contractor is cured or terminated 
when the creditor fails to co-operate or prevents performance by the debtor.  
The following passage in Erasmus v Pienaar,226 sheds light on this aspect of the 
effects of mora creditoris and how it correlates with the consequence of time being at 
large under English law: 
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“Mora creditoris het tot gevolg dat die skuldenaar se aanspreeklikheid in 
verskeie opsigte verslap word.” (Sien De Wet en Yeats Kontraktereg en 
Handelsreg 4de uitg op 169–170 en sake daar aangehaal en De Villiers (op 
cit op 207 ev).) De Wet en Yeats (op cit op 169), met ’n beroep op D 
50.17.173.2 ("Unicuique qua mora nocet") en Voet 22.1.28 ("De caetero mora 
regulariter soli nocet, non alteri"), verduidelik hierdie verslapping op die basis 
"dat iemand se mora net homself behoort te benadeel en nie sy teenparty of 
selfs ’n  derde nie”. 
De Villiers (op cit op 209) verduidelik dit op dieselfde basis: 
“As die verbintenis egter heeltemal onveranderd, en in sy volle strengheid, 
sou bly voortbestaan na die intrede van mora creditoris totdat dit uiteindelik 
die skuldeiser sou pas om sy toepaslike medewerkingshandeling te verrig, 
sou van die skuldenaar meer geverg word as wat hy verplig is om te doen. As 
die verbintenis so onveranderd sou bly voortbestaan, sou die skuldeiser 
homself ten koste van die skuldenaar kon bevoordeel terwyl debet neutri sua 
frustratio prodesse (D 17.1.37), en die grondbeginsel in verband met mora as 
vorm van kontrakbreuk unicuique sua mora nocet is. 
“Mora debitoris het die gevolg dat die verpligtinge van die skuldenaar ’n 
verhoging en uitbreiding ondergaan. By mora creditoris geld die 
teenoorgestelde. Terwyl die verbintenis as gevolg van mora debitoris stywer 
aangetrek word, word dit na die intrede van mora creditoris slapper.” 
The above passage indicates that the effect of mora creditoris, is that the obligation 
of the debtor is relaxed. In Kelly and Hingle’s it was stated that where the engineer 
had no jurisdiction to assess the delay caused by the action of the building owner, 
“the contingency is therefore not covered by any provision of the penalty clause, and, 
as soon as it is established that delay was caused by such action, the penalty clause 
ceases to apply, for the contractor will in that case have been deprived, owing to the 
delay caused by the execution of extra works, of part of the given period allowed (in 
this case twenty-four months from 10 September 1923 – the date of handing over 
the site), for the completion of the building and the clause makes no provision for the 
proportionate lengthening of that original period, or for the substitution of some other 
period, in such an eventuality.” Accordingly, the fixed date for completion cannot 
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exist where there is no mechanism in the contract to establish a new date for 
completion, to the extent of the delay and time will become at large. 
It is evident from the above authorities that the engineer does not have any 
jurisdiction in the absence of an extension of time clause to proportionally lengthen 
the contractual period in order to preserve the Employer’s right to Penalties. It may 
be argued that the Conventional Penalties Act227 makes provision for such 
eventuality by allowing the Penalty to be reduced in proportion to the prejudice 
suffered. In other words the Penalty will be reduced to the extent that the delay is 
caused by the Employer. 
However, by considering the Conventional Penalties Act,228 the conclusion must be 
drawn that it is only the court’s jurisdiction to possibly reduce such Penalty. It is 
contended that the application area of the Penalties Act should not be extended to 
be included as a qualifying factor in the proposed “Proposition Matrix”. 
It is therefore the submission of this thesis that the application of Proposition 2 is 
consonant with the applicable South African legal principles not only where the 
Contractor’s progress has been delayed due to the default of the Employer or its 
Agents but also any other act or omission impacting on the Contractor’s express 
right to a certain amount of time to perform the works. The Contractor will be able to 
argue that the fixed completion date has become inoperable, could be disregarded 
and time became at large.  
The authority for the “Time at Large” argument is, however, not founded solely on 
the “Prevention Principle”. In England the “Prevention Principle” is the implied term 
which was defined in the Holme v Guppy case as “[i]f a man by his own act prevents 
the performance of what another has stipulated to perform, he cannot take 
advantage of his own wrong”. 
In light of the Group Five decision that a tacit term cannot co-exist with a 
contradictory express one should the “prevention Principle” should find application in 
South Africa on another basis. 
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The application of Proposition 2 in South Africa should therefore be based on the 
notion that the Contractor has an express right to complete a certain Scope of Works 
within a certain time period. When the Employer unilaterally impacts on this right 
without a contractual mechanism (from the transaction) to fix a new date for 
completion (ex re), time will be at large. 
This Proposition 2 may, however, be qualified by Proposition 3, which is subject to 
Proposition 4, as will be further discussed hereunder. 
4.2.3.3 Proposition 3 – Extension of Time 
Proposition 1 is the general rule that the Employer is entitled to levy a penalty 
payable by the Contractor for late completion. Proposition 1 is, however, qualified by 
Proposition 2, as an exception to the general rule, where the delay was caused by 
an Employer’s act of prevention.  
The qualification of Proposition 1 by Proposition 2 is, however, subject to a further 
qualification by Proposition 3, in terms of which Proposition 2 must yield to the 
express terms of the Contract. 
The important consideration in relation to Proposition 3 is whether the contract has 
an extension of time mechanism to fix a new date for completion ex re (by the 
transaction) where the previous fixed date became inoperable because of the 
operation of Proposition 2. 
Proposition 3 will have the effect of preventing the fixed date for completion from 
being disregarded and time becoming “at large”. The operation and effectiveness of 
Proposition 3 will depend on the interpretation of the scope of the “prevention acts’ 
covered. 
The applicability of Proposition 3 will further depend on the jurisdiction of the 
Contract Administrator229 or Principal Agent (in terms of the JBCC PBA). A Contract 
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Administrator derives its authority to act from the contract itself and does not have 
jurisdiction to fix a new date for completion where such authority is not specifically 
derived from the contract. 
In determining the ambit of the provisions covering the extension of time events and 
the jurisdiction of the Contract Administrator, Proposition 3 will be subject to the rules 
governing the interpretation of Proposition 4. 
4.2.3.4 Proposition 4 – Restrictive interpretation 
As stated above Proposition 4 introduces the rules of interpretation which will apply 
to determine the ambit of Proposition 3 and whether same has the effect of qualifying 
Proposition 2. 
Therefore if it is determined that, in terms of Proposition 3 the contractual extension 
of time mechanism allows for a new date for completion to be fixed in the event of an 
Employer Risk Event,230 the penalty provision will remain enforceable. 
Accordingly if the extension of time clause, subject to a Proposition 4 restrictive 
interpretation, is wide enough to cover the circumstances or the event causing the 
delay and affording the Contract Administrator authority to apply it, a new date for 
completion will be fixed. Penalties will remain enforceable if the Contractor fails to 
complete the works by the revised new date for completion. 
However, if it is found that in terms of Proposition 3, the contractual extension of time 
mechanism does not on a proper interpretation include the specific event or 
circumstance or does not provide the Contract Administrator with the jurisdiction to 
fix a new date for completion ex re (by the transaction), time will become “at large” 
and the Penalty provision will become inoperable. 
Therefore, because the applicability of Proposition 3 will have a direct impact on the 
enforceability of Penalties in relation to Proposition 1, it will be subject to restrictive 
interpretational rules as laid down by the various authorities as applicable to Penalty 
provisions. 
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In the Kelly and Hingle’s case, Judge Feetham enunciated the following: “I have to 
take into account the rules which are recognised in, or may be deduced from, that 
case and the earlier decisions as governing the application of penalty clauses in 
building contracts; namely, (1) that where a building owner by his own act prevents 
performance he is not, apart from special stipulation, entitled to take advantage of 
his own wrong; (2) that where the terms of the contract are ambiguous, and one 
construction would lead to an unreasonable result the Court will be unwilling to adopt 
that construction: (3) that an unreasonable burden is cast upon the contractor where 
the work to be done in a limited time subject to a penalty clause may be increased at 
the will of the building owner; and (4) that, where the terms of the contract are such 
as in effect to make the building owner judge in his own cause on questions of delay, 
such provisions are to receive a restrictive interpretation.”231 
In the Wells case, the decision given by Judge Wright, and confirmed by the court of 
appeal is clear authority in favour of a restrictive interpretation on the basis of the 
euisdem generis rule. 
Judge Salmon in Peak Construction (Liverpool) Ltd v McKinney Foundations Ltd232 
stated the following: “The Liquidated and Ascertained Damages and Extension of 
Time Clauses in printed forms of contract must be construed strictly contra 
proferentem. If the Employer wishes to recover Liquidated and Ascertained 
Damages for a failure by the Contractors to complete on time in spite of the fact that 
some of the delay is due to the Employer's own fault or Breach of Contract, any 
Extension of Time Clause should provide, expressly or by implication, for an 
extension on account of such fault or breach on the part of the Employer."  
“No doubt it may be said against this restrictive construction that in such a contract 
as this variations involving additions to the works as described in the contract 
documents, and consequent delay in completion, must have been anticipated by 
both parties as highly probable if not inevitable, and that it can never have been the 
intention of the building owner that the penalty clause should cease to apply 
immediately such a variation was made; but I must take the words of the penalty 
clause as actually framed as expressing the intention of the parties, and if the 
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building owner, who is responsible for framing the conditions of contract, has failed 
to frame the penalty clause in terms as favourable to himself as he intended, he is 
not entitled to have its terms stretched against the contractor in order to cover a 
contingency for which he has omitted to make express provision; in case of 
ambiguity the rule in favour of construction contra preferentem clearly applies to 
such a penalty clause.”233  
In Dodd v Churton,234 it was stated that “one rule of construction with regard to 
contracts is that when the terms of a contract are ambiguous and one construction 
would lead to an unreasonable result, the Court will be unwilling to adopt that 
construction.”235 
It is evident from the authorities cited above that there is a general rule of 
construction that, subject to any express term to the contrary, ambiguities, or 
inconsistencies, in contract documents should be construed contra proferentem, and 
particularly with regard to liquidated damages and penalty clauses. The above 
quotes have been included to illustrate the operation of the restrictive interpretation 
rules more conveniently. It is uncertain whether the South African courts would follow 
this restrictive interpretation or opt for the purposive interpretational approach. 
However, a Contractor may still argue that the restrictive interpretation rules are 
applicable in South Africa. It is therefore pertinent that these gaps that allow for 
potential dispute be closed. 
In one of the more recent cases in England, Multiplex Constructions (UK) v 
Honeywell Control Systems Ltd,236 Jackson, J derived three propositions regarding 
the prevention principle of which the last is particularly relevant to the interpretation 
of extension of time clauses, which stated: 
(i) “Actions by the employer which are perfectly legitimate under a construction 
contract may still be characterised as prevention, if those actions cause delay 
beyond the contractual completion date. 
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(ii) Acts of prevention by an employer do not set time at large, if the contract 
provides for extension of time in respect of those events. 
(iii) In so far as the extension of time clause is ambiguous, it should be construed 
in favour of the contractor” 
The English case of Bramall & Ogden Limited v Sheffield City Council237 involved a 
contractor being contracted by a local authority to construct a number of dwelling 
houses. This contract was based on the terms of JCT Standard Form of Building 
Contract (1963 edn), which is the standard building contract in use in the United 
Kingdom. The contract had provision for sectional completion but in the present case 
provided for a single completion date for the whole of the works. The contract 
appendix, however, defined the rate of liquidated damages as based on the number 
of houses which remained “uncompleted”. Thus, the contract linked the rate of 
liquidated damages to sectional completion of the works. It was held that the 
sectional basis of the liquidated damages was inconsistent with the non-sectional 
definition of the Works and the completion date. Thus, the fact that the contract did 
not provide for completion of the houses individually or in sections, but for the works 
as a whole meant that the liquidated damages provision was inconsistent with the 
provisions for the completion of the whole of the works as stated in the contract. On 
this basis, and guided by the principle that liquidated damages provisions should be 
construed strictly and contra proferentem, the court held that this inconsistency 
between the relevant contractual provisions had the effect of preventing the 
employer from enforcing his rights to liquidated damages against the contractor. 
Another illustration of this area of application is found in the case of Arnhold & Co Ltd 
v Attorney General of Hong Kong,238 in which the contractor undertook to execute 
works for the construction of sewerage works. There were substantial delays in 
completion of the works and the government sought to deduct liquidated damages. 
The liquidated damages provision provided for a minimum and a maximum amount 
to be deductible per day. A clause provided that above the minimum the sum should 
vary in accordance with the extent to which any part of the works was capable of 
occupation or use by the government. The contractor sought a declaration that the 
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government was not legally entitled to the deduction because the term containing the 
right to liquidated damages was void for uncertainty. In this case the uncertainty in 
the contract also gave rise to the findings of the court that the liquidated damages 
provision was void for uncertainty, because there was nothing within the contract 
documents which indicated what principles governed the liquidated damages being 
fixed as a figure between the maximum and the minimum figures or how such fixing 
should be done. 
In considering the above authorities on the interpretational rules as envisaged by 
Proposition 4 based on “Penalty Clauses”, the earlier cases also referred to the 
“Extension of Time Clauses” as “Penalty Clauses” and used same interchangeably. 
In Kelly and Hingle’s Judge Feetham referred to the interpretation of the words 
“….other causes beyond the contractor’s control” in terms of Clause 17 and ruled 
that “ordering extras” was not covered by the “Penalty Clause”. Generally the 
aforesaid clause will be referred to as an “Extension of Time Clause” and not a 
“Penalty Clause”. 
Based on the “Proposition Matrix”, the interpretation rules included in Proposition 4 
were specifically in relation to Proposition 3 which includes the “Extension of Time 
Clauses”. 
However, in the two modern cases, Bramall239 and Arnhold,240 quoted above, the 
interpretational rules also relate to the Liquidated Damages or Penalty provisions or 
“Penalty Clauses” itself. It should therefore be concluded that these add another 
dimension to the “Proposition Matrix”. The two cases cited above provide authority 
that not only Proposition 3 (extension of time) is subject to Proposition 4 (Restrictive 
Interpretation), but Proposition 1 (Penalty) should also be subject to Proposition 4 in 
determining whether it is enforceable. 
It is therefore concluded that the “Proposition Matrix” should be expanded not only to 
include the possible scenarios of applying to the “Prevention Principle” or “Time at 
Large” but to also cover the wider concept of “Ineligibility of Penalties”. The legal 
issue to be determined in the above scenario is then whether the Employer is 
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entitled to levy Penalties or the Employer is deprived of such right and must claim 
and prove damages. 
Therefore the starting point should always be Proposition 1. However, even before 
considering whether Proposition 1 should be qualified by Proposition 2, same should 
be subject to Proposition 4. The Penalty provision itself should be construed strictly 
and contra proferentem and any inconsistency between the relevant contractual 
provisions should have the effect of preventing the Employer from enforcing his 
rights to levy Penalties against the Contractor. Only after passing this first hurdle 
would Proposition 2 find application as illustrated above. Even though Proposition 2 
was considered contentious in the Group Five case, it is submited that the 
Contractor does not have to rely on an implied term to overtake an express fixed 
date or completion date as contended in the case. The Contractor’s right to a certain 
construction period is also an express term and Proposition 2 has equal weight to 
qualify the Penalty Provision of Proposition 1. 
It is therefore contended by this thesis that all the legal principles included the 
“Proposition Matrix” are consistent with and applicable in South African law. 
4.3 Application areas in terms of JBCC PBA 
4.3.1 Proposition 1 – Penalty 
From the Bramall241 and Arnhold242 cases it is evident that the Contractor may 
succeed in contesting Penalties being levied on grounds that the Penalty Provision is 
ambiguous or inconsistent and same should be construed strictly and contra 
proferentem, in other words, in favour of the Contractor. 
JBCC PBA provides for the levying of Penalties in Clause 24:  
24.1 “Where the contractor fails to bring the works or a section thereof [CD] to 
practical completion by the date for practical completion [CD], or the 
revised date for practical completion, the contractor shall be liable to the 
employer for the penalty [CD] 
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24.2 Where the employer elects to levy such penalty, on notice thereof to the 
contractor, the principal agent shall determine the amount due from the 
later of the date for practical completion [CD], or the revised date for 
practical completion up to and including the earlier of: 
24.2.1 The actual or deemed date of practical completion of the works [23.7.1] 
or a section thereof 
24.2.2 The date of termination [29.0].” 
Provision is made on page 7 of the Contract Data, under the heading “19/20/24 
Practical Completion/penalty for late completion”, “to include the ‘date for practical 
completion’ and the ‘Penalty amount per calendar day’”. 
The Contract Data allows the above options for “Practical completion of the works 
as a whole” OR “Practical completion of the works in sections”. 
It often happens in the industry that the Contract Data is completed to provide for 
Sectional Completion on specified Dates for Practical Completion, without properly 
defining the Section of the Works in the contract. 
In other occasions, the Contract Data will not provide for Sections and will 
accordingly have a Date for Practical Completion for the Works as a whole, with a 
corresponding Penalty. On site, however, the different units will, for example, be 
certified as Practically Complete on different dates to facilitate the handing over to 
the Employer. In such situations the Penalty will then often be applied proportionally 
to the amount specified in the Contract Data. 
The above are scenarios where the Employer will run the risk of being deprived of 
levying Penalties on the basis of Proposition 1 being subject to Proposition 4. 
A further possible application area will be based on the interpretation of Clause 24 
itself. 
Clause 24.2 stipulates that the Principal Agent shall determine the amount due from 
the Date for Practical Completion as included in the Contract Data or revised Date 
for Practical Completion. Accordingly, this denotes an original Date for Practical 
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Completion or revised Date for Practical Completion in terms of Clause 23.7.1 by the 
Principal Agent after a claim was received. 
Clause 24.2.1 stipulates further that the duration of delay for the purposes of 
calculating the Penalties shall be until actual or deemed Date of Practical Completion 
of the Works in terms of Clause 23.7.1. The Clause is inconsistent in that the date of 
Practical Completion should be certified by the Principal Agent in a Certificate of 
Practical Completion in terms of Clause 19.4 and not as revised in terms of Clause 
23.7.1. 
In the industry, the above inconsistency is not contentious as industry members 
apply Penalties until the date as certified in the Certificate of Practical Completion 
without contestation. However, on the authorities cited above and if challenged by a 
scrupulous Contractor, the court may be forced to approach same differently. 
Clause 24.2 further stipulates that the Principal Agent shall determine the amount 
due after a notice has been issued by the Employer to the Contractor in the event of 
the former electing to levy such a penalty. 
The Employer is very rarely involved in any of the administration procedures and it 
may very well happen that the Principal Agent levies Penalties without the Employer 
notifying the Contractor. 
Courts may consider the notification as a condition precedent to the levying of 
Penalties. It will also be open to the Contractor to argue that the Principal Agent has 
only jurisdiction to levy Penalties from the time of such Notice and not 
retrospectively. 
The following amendments to JBCC PBA Clause 24 are proposed to remove these 
doubts and inconsistencies. 
24.1* “Where the contractor fails to bring the works or a section thereof [CD] to 
practical completion by the date for practical completion [CD], or the 
revised date for practical completion, the contractor shall be liable to the 
employer for the penalty [CD] 
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24.2* Where the employer elects to levy such penalty, the principal agent shall 
notify the contractor thereof and shall determine the amount due from the 
date for practical completion up to and including the earlier of: 
24.2.1* The actual [19.3.3] or deemed [19.4] date of practical completion of the 
works or a section thereof 
24.2.2* The date of termination [29.0].” 
4.3.2 Proposition 3 – Extension of Time 
As discussed above, in order to prevent time from becoming at large and accordingly 
for the Employer to preserve its right to levy Penalties, Proposition 3 should qualify 
Proposition 2 in order for Proposition 1 to remain applicable. 
In order to determine the above legal issue, the interpretational rules of Proposition 4 
shall apply. Proposition 3 is therefore subject to Proposition 4. 
Proposition 3 should therefore comply with two separate requirements. Firstly, the 
Contract Administrator should have powers conferred by the contract to revise the 
Date for Practical Completion and secondly, the delaying event allegedly causing the 
delay should be covered by the Extension of Time Provision in the contract. 
4.3.2.1 Principal Agent’s jurisdiction 
In terms of the JBCC PBA, the Principal Agent derives its power and authority to act 
and bind the Employer from the terms of the Agreement. Refer to JBCC Clause 6.1 
and the definition of the Principal Agent. 
6.1 “The employer warrants that the principal agent has full authority and 
obligation to act and bind the employer in terms of this agreement. The 
principal agent has no authority to amend this agreement” 
“PRINCIPAL AGENT: The entity [CD] appointed by the employer with full 
authority and obligation to act in terms of this agreement” 
In relation with the Principal Agent’s Authority and power to revise the date for 
Practical Completion, the following provisions are relevant. 
JBCC PBA Clauses 23.1 to 3 set out the events and circumstances entitling the 
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Contractor to claim a revision of the date for Practical Completion for a delay to 
Practical Completion caused by such events. Refer to Clause 23.1 below (own 
emphasis). 
23.1 The contractor is entitled to a revision of the date for practical 
completion by the principal agent without an adjustment of the contract 
value for a delay to practical completion caused by one or more of the 
following events: 
JBCC PBA Clause 23.4 lays down the procedure for such claim and the authority of 
the Principal Agent to determine the revised Date for Practical Completion in terms 
of Clause 23.7 after receipt of the claim. 
However, Clause 23.4 provides for a claim procedure where the events or 
circumstances listed in Clause 23.1 to 3 could cause a delay to the Date for Practical 
Completion. As illustrated in Chapter 2 above, the Date for Practical Completion will 
not be delayed by an event delaying the critical path of the Programme. It will be the 
Date of Practical Completion (construction completion date) that will be delayed, 
which should entitle the Contractor to a revision of the Date for Practical Completion 
(contractual completion date). 
Furthermore, Clause 23.4.2 provides for a notice to be issued by the Contractor of its 
intention to claim for a revision to the Date of Practical Completion and Clause 23.5 
provides for the Contractor to submit a claim for the revision of the Date of Practical 
Completion to the Principal Agent. 
Accordingly, Clause 23.4, 23.4.2 and 23.5 provide for the procedure and conditions 
precedent for such claim for the revision of the date of Practical Completion caused 
by a delay to the Date for Practical Completion to be deemed by the Principal Agent 
in terms of Clause 23.7. 
When applying the restrictive interpretational rules of Proposition 4, it may be found 
due to the inconsistency, that the Principal Agent has no authority to determine a 
claim for the revision of the Date for Practical Completion caused by a delay to the 
Date of Practical Completion according to the Contractor’s entitlement in terms of 
Clause 23.1 to 3. 
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In order to prevent the possibility it is recommended that the relevant JBCC Clauses 
be amended as follows: 
23.4* Should a listed event or circumstance occur [23.1-3] which could cause a 
delay to the date of practical completion, the contractor shall: 
23.4.1 *Give the principal agent reasonable and timeous notice of such event or 
circumstance and take reasonable steps to avoid or reduce such delay 
23.4.2 *Within ten (10) working days of becoming aware, or when it ought 
reasonably to have become aware of such event or circumstances, give 
notice to the principal agent of the intention to submit a claim for a 
revision to the date for practical completion, failing which the contractor 
shall forfeit such claim 
23.5* The contractor shall submit a claim for the revision of the date for 
practical completion to the principal agent within twenty (20) working 
days, or such extended period the principal agent may allow, from the 
end of the event or circumstance, failing which the contractor shall forfeit 
such claim 
4.3.2.2 Ambit of Extension of Time provisions 
The importance for the Employer to properly frame the Extension of Time Clause as 
favourably as possible for him in order to cover a wide contingency of events, is 
clearly evident from the cited authorities that pertain to the “Prevention Principle”. 
The Extension of Time Clause is like a two-edged sword: on the one hand, it entitles 
the Contractor to more time to escape Penalties from being levied; and on the other 
hand, it preserves the right of the Employer to levy Penalties and prevent time from 
becoming at large. Almost all modern contracts would have closed this gap by 
including a general Extension of Time provision to revise the Date for Completion to 
the following effect: 
“Any delay, impediment or prevention caused by or attributable to the Employer, the 
Employer’s Personnel, or Employer’s other contractors on the Site.”243 
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JBCC PBA drafters might have attempted to achieve this with Clause 23.3. It is, 
however, questionable whether they managed to close this gap in order to preserve 
the Employer’s right to levy Penalties. 
Clause 23.3 relies on the phrase “….due to any other cause beyond the 
contractor’s reasonable control that could not have reasonably been anticipated 
and provided for”, to cover any prevention act of the Employer or its Agents. It further 
states that the “principal agent shall adjust the contract value where such delay is 
due to the employer and/or agents….” 
In Kelly and Hingle’s the expression “….other causes beyond the Contractor’s 
control” was, on a strict interpretation, construed not to include the ordering of 
alterations and additions. 
It is furthermore submitted that the words added to the phrase “that could have 
reasonably been anticipated and provided for” further narrows down the ambit of 
Clause 23.3. On construing Clause 23.3 contra proferentem against the Employer it 
could be argued that any construction related delaying event, albeit not under the 
Contractor’s reasonable control, should have been reasonably anticipated and 
therefore not in the ambit of Clause 23.3. In addition, it may be further argued that 
there could be provided for most delaying events by building float into the 
Programme. From the above it is evident that there are shortcomings in the Clause 
23.3 to counter “Time at Large” arguments by Contractors. 
A specific area where the JBCC PBA may be vulnerable in relation to “Time at 
Large” arguments is in the event where outstanding Construction Information has 
been issued late by the Agents. It may be argued by a Contractor that Clause 23.2.5 
on a restrictive, contra proferentem interpretation against the Employer does not 
cover the event envisaged by Clause 12.2.8.  
12.2.8 “Regularly submit to the principal agent a progress report and a schedule 
of outstanding construction information to avoid delays to the works”  
Clause 23.2.5 specifically provides for late Construction Information in terms of 
Clauses 5.5, 6.4, 13.2.3, and 17.1.1–2.  
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23.2.5 “Late or incorrect issue of construction information [5.5; 6.4; 
13.2.3;17.1.1–2]” 
It may therefore be contended that by applying eiusdem generis interpretation as 
envisaged by the interpretational rules as laid down by Proposition 4, it does not 
include the late issue of outstanding Construction Information as provided for in 
terms of Clause 12.2.8 
It is often found that the Principal Agents out of ignorance delete certain specific 
prevention acts from Clause 23.2.244 The Contractor may use the opportunity to 
argue that time became at large on the occurrence of such events where there is no 
specific provision for Extension of Time. The Employer will then need to argue that 
Clause 23.3 is wide enough to cover this. However, with the possible narrow 
interpretation of Clause 23.3 the Contractor may succeed in their argument which 
may be fatal for the Employer to preserve Penalties and prevent time from becoming 
at large. 
It is therefore recommended to remove doubt and uncertainty by specifically 
including the following provision to cover any prevention act. 
23.2.13* Any delay, impediment or prevention caused by or attributable to the 
employer, the principal agent and/or agents, or other direct contractors 
on the site 
4.4 Conclusion 
The above amendments will close the gap for Contractors to bring arguments 
against the Employer’s entitlement to levy Penalties. The first category of 
amendments pertaining to Clause 24 will ensure consistency in defining the Penalty 
amounts and the calculation of such. In conjunction with same, the Principal Agent 
should ensure that the Contract Data is completed properly, especially where the 
Works will be executed in Sections. Penalties and Dates for Practical Completion 
should be separately included for each Section and the Scope of the Works 
pertaining to such Section should be clearly defined. 
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The second category of amendments will ensure that there is no lack of jurisdiction 
or authority for the Principal Agent to determine Extension of Time Claims. On a 
restrictive contra proferentem interpretation it may be argued that due to the 
inconsistency in Clause 23.4 to 5 the Principal Agent lacks jurisdiction to revise the 
Date for Practical Completion as envisaged by Clause 23.1 to 3 entitling the 
Contractor to same. 
The third category of amendments widens the ambit of the Extension of Time 
Provisions to specifically include any delay, impediment or prevention caused or 
attributable to the Employer, his Agents or Direct Contractors. 
As mentioned, the concept of “Time at Large” is relatively unfamiliar to the South 
African industry. It is, however, worth the effort to apply the lessons learnt in England 
to prevent unnecessary disputes and litigation suits. The JBCC PBA as illustrated 
above can be amended with relative ease to prevent uncertainty in this potentially 
hazardous area of litigation. 
  






The use of Critical Path Method (CPM) based programming techniques to analyse 
construction contract disputes in the USA and the UK have increased dramatically 
over the past 25 years.245 CPM techniques are used for proving the effect of causal 
events rather than inferring the cause from the perceived event.246 In principle, there 
are three methods of analysis available that rely on a fixed baseline, which are 
referred to as static methods and one method that relies on a shifting baseline and is 
referred to as a dynamic method.247 The static methods are: (i) as-planned versus 
as-built, (ii) as planned impacted and (iii) as-built but-for and the dynamic method 
which entails a time impact analysis.248 
Given that many of the events causing delay are interrelated and competing, 
problems often arise in determining cause and effect. Most standard construction 
contracts are not only silent on which of the delay analysis techniques is to be used, 
but also on important issues such as how to deal with float, concurrent delays and 
global claims.249 The thesis will further deal with these uncertainties in relation to the 
JBCC PBA from a South African law perspective. 
It is submitted that the static methods of delay analysis are not compatible with the 
proposed methodology and amendments to the contractual provisions which 
increase the legal significance of the Programme as discussed in Chapter 3 of this 
thesis. 
The time impact analysis is the only method which is consistent with the key 
principles which are incorporated as a result of the proposed amendment of JBCC 
PBA Clause 12.2.6. 
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 Float, concurrent delay and global claims will be defined under the relevant subheadings. 
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5.2 Time Impact Analysis 
Time impact methodology, also referred to as the snapshot or time slice method, is 
an impact technique that examines Employer Risk Events and their effects at 
different times during the progress of the project. Events are analysed 
contemporaneously, with each event being judged on its own merits and information 
available at the time.250 This method has been recognised as an appropriate method 
of analysis by the United States Board of Contract Appeals, is expressly required by 
USA government contracts and is acknowledged by the SCL Protocol as the 
appropriate method for contemporaneous analysis.251 It is a dynamic method of 
calculation which derives its baseline from the Contractor’s changing programme 
during the course of the works, to which is added fragments of events that have 
occurred in order to calculate their effect on the programme expressly or impliedly in 
use at the time of the event.252 In doing so account is taken of the changing pattern 
of float and the shift in the critical path.253  
This contemporaneous approach to delay analysis allows assessment to be made of 
three important aspects that tend to be unavailable with other methods: 
1.  “The actual state of progress at the time the event was initiated; 
2.  the changing nature of the critical path as a result of delay to progress and 
acceleration; and 
3.  the concurrency of delays to progress and to completion.”254 
Gibson255 submits that the following should be done for each Employer Risk Event: 
1.  Update the as-planned programme to show what had actually been achieved 
at the time of the Employer Risk Event. 
2.  Analyse the updated programme which represents the position of the project 
at the time of the event, this programme will forecast whether the project is 
likely to be completed ahead of, on or behind schedule. 
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3.  Create an impacted programme demonstrating, with descriptions, the duration 
of new activities flowing from the delay event, and their logical interface with 
the remaining contract works. It is recommended that a subnet be created for 
this. 
4.  Add that subnet into the impacted programme and link this to the existing 
programme activities and reanalyse the impacted programme. 
5.  If the planned construction completion date is later than the planned 
construction completion date on the current updated programme, then there is 
an entitlement to an extension of time. 
6. The extent of the extension of time is the slippage between the construction 
completion date on the current updated programme and that shown on the 
impacted programme.256 
This prospective method analyses the likely or expected effect of the delay event on 
the completion of the works, and therefore shows a Contractor’s entitlement to 
extension of time.257 
It is therefore recommended that the JBCC PBA incorporate the dynamic impact 
analysis method as the required method to prove cause and effect. JBCC Clause 
23.6.2 should accordingly be amended as follows: 
23.6.2*  The cause and effect of the delaying event or circumstance on the date of 
practical completion, illustrated by the impact and/or a change to the 
critical path on the programme by performing a time impact analysis  
Furthermore the time impact analysis is the only analysis technique that affords an 
acceptable framework for the legal principles discussed hereunder. 
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Concurrent delay is defined by the SCL Protocol as “the occurrence of two or more 
delay events at the same time, one an Employer Risk Event, the other a Contractor 
Risk Event and the effects of which are felt at the same time.”258 Contract 
Administrators often find claims involving concurrent delay difficult to resolve due to 
the fact that standard forms of contract do not address this particular issue. Due to a 
lack of case law on many construction matters, South African courts, as previously 
discussed, often turn to English cases for guidance. This section discusses 
concurrent delays and analyses how they are dealt with under English law with a 
view to determine if South Africa can rely on English law for guidance on this issue. It 
is further important to take into consideration and compare the specific contractual 
settings to determine whether the English position involving the JCT259 is consistent 
with the South African position under the JBCC PBA.  
5.3.1 English position260 
The point of departure for establishing the English position on concurrency is the 
recent case of Walter Lilly & Company LTD v Mackay & Anor,261 which approved and 
accepted the Malmaison approach as reflecting the UK law as consistently applied in 
the English courts.262  
This approach is derived from Henry Boot Construction (UK) Ltd v Malmaison Hotel 
(Manchester) Ltd, where the court in deciding on extension of time in relation to 
concurrent delays, stated: 
 “…it is agreed that if there are two concurrent causes of delay, one of which 
is a relevant event, and the other is not, then the contractor is entitled to an 
extension of time for the period of delay caused by the relevant event 
notwithstanding the concurrent effect of the other event. Thus, to take a 
simple example, if no work is possible on a site for a week not only because of 
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 SCL Protocol op cit note 14 at 53. 
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 The Joint Contracts Tribunal Standard Form of Building Contract 1998 Edition. 
260
 It must be noted that the position as discussed in this thesis is in relation to the JCT contract as all cases 
referred to dealt with same. 
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 See De Beers v Atos Origin IT Services UK Ltd [2011] BLR 274 and Adyard Abu Dhabi v SD Marine Services 
[2011] EWHC 848. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
114 
 
the exceptionally inclement weather (a relevant event), and if the failure to 
work during the week is likely to delay the Works beyond the completion date 
by one week, and then if he considers it fair and reasonable to do so, the 
architect is required to grant an extension of one week. He cannot refuse to 
do so on the grounds that the delay would have occurred in any event by 
reason of the shortage of labour.”263 
The case of Peak Construction (Liverpool) Ltd v McKinney Foundations Ltd264 makes 
this position clear when the court states:  
“If the failure to complete on time is due to the fault of both the Employer and 
the Contractor, in my view [Liquidated and Ascertained Damages] Clause 
does not bite. I cannot see how, in the ordinary course, the Employer can 
insist on compliance with a Condition if it is partly his own fault that it cannot 
be fulfilled….I consider that….the Employer, in the circumstances postulated, 
is left to his ordinary remedy; that is to say, to recover such damages as he 
can prove flow from the Contractor’s breach…The Liquidated and Ascertained 
Damages and Extension of Time Clauses in printed forms of contract must be 
construed strictly contra proferentem. If the Employer wishes to recover 
Liquidated and Ascertained Damages for a failure by the Contractors to 
complete on time in spite of the fact that some of the delay is due to the 
Employer’s own fault or Breach of Contract, any Extension of Time Clause 
should provide, expressly or by implication, for an extension on account of 
such fault or breach on the part of the Employer.”265 
The court’s reasoning was further enunciated in Walter Lilly as follows: 
“Part of the logic of this is that many of the Relevant Events would otherwise 
amount to acts of prevention and that it would be wrong in principle to 
construe Clause 25 on the basis that the Contractor should be denied a full 
extension of time in those circumstances. More importantly however, there is 
a straight contractual interpretation of Clause 25 which points very strongly in 
favour of the view that, provided that the Relevant Event can be shown to 
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have delayed the Works, the Contractor is entitled to an extension of time for 
the whole period of delay caused by the Relevant Events in question. There is 
nothing in the wording of Clause 25 which expressly suggests that there is 
any sort of proviso to the effect that an extension should be reduced if the 
causation criterion is established. The fact that the Architect has to award a 
“fair and reasonable” extension does not imply that there should be some 
apportionment in the case of concurrent delays….”266 
The Malmaison approach has been justified with reference to several legal 
principles, including prevention principle, the doctrine of penalties, the burden of 
proof and the contractual status of the programme.267 The Malmaison approach has 
also been adopted by the SCL Protocol. The Protocol formulated the approach as 
follows: 
“Where the Contractor Delay268 to Completion occurs concurrently with 
Employer Delay269 to Completion, the Contractor’s concurrent delay should 
not reduce any EOT270 due.”271 
The Walter Lilly272 case further justifies the Malmaison approach on a “straight 
interpretation of clause 25” of the JCT contract, which states as follows: 
JCT Clause 25.3.1 
“If, in the opinion of the Architect/the Contract Administrator…any of the events 
which are stated by the Contractor to be the cause of delay is a Relevant Event 
and…the completion of the Works is likely to be delayed thereby beyond the 
Completion Date, the Architect/Contract Administrator shall in writing to the 
Contractor give an extension of time by fixing such later date as the Completion Date 
as he then estimates to be fair and reasonable …” 
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It is therefore important to note that the analysis of the English position on 
concurrency with reference to the aforesaid legal principles including the prevention 
principle, the doctrine of penalties, burden of proof and the contractual status of the 
programme, are specifically based on a JCT contractual setting. 
5.3.1.1 Prevention Principle 
As already discussed, the “Prevention Principle” is a common law principle that “no 
person can take advantage of the non-fulfilment of a condition the performance of 
which has been hindered by himself”.273 It is a consequence of this principle that 
where the contract does not have a clause providing for the Contract Administrator to 
extend time for the delay to completion caused by the Employer then the mechanism 
for liquidated damages will fail and time will become “at large”.274  
5.3.1.2 Doctrine of Penalties 
Where liquidated damages are deductible only for delays to completion at the 
Contractor’s risk, it is arguable that in situations of concurrent delays the damages 
so deducted cannot be liquidated damages because it cannot be established that the 
delay to completion was caused by the Contractor.275 In this instance, the damages 
will be a penalty, and penalties are not enforceable in English courts.276  
 Alternatively, a failure to grant the Contractor an extension of time may arguably 
result in a penal deduction of damages by the Employer when there is no real 
loss.277 As the purpose of an extension of time is to preserve the Employer’s right to 
deduct liquidated damages, extension of time should therefore be granted to 
preserve that right.278 In line with this argument, any contractual Clause purporting to 
allocate a time related risk of concurrent delay to the Contractor will not be valid or, 
failing that, any clause providing for liquidated damages will be unenforceable as a 
penalty.279 
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5.3.1.3 Burden of proof 
It has also been argued that in situations of true concurrency, contractual 
responsibility for delay to completion can be considered indeterminate.280 The 
Employer will be unable to positively determine its entitlement to liquidated damages 
and the Contractor will also be unable to prove its corresponding entitlements to 
reimbursement of its time related costs and accordingly the losses will be left where 
they fall.281 
5.3.1.4 Contractual status of the Programme 
Further support for the approach of granting extension of time in the case of 
concurrent delays is provided by a consideration of the contractual status of 
construction Programmes.282 Under most standard forms of contract, Contractors are 
not required to perform the activities comprising the work in any particular order or 
sequence.283 The Contractor must start on the commencement date and complete 
by the completion date but between those dates it can work at any pace whether it 
complies with the Programme or not.284 How the Contractor proceeds with the work 
between commencement and completion dates is up to it, provided it does not 
suspend works or fail to proceed regularly and diligently.285 Under this regimen the 
Employer cannot do anything to control the timing or duration of individual activities 
or their sequence. Unless the Employer is of the opinion that the Contractor is 
unlikely to complete the Works by the completion date, there is rarely any reason for 
the Employer to want to control the sequence, timing or order of the Contractor’s 
work.286  
When the Contractor sets down its programme, it registers its intent for the duration 
and sequence of the activities in its Programme.287 However, subject to the terms of 
the specific contract, this intention is not usually a contractually fixed intention.288 If 
the Contractor wishes to make changes to the sequence, duration and timing of 
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particular activities it is free to do so, but his delay to progress is measured by 
reference to the difference between the intention that is shown on its programme and 
what, in fact, it achieves.289 
5.3.1.5 Compensation for prolongation 
The Protocol formulates recommendations on compensation in relation to concurrent 
events as follows: 
“Where an Employer Risk Event and a Contractor Risk Event have concurrent 
effect, the Contractor may not recover compensation in respect of the 
Employer Risk Event unless it can separate the loss and/or expense that 
flows from the Employer Risk Event from that which flow from the Contractor 
Risk Event. If it would have incurred the additional costs in any event as a 
result of Contractor Delays, the Contractor will not be entitled to recover these 
additional costs. In most cases this will mean that the Contractor will be 
entitled to compensation only for any period by which the Employer Delay 
exceeded the duration of the Contractor Delay.”290 
In most cases, the awarding of an extension of time and fixing of a new contractual 
completion date would precede any concomitant expense and/or loss. Most standard 
construction contracts envisage that the Contract Administrator will determine 
extension of time on a prospective approach whereas determining expense and/or 
loss involves a review based on a retrospective approach. Thus the evidence used 
by the Contract Administrator in forming his view on extension of time and the 
duration arrived at can be useful (but not conclusive) in determining expense and/or 
loss caused by the delay. While it may not be prudent to rely solely on the 
extensions to the contractual completion date as the prime evidence for calculating 
expense and/or loss, it cannot be ignored. The Architect is required under JCT 
Clause 26.3 to disclose what extension of time he has granted in respect of causes 
which also give rise to a claim for reimbursement of loss and/or expenses, if this is 
necessary for the purposes of ascertainment.291  
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JCT Clause 26.3 states as follows: “If and to the extent that it is necessary for 
ascertainment under clause 26.1 of loss and/or expense the Architect shall state in 
writing to the Contractor what extension of time, if any, has been made under clause 
25 in respect of the Relevant Event or Events referred to in Clause 25.4.5.1 (so far 
as that clause refers to clauses 2.3, 13.2, 13.3 and 23.2) and in clauses 25.4.5.2, 
25.4.6, 25.4.8 and 25.4.12.” 
In Walter Lilly292 it was stated that claims by Contractors for delay and disruption 
related claims must be proved as a matter of fact.293 The Contractor will have to 
demonstrate on a balance of probabilities that: (i) events occurred which entitle it to 
loss and expense; (ii) those events caused delay and/or disruption; (iii) such delay or 
disruption caused it to incur loss and/or expense.294 
The Employer will always have a positive and a negative defence to such claim. The 
negative defence amounts to saying that the activities relied on by the Contractor did 
not cause delay because they were not on the critical path and therefore did not 
cause delay.295 The positive defence is that the true delay was not caused by 
Relevant Events but by events for which the Contractor was responsible.296 
The above discussion has highlighted the way the English courts deal with 
concurrent delays and the reasoning behind the said approach. It is clear from the 
Walter Lilly case that the Malmaison approach that where the delay is caused by two 
or more effective causes, one of which entitles the Contractor to an extension of time 
as being a Relevant Event, the Contractor is entitled to a full extension of time has its 
roots in the “Prevention Principle” (as enunciated in Peak Construction) and the 
wording of the JCT. Furthermore, it is clear that a Contractor is not entitled to any 
monetary claim for loss and expenses for concurrent delays unless it can discharge 
the onus of proving causation by showing that, without the Employer’s risk event 
relied upon, the postulated loss or expense would not have been incurred.297 
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5.3.2 South African position 
Where the English courts have adopted the Malmaison approach to deal with 
concurrent delays, the South African courts are yet to deal with this matter. South 
African courts are not bound to follow English court decisions as they only enjoy 
persuasive force here, but given the lack of construction case law on the issue, 
English law will in all likelihood be followed unless there is a good reason to depart 
from it. This part of the thesis seeks to determine the applicability of the Malmaison 
approach in dealing with concurrent delays under the JBCC PBA.  
Any such analysis should firstly compare the contractual interpretation of JBCC PBA 
Clauses 23 and 26 with JCT Clauses 25 and 26 and secondly the applicability of the 
underlying legal principles on which the Malmaison approach is based, namely; the 
prevention principle, doctrine of penalties, the burden of proof and the contractual 
status of the Programme. 
5.3.2.1 Contractual comparison 
By comparing the extension of time provisions of JCT Clause 25 with the JBCC 
Clause 23 the distinguishing factors can be summarised as follows: 
(i)  Submission of Claim 
The Contractor submits a claim in terms of JBCC Clause 23.5 in order to enforce its 
contractual entitlement provided by JBCC Clauses 23.1 to 3 and the Principal Agent 
determines the claim in terms of Clause 23.7. The claim shall in respect of each 
event298 or circumstance separately state “the cause and effect of the delaying 
event.”299  
 
The Contractor in terms of JCT Clause 25.2 notifies the Architect of material 
circumstances which may delay the works, including the cause of the delay and 
identifies the Relevant Event. The Architect will award an extension of time as he 
estimates to be fair and reasonable. 
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(ii) Compensation related to Extension of Time 
The Contractor is entitled to an adjustment of the Contract Value in terms of JBCC 
Clause 26.0 if it is successful in an extension of time claim in terms of events listed 
under JBCC Clause 23.2. 
The Contractor must prove expense and loss or both under JCT Clause 26 and is 
not entitled to an automatic adjustment to the Contract Value.  
The thesis therefore contends that on a contractual interpretation of the JBCC 
Clause 23, the onus is on the Contractor to prove on a balance of probabilities that: 
(a) In terms of Clause 23.4 that the Relevant Event provided for by Clause 23.1 
to 3 has occurred; 
(b)  in terms of Clause 23.6.2 that the Relevant Event caused a delay to the date 
of Practical Completion by illustrating it on a critical path of an approved 
Programme and 
(c)  in terms of Clause 23.6.3, the quantification or calculation of the working days 
has been delayed. 
Clause 23 of the JBCC should therefore be distinguished from Clause 25 of the JCT 
on two major grounds. Firstly, the JBCC Clause 23 onus of proof requirements for 
extension of time compares with the requirements as accepted in the Walter Lilly300 
case to prove expense or loss in relation to JCT Clause 26. The discretion of the 
Architect in terms of JCT Clause 25 to award an extension of time he estimates to be 
fair and reasonable does not exist in JBCC Clause 23. Secondly, JBCC Clause 23 
makes provision for compensation which may also be the main reason for the 
required onus of proof. Whereas JCT Clause 25 merely entitles the Contractor to an 
extension of time to exonerate them from Penalties, JBCC Clause 23 also includes 
compensation. The same interpretation as applied by Judge Akenhead in Walter Lilly 
in relation to JCT Clause 25 pertaining to concurrent delays can therefore not be 
applied to the JBCC PBA Clause 23. 
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It is therefore submitted that the JBCC position regarding concurrent delays renders 
an already challenging legal conundrum even more complicated. The competing 
factors in deciding between the two events, one a Relevant Event entitling the 
Contractor to extension of time and the other a Contractor’s Risk Event which does 
not entitle the Contractor to extension of time, is more contentious because of the 
possibility that the Contractor will be entitled to compensation in the event of 
extension of time. 
Where the Relevant Event is fully within JBCC Clause 23.1, it is a Neutral Event 
affording the Contractor an extension of time without compensation and can 
therefore be compared to the JCT Clause 25. However, where the Relevant Event is 
within terms of Clause JBCC 23.2, it adds another dimension because of the 
Contractor’s entitlement to compensation in addition to extension of time. 
JBCC Clause 23.2 entitles the Contractor to an adjustment to the Contract Value in 
terms of Clause 26.0. This in turn entails two separate entitlements. Firstly, Clause 
26.9.4, which is an automatic or proportionate entitlement to time related 
Preliminaries as defined in the Bill of Quantities and in terms of the method selected 
in the Contract Data. Therefore, no additional proof of any actual damages or 
prolongation cost is required. These time related Preliminaries may be viewed in the 
same light as Penalties or liquidated ascertained damages (LADs). The time related 
Preliminaries can be seen as a “liquidated prolongation cost” or the converse of 
Penalties. The time related Preliminaries are due to the Contractor in the event of an 
extension of time, without the need to prove any actual cost or expense and/or loss. 
Secondly, the Contractor is entitled in terms of Clause 26.5 to claim actual proven 
expense and/or loss in addition to the related Preliminaries in terms of Clause 
26.9.4. Clause 26.5 is worded very widely to include expense and/or loss for which 
provision was not required in the Contract Sum. If the aforesaid clause is compared 
with Clause 32.5 of the JBCC 2007, the predecessor of the JBCC PBA, it is evident 
that its wide ambit may pose a risk for the Employer which may as a result face 
unexpected claims. 
Clause 32.5 of the JBCC 2007 was in line with Clause 26 of JCT by listing certain 
events which may entitle the Contractor to expense and/or loss to circumstances due 
to no fault of the Contractor. The listed events inter alia include: 
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32.5.1 The issue of contract instruction 
32.5.2 The failure to issue or the late issue of contract instruction following a 
timeous request from the contractor [15.6] 
32.5.3 Nondisclosure of changes made to the provisions of JBCC standard 
documentation 
32.5.4 Expense and loss caused by a direct contractor [22.4] 
32.5.5  Default by the employer or his agents 
32.5.6 Suspension or termination of a n/s subcontract due to default by the 
employer or his agents 
32.5.7 Default or insolvency of a nominated subcontractor 
32.5.8 Suspension of the works [31.15] 
It is the submission of this thesis that the JBCC PBA should not follow the JCT 
approach on extension of time in relation to concurrent delays. The difference in 
interpretation and the automatic entitlement to compensation when extension of time 
is awarded, distinguish these two Clauses. Accordingly, in the event of concurrent 
delays, the Contractor should only be entitled to extension of time to the extent that it 
is able to prove that the Relevant Event in question delayed the date of Practical 
Completion on the critical path of an approved Programme. 
5.3.2.2 Burden of Proof Approach 
The above are the recommendations pertaining to and based on an interpretation of 
the JBCC as compared and distinguished from the JCT. These should be further 
tested to determine their compatibility with the legal principles used to support the 
Malmaison approach to evaluate the enforceability of the proposed “Burden of Proof 
Approach”. 
It is contended, as a point of departure, that following the impact delay analysis 
method to determine cause and effect of a potential Relevant Event will eliminate 
many of the potential problems. A purported Employer Risk Event in terms of a static 
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delay analysis method may in fact not be a Relevant Event if analysed by a dynamic 
delay analysis method. 
As discussed in Chapter 3 and 4, the time for performance by the Employer or its 
Agent’s reciprocal obligations should not be static, but should be dynamic and be 
adjusted by the updated Programmes. Therefore, if a Programme is updated to 
reflect actual progress, the Contractor’s Delay must be programmed as part of the 
actual progress which will adjust the time for performance of the Employer 
accordingly. On such an adjusted or delayed Programme it may be evident that the 
Employer is not in mora and the event therefore does not constitute a Relevant 
Event in terms of the contract. As a consequence of the dynamic approach, the time 
for performance by the Employer will be relaxed and therefore there will be no 
concurrent delay situation. 
(i) The Prevention Principle 
As previously stated, the Prevention Principle is a common law rule which applies to 
construction contracts. On the authority of the Group Five301 case, such a rule, often 
called an implied term cannot in South African law co-exist with a conflicting express 
term. The Prevention Principle will accordingly not have the same impact in South 
African law as illustrated in the UK cases of Henry Boot302, Peak Construction303 and 
Walter Lilly.304. 
It is therefore argued that the Prevention Principle is no constraint or prohibition for 
applying the proposed Burden of Proof Approach. 
(ii) Doctrine of Penalties 
The same arguments against the enforceability of liquidated damages in terms of the 
UK law do not apply in terms of South African law. Under South African law the 
Employer does not need to prove any delay damages. Penalties are enforceable in 
terms of the Conventional Penalties Act.305 In the UK it may be argued that the 
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liquidated damages, when disproportionate to the actual damages, constitute a 
Penalty, which is not enforceable under English law. 
(iii)  Contractual Status of the Programme 
The proposed methodology on the Programme as set out in Chapter 3 changes the 
general position as put forward as support for the approach of granting extension of 
time in case of concurrent delay. The position adopted by Pickavance,306 where the 
Contractor must start on the commencement date and complete by the completion 
date but can between those dates work at any tempo, whether it complies with the 
Programme or not, has been changed in relation to the JBCC PBA amendments. 
The above principle is therefore a fortiori in relation to the Burden of Proof Approach 
as proposed in relation to concurrent delays. 
5.3.2.3 Further clarification in relation to the JBCC PBA 
The onus of proof is the same in terms of JBCC Clause 23 for all Relevant Events, 
irrespective of whether Clause 23.2 (Employer Risk Events) or Clause 23.1 (Neutral 
Events) apply. In terms of the JBCC PBA, if a Neutral Risk Event caused delay to 
Practical Completion, the Contractor will not be entitled to compensation in terms of 
Clause 23.1 whereas when the delay is caused by an Employer Risk Event, the 
Contractor will be entitled to compensation in terms of Clause 23.2. The UK 
authorities do not provide any clarity on the distinction when the Relevant Event is an 
Employer Risk Event or a Neutral Event. The UK position where the Contractor is 
entitled to a full extension of time in the event of a concurrent delay caused by a 
Contractor’s Risk Event and a Neutral Risk Event is not supportive of the notion that 
it is based on the prevention principle. A Neutral Event such as inclement weather is 
not an “act of prevention” as envisaged by the prevention principle. 
There is no legal basis for determining concurrency based on two Relevant Events, 
one a Neutral Event without compensation and the other a Relevant Event with 
compensation. 
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It is therefore proposed that the contract should specifically provide that the 
Contractor’s entitlement in terms of Clause 23.2 is subject to Clause 23.1. In other 
words, the Contractor will be entitled to compensation only to the extent that the 
delay is not caused by a Neutral Risk Event in terms of Clause 23.1 but by an 
Employer Risk Event in terms of Clause 23.2. The same defences will then be 
available for an Employer in defence against such claims in the form of the negative 
and positive defences as previously discussed. 
The JBCC Clause 23.2 should accordingly be amended as follows: 
23.2* The contractor is entitled to a revision of the date for practical completion 
by the principal agent with an adjustment to the contract value [26.0], for 
a delay to practical completion caused by one or more of the events listed 
below. Such entitlement shall be subject to the entitlement provided [23.1]. 
Therefore if a concurrent delay to practical completion is caused by both 
a [23.1] and [23.2] event, then [23.1] shall apply and the contractor shall 
be entitled to a revision of the date for practical completion by the 
principal agent without an adjustment of the contract value.  
5.4 Ownership of Float 
Terminal or Total Float307 is defined by the SCL Protocol as the period of time that an 
activity may be delayed beyond its early start or early finish dates without delaying 
the contractual completion date.308  
The contractual completion date in question may be a sectional completion date, the 
overall completion of the works or an interim milestone or key date.309 The 
‘ownership’ of float causes particular arguments in disputes over entitlement to 
extension of time.310 A Contractor may argue that it ‘owns’ the float, because, in 
planning how it proposes to carry out the works, it has allowed additional or float time 
to give itself some flexibility in the event that it is not able to carry out the works as 
quickly as it planned.311 If, therefore, there is any delay to the Contractor’s progress 
for which the Contractor is not responsible, it may contend that it is entitled to an 
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extension of time, even if the delay to progress will not result in the contract 
completion date being missed, but merely in erosion of its float.312 On the other 
hand, an Employer may typically argue that the Contractor has no contractual 
remedy for being prevented from completing the works at any time prior to the 
contractual completion date, and is therefore not entitled to an extension of time 
unless the delay to progress will result in a contractual completion date being 
missed. The Employer may therefore say that the project owns the float.313 
The expression ‘float’ hardly if ever appears in standard form conditions of 
contract.314 Where the wording of the extension of time clause in a contract is such 
that an extension of time is only to be granted if an Employer Risk Event delays 
construction completion beyond the contractual completion date, then the likely 
effect of that wording is that float has to be used up before an extension of time will 
be due.315 If the wording of the extension of time clause is such that an extension of 
time will be due whenever an Employer Risk Event delays the Contractor’s planned 
construction completion date, then float will probably not be available for the benefit 
of the Employer and the Contractor should accordingly be awarded an extension of 
time.316 Some conditions of contract give no indication as to whether an Employer 
Risk Event has to affect the contractual completion date or merely the Contractor’s 
planned construction completion date before an extension of time is due.317 
Each of the permutations described above can create unfairness and uncertainty or 
both of these consequences.318 Under contracts where the Employer Risk Event has 
to affect the contractual completion date, if an Employer Risk Event occurs first and 
uses up the float, then the Contractor can find itself in delay and paying Penalties as 
a result of a subsequent Contractor Risk Event which would not have been critical if 
the Employer Risk Event had not occurred first.319 Under contracts where the 
Employer Risk Event only has to affect the Contractor’s planned construction 
completion date, the Contractor is potentially entitled to an extension of time every 
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time the Employer or Contract Administrator delays any of its activities on the critical 
path, irrespective of their impact to meeting the contractual completion date.320 
Under the type of contract that is silent or ambiguous about float, uncertainty exists 
and disputes are likely to follow.321 
5.4.1 South African position 
There is a misconception in the South African industry on the issue of ownership of 
float. The perception that the Employer “owns” the float is due firstly to the fact that in 
terms of JCT Clause 25 the Employer “owns” the float and due to the judgment in the 
Ovcon322 case.  
The Management Guide to the General Conditions of Contract (GCC) 2010 submits 
that float belongs to the owner and cites the Ovcon323 case as authority for this 
contention.324 It states that if an event prevents the Contractor from completing the 
Works by his programmed completion date, being a date earlier than the Due 
Completion Date, the Contractor is only entitled to extension of time in so far as it 
exceeds the Due Completion Date.325 As a result the Contractor will not get an 
extension of time for delays to an earlier planned construction completion date.  
The above submission is based on Clause 5.12.1 of the GCC 2010 which states:  
“If the Contractor considers himself entitled to an extension of time for circumstances 
of any kind whatsoever which may occur that will, in fact, delay Practical Completion 
of the Works, the Contractor shall claim in accordance with Clause 10.1 such 
extension of time as is appropriate. Such extension of time shall take into account 
any special non-working days and all relevant circumstances, including concurrent 
delays or savings of time which might apply in respect of such claim” (own 
emphasis). 
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The aforesaid clause falls into the category where the Contractor should get 
extension of time whenever the planned construction completion date (Practical 
Completion in casu) is delayed. 
As stated above, the JCT falls into the category in which the Contractor should only 
get extension of time where the planned completion date has been delayed beyond 
the contractual completion date. JCT clause 25.3.1 states as follows:  
“If, in the opinion of the Architect/the Contract Administrator…any of the events 
which are stated by the Contractor to be the cause of delay is a Relevant Event 
and…the completion of the Works is likely to be delayed thereby beyond the 
Completion Date, the Architect/Contract Administrator shall in writing to the 
Contractor give an extension of time by fixing such later date as the Completion Date 
as he then estimates to be fair and reasonable…” (own emphasis). 
On the other hand JBCC Clauses 23.1, 23.2 and 23.3 provides as follows: 
23.1 “The contractor is entitled to a revision of the date for practical 
completion by the principal agent without an adjustment to the contract 
value for a delay to practical completion caused by one or more of the 
following events:…” 
23.2 “The contractor is entitled to a revision of the date for practical 
completion by the principal agent with an adjustment of the contract 
value [26.0], for a delay to practical completion caused by one or more of 
the following events: …” (own emphasis). 
23.3 “Further circumstances for which the contractor may be entitled to a 
revision of the date for practical completion and an adjustment of the 
contract value are delays to practical completion due to any other cause 
beyond the contractor's reasonable control that could not have reasonably 
been anticipated and provided for. The principal agent shall adjust the 
contract value where such delay is due to the employer and/or agents” 
(own emphasis). 
There is accordingly no requirement that Practical Completion should be delayed 
beyond the date for Practical Completion. 
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It is therefore contended that the “ownership” of float should not pose any problems 
in terms of the JBCC PBA, because it is purely a matter of contractual interpretation. 
An attempt to apply case law to solve the issue of “ownership of float” will be 
ineffective as clearly stated in the Ovcon326 case where the Contractor, the plaintiff in 
this case, argued that the acceptance by the Director Works of the programme 
creates an obligation on the employer, or defendant in this case, to do nothing that 
will prevent the completion of works within the time envisaged in the programme and 
quoted Loots Engineering and Construction Law at page 126 as authority for its 
contention: 
“Programmes which are approved by the engineer and which show 
completion considerably in advance of the contract completion date may be 
used correctly by the contractor to justify a claim for late information or to 
allege failure to give access or to found a claim for additional preliminary and 
general costs, even where the contractor completes before the contract 
completion date.”327 
Judge Hugo distinguished the above arguments by stating: 
“These statements from these authors are well-nigh useless unless they are 
reduced to their particular contractual setting. Loots' statement for example is 
based upon clause 14 of the Standard Form of Engineering J Contracts in the 
1982 version. The powers given the engineer under the remaining subclauses 
of clause 14 are much wider than those given under the instant contract. For 
these reasons but little light can be gleaned from the textbooks.”328 
It is the author’s submission that this matter is dealt with in South Africa in an 
unsatisfactory manner, to a great extent because of the position taken in the Ovcon 
case. As previously stated, the Ovcon case is quoted as authority for the proposition 
that the “float belongs to the Employer”. This statement is completely 
unsubstantiated for the following reasons: 
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 The claim was not for extension of time, but for expense or loss beyond that 
provided for in or reasonably by the contract; and 
 There was no approved programme (or progress chart). 
This was a typical case where the Contractor could have been entitled to extension 
of time, but did not follow the Extension of Time provisions as provided for under its 
contract. 
In an attempt to circumvent the possible time barring provisions or in ignorance, the 
Contractor couched its claim under expense or loss which failed based on the 
specific interpretation of the contractual provisions relied on. 
Judge Hugo emphasised in his judgement that each case must be reduced to its 
particular contractual setting and he specifically maintained that in the final instance 
the plaintiff’s case would stand or fall on the status of the Programme.329 In this case 
much emphasis was thus put on the status of the programme which eventually 
dictated the outcome of the case. With this background it should be concluded that 
the precedent created by the Ovcon case cannot be applied to an Extension of Time 
matter and secondly that it must be distinguished from any case where an approved 
Programme existed.  
In accordance with the obiter dictum made by Judge Hugo in the aforesaid decision, 
it is submitted that each case must be reduced to its contractual setting and be 
determined by the interpretation of the particular provisions of the contract, rather 
than with reference to supposed legal principles, maxims or guidelines such as to 
whom the ownership of float belongs.  
It is, however, important that the contract make provision for the Programme to be 
approved. The ownership of float would therefore be problematic if applied to the 
JBCC PBA 2014 unamended version, which does not make provision for the 
Programme to be agreed on and approved. An Employer may, however, be unwilling 
to agree to a Programme that reflects an early construction completion date for 
several reasons. Firstly their operations or lease may only be commencing at a later 
date, in line with the Date for Practical Completion. Secondly, early completion of 
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construction will have the effect of them taking possession with the result that the 
risk for damage to the works will pass to them. This, in turn will mean that their 
insurance must be in place and that they will be responsible for the security of the 
site. Thirdly, the Employer’s cash-flow may be budgeted in line with the Contract 
Period (until the construction completion date) as provided for in the contract and 
does not allow for an accelerated Construction Period as proposed in the 
Programme. However, once a Programme reflecting early completion has been 
agreed on and approved by the Employer, the Contractor should be entitled to 
extension of time for delays to Practical Completion and accordingly the float should 
belong to the Contractor. 
5.5 Global claims 
In the Walter Lilly case, a global claim is defined as “a contractor’s claim which 
identifies numerous potential or actual causes of delay or disruption, a total cost on 
the job, a net payment from the employer and a claim for the balance between costs 
and payment which is attributed without more and by inference to the causes of 
delay and disruption relied on.”330 
Giving judgment overwhelmingly in favour of the Contractor, the Court in Walter Lilly 
held that the Contractor was entitled to an extension of time and held that the 
Contractor had established a link between the events identified and resources 
expended. Akenhead J reviewed relevant authorities on global claims and 
summarised the law. He inter alia stated the following: 
(i) Claims by contractors for delay or disruption related loss and expense must 
be proved as a matter of fact. The Contractor has to demonstrate on a 
balance of probabilities that, first, events occurred which entitle it to loss and 
expense, secondly, that those events caused delay and/or disruption and 
thirdly that such delay or disruption caused it to incur loss and/or expense. 
(ii) Determine if there are contractual restrictions on global claims by the 
interpretation of the contractual clause relied on. 
(iii)  The Contractor will need to comply with conditions precedent. 
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(iv)  It is open to contractors to prove these elements with whatever evidence will 
satisfy the requisite standard of proof. 
(v)  There is nothing wrong in principle with a total or global cost claim, but there 
are added evidential difficulties which a claimant contractor will have to 
overcome. 
(vi)  The fact that one or a series of events or factors (unpleaded or which are the 
risk or fault of the claimant contractor) caused or contributed (or cannot be 
proved not to have caused or contributed) to the total or global loss does not 
necessarily mean that the claimant contractor can recover nothing. It depends 
on the impact of those events or factors.331 
In relation to global claims for extension of time, it is contended that the JBCC 
Clause 23.6, as quoted below should be the determining factor. 
23.6*  Where the contractor requests a revision of the date for practical 
completion the claim shall in respect of each event or circumstance 
separately state: 
23.6.1*  Particulars of such event or circumstance and the relevant clause [23.1-3] 
on which the contractor relies 
23.6.2*  The cause and effect of the delaying event or circumstance on the date of 
practical completion, illustrated by the impact and/or a change to the 
critical path on the programme 
23.6.2* The cause and effect of the delaying event or circumstance on the date of 
practical completion, illustrated by the impact and/or a change to the 
critical path on the programme by performing a time impact analysis 
The Clause pertinently states that “….the claim shall in respect of each event or 
circumstance separately state...” and furthermore that the cause and effect of the 
delaying event or circumstance be….. illustrated by the impact and/or a change to 
the critical path on the programme”. It is therefore contended that the JBCC PBA 
rules out the possibility of submitting global claims in relation to extension of time. 
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The general principle that manifested through all the above in solving the legal 
issues is that firstly, the substantive law needs to be applied and secondly, the 
importance of interpreting the specific contractual provisions. 
The discussion emphasises the importance to create certainty and consistency in 
contracts. The amendments in relation to the contractual status of the Programme 
are shown by this chapter to be crucial in relation to dealing contractually with 
difficult issues such as concurrency and float. 
A properly agreed and approved Programme and subsequently updated 
Programmes are also essential to the success of any delay analysis, but specifically 
pertaining to the dynamic time impact delay analysis method. 
 
  




CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 Conclusions and recommendations 
This thesis researched delay and disruption matters in relation to the JBCC Principal 
Building Agreement Edition 6.1 March 2014. This was done through an analysis of 
the application of the concepts; extension of time, penalties, critical path, ownership 
of float, concurrent delays, delay analysis methods and time at large. 
This analysis revealed not only shortcomings in dealing with the above concepts but 
also numerous instances of incorrect clause referencing, conflicting provisions and 
omissions from the Contract Data emphasising the need for revision in order to 
remove obvious errors and eliminate ambiguity and uncertainty. 
Chapter two demonstrated the shortcomings which have been caused by the various 
inconsistent and conflicting uses of JBCC PBA provisions. The effect of such 
inconsistency impacts on material terms such as Penalties, Termination, Risk of 
damage to the Works, Insurance, Security, and Time Barring, as illustrated. 
Chapter three highlights that the current legal position and status of the Programme 
is unsatisfactory. The times for performance, other than dates expressly incorporated 
in the Agreement by its inclusion in the Contract Data, are not contractually 
enforceable. The Contract Data fix the date for possession of the Site and the date 
for Practical Completion, and a failure to meet these dates will result in mora ex re 
(delay arising from the transaction). However, within the window between these two 
defined dates, the times for performance are left open, and the parties need to 
establish a time for performance ex persona by issuing a demand for performance or 
an interpellatio. As long as the Programme has no legal significance, there will be no 
agreed times for performance. Accordingly, it will be very difficult for the Contractor 
to prove Employer Risk Delays. The current JBCC Programme will at best function 
as a management tool with evidentiary value. 
The absence of an approved Programme leaves an array of matters open to 
interpretation and creates immense uncertainty which, as submitted above, may lead 
to disputes. From both Parties’ perspectives it is important to commit to certain 
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agreed dates in order to co-operate and not prevent or hinder each other’s 
performance. Further, where the failure of the one party may entitle the other to 
extension of time or compensation or both, it is important to establish the time of 
performance of obligations. 
From this perspective, it is critical for the Contractor to fix the Employer’s or Principal 
Agent’s time for performance contractually without the need to have to prove that it 
complied with the common law requirements to establish the time for performance ex 
persona through the issuing of a letter of demand (interpellatio). 
It is recommended that the JBCC PBA follow the basic guidelines recommended by 
the SCL Protocol as fully motivated in Chapter 3. 
Chapter Four considered the legal position and possible application of the 
“Prevention Principle” and “Time at Large” in South Africa. These concepts were 
researched and analysed with the view to determine the vulnerability of the JBCC 
PBA against possible Contractor’s applications to strike out the Penalties. The 
conclusion is that although there is no certainty on whether these concepts are 
consistent with South African law, they may still be brought as a defence against the 
Employer’s claim for Penalties. Alternatively, the Contractor may attempt to use 
other interpretational rules or principles on which similar legal outcomes may be 
reached. 
It is recommended that the possible contractual gaps be closed by proper wording 
such as to exclude time being rendered at large and the Employer’s right to levy 
Penalties being preserved. 
Chapter Five suggested that the prospective dynamic analysis method is superior to 
the retrospective static methods. It is also submitted that the contemporaneous 
approach to delay analysis incorporates the key aspects of actual progress, possible 
changing of critical path, float and concurrency. 
The process of performing time impact analysis is compatible with the proposed 
“Burden of Proof Approach” on concurrent delays. Any possible disputes will 
manifest early in the process of determining possible extension of time and would be 
capable of being adjudicated with contemporaneous information available. 
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It is submitted that on a straight contractual interpretation of Clause 23 of the JBCC 
PBA, together with the South African law approach to the legal principles including 
the prevention principle, doctrine of penalties, burden of proof and the contractual 
status of the programme, the Malmaison Approach as followed by English courts 
should not be used in South Africa. The recommended amendments to the JBCC 
PBA as discussed by the thesis are included as Annexure B. 
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Figure 8 – Deemed Practical Completion 
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DETAILS OF CHANGES MADE TO THE PROVISIONS OF JBCC STANDARD 
DOCUMENTATION AND EXPRESS AMENDMENTS TO THE PROVISIONS OF 
THE JBCC PRINCIPAL BUILDING AGREEMENT AND CONTRACT DATA  
– March 2014 Edition 6.1 
 
In this regard, the Standard JBCC Principal Building Agreement and Contract 
Data 2014 is amended by the numbered clauses set out below, as follows: 
 
(i) where the Standard JBCC Principal Building Agreement and Contract Data 
2014 contains no provision with the corresponding clause number, the clause set out 
herein is inserted into the contract; and 
 
(ii) where the Standard JBCC Principal Building Agreement and Contract Data 
2014 contains a provision with the corresponding clause number, the same is 
deleted in its entirety and replaced with the provision having such clause number, as 
set out herein. 
 
Save as amended in terms of this document, the provisions of the Standard 
Principal Building Agreement and Contract Data 2014 shall remain unchanged. 
 
1.0        DEFINITIONS and INTERPRETATION 
1.1 Definitions 
CONTRACT PERIOD*: The period commencing on the intended date [CD] of 
possession of the site by the contractor and ending on the date for practical 
completion. 
 
DATE FOR PRACTICAL COMPLETION*: The contractual completion date or dates 
stated in the contract data or revision thereof [23.0] on or before which the 
contractor agrees to bring the works or sections thereof to practical completion. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
The contractor will be liable for the determined penalty [24.0] in failure to achieve 
practical completion on or before such date. References to “date for practical 
completion” will be included in the definitions where the “date for” is not bold in the 
standard JBCC text. 
 
DATE OF PRACTICAL COMPLETION*: The construction completion date or dates, 
which is initially the intended or planned date or dates to bring the works or 
sections thereof to practical completion and subsequently the actual or deemed 
date or dates on which the contractor achieved practical completion as stated in a 
certificate of practical completion. References to “date of practical completion” 
will be included in the definition where the “date of” is not bold in the standard JBCC 
text. 
 
PROGRAMME: A diagrammatic representation of the planned execution of units of 
work or activities indicating the dates for commencement and completion prepared 
and maintained by the contractor. The programme will be developed in the 
software as stated in the contract data or otherwise agreed by the parties. When 
reference is made to submit or update the programme it will mean in a soft and hard 
copy of it. The latest programme uploaded by the principal agent will supercede the 
previous programme.  






DUTIES OF THE PARTIES 
 
12.2.6. The contractor shall prepare and submit to the principal agent within 
fifteen (15) working days of the receipt of the contract documents an 
initial programme in the detail as required below of carrying out the 
Works in order to meet the date for practical completion.  
 
12.2.6.1 the initial programme and all subsequent updated programmes shall 
show the sequence of the execution of the works, the reciprocal 
obligations of the employer and the other information as including but 
not limited to: 
 
12.2.6.1.1 the date of possession of the site and/or access to any part of the site or 
works [23.2.1] 
12.2.6.1.2 outstanding construction information [23.2.5] 
 
12.2.6.1.3 Free issue [23.2.6] 
 
12.2.6.1.4 the appointments of subcontractors [23.2.7] 
 
12.2.6.1.5 acceptance of designs of selected subcontractors [23.2.8] 
 
12.2.6.1.6 date for practical completion as a whole or dates for practical 
completion in sections [CD] 
 
12.2.6.1.7 date of practical completion as a whole or dates of practical 
completion in sections [19.3.3] 
 
12.2.6.1.8 critical path and float 
 
12.2.6.1.9 health and safety requirements 
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12.2.6.1.10 approvals by authorities, employer or agents 
 
12.2.6.1.11 all contractual notices issued and claims submitted [23.0;26.0] 
 
12.2.6.2 The contractor shall program the works by taking full cognisance and 
should comply with any programming requirements in relation to, inter 
alia sequencing, key dates, milestones, restrictions or constraints as 
included in the contract data. 
12.2.6.3  
The principal agent shall, within five (5) working days after the 
contractor has submitted an initial or updated programme, approve and 
agree on the specific dates for performance by the employer included in 
such programme or, rejecting same with reasons and instruct the 
contractor to amend such programme. Reasons for rejecting a 
programme are inter alia that it is not in accordance with the agreement 
or does not reflect the actual progress. The principal agent’s failure to 
approve or reject with reasons the submitted programme. 
 
12.2.6.3.1 shall, in the event of the submitted programme being an adjusted 
programme, be deemed to have been  approved; and 
 
12.2.6.3.2 shall, in the event of the submitted programme being an initial 
programme, not be deemed to constitute approval. However, the 
contractor shall have the right to suspend the works [6.4] 
 
12.2.6.4 The programme shall be subject to review on a monthly basis. The 
contractor shall deliver to the principal agent an updated programme 
reflecting actual progress and updated dates in accordance with 
[12.2.6.1], even though it may reflect that the planned date(s) of 
practical completion will be later than the corresponding date(s) for 
practical completion. The fact that the contractor may be in culpable 
delay does not relieve him from submitting an updated programme 
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every month, and in addition; 
 
12.2.6.4.1 when a specific event or circumstance occurs which may cause a delay 
to the date of practical completion [23.6.2]; 
 
12.2.6.4.2 when a specific event or circumstance occur which may cause expense 
and/or loss or both [26.5]; 
 
12.2.6.4.3 with each claim [23.6.2; 26.5]; and 
 
12.2.6.4.4 after each assessment or ruling [23.7; 26,7] 
 
12.2.6.4.6 where the parties fail to reach agreement on an updated programme 
within a further fife (5) working days after the principal agent’s 
rejection of a programme [12.2.6.3], the programme shall be deemed to 
be a dispute [30.2] and referred to adjudication [30.6] 
 
19.0        PRACTICAL COMPLETION 
  
19.1 The principal agent shall: 
  
19.1.1 Inspect the works at appropriate intervals to give the contractor 
interpretations and direction on the standard of work, the state of 
completion of the works and the documentation to be prepared and 
submitted [12.2.19-20] as a required criteria of the contractor to achieve 
practical completion [CD] 
 
19.2 The contractor shall: 
 
19.2.1 Inspect the works in advance of the anticipated date of practical 
completion to confirm that the standard of work required and the state 
of completion of the works has been achieved and documentation 
[12.2.19-20] has been provided for practical completion [CD] to be 




19.2.2 Give timeous notice to the principal agent of the anticipated date of 
practical completion of the works, in order for the principal agent to 
inspect the works [19.1.3] so as to meet such date 
 
19.4 Should the principal agent not issue a list for practical completion 
[19.3.1] after the contractor’s notice [19.2.2] and the inspection period 
[19.1.3] or the updated list [19.3.2] within five (5) working days after the 
contractor’s notice requesting a follow up inspection, the contractor 
shall give a further notice to the employer and the principal agent 
referring specifically to the previous notice. Should the principal agent 
not issue such list within five (5) working days of receipt of such further 
notice, practical completion shall be deemed to have been achieved 
on the anticipated date of practical completion as notified in the 
previous notice referred to and the principal agent shall issue the 
certificate of practical completion forthwith 
 
19.6 Where the employer takes possession of the whole or a portion of the 
works by agreement the agreement will be amended to provide for the 
works to be completed in sections [20.0] and to include all the 
necessary contractual implications, inter alia, the definition of each 
section, the date for practical completion of each section and the 
penalty applicable for each section. 
 
19.8 Where the works or a part thereof includes mechanical and/or electrical 
systems that are put to use for the convenience of the employer with the 
permission of the contractor, the guarantee period for such systems 
shall commence on the date of practical completion [19.0]. The 
aforesaid actions shall not constitute the taking of possession [19.6; 8.1] 
and the risk and responsibility shall accordingly not pass to the 
employer. 
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23.0 REVISION OF THE DATE FOR PRACTICAL COMPLETION 
  
23.2 The contractor is entitled to a revision of the date for practical 
completion by the principal agent with an adjustment to the contract 
value [26.0], for a delay to practical completion caused by one or more 
of the events listed below. Such entitlement shall be subject to the 
entitlement provided in [23.1]. Therefore if a concurrent delay to 
practical completion is caused both by a [23.1] and a [23.2] event, then 
[23.1] shall apply and the contractor shall be entitled to a revision of the 
date for practical completion by the principal agent without an 
adjustment of the contract value.   
 
23.2.1 Delayed possession of the site [12.1.7] and/or access to any part of the 
site or works in terms of the programme 
 
23.2.3 contract instructions [17.1-2; 17.1.13] not occasioned by the 
contractor’s default 
 
23.2.5 Incorrect issue of construction information and the late issue of 
outstanding construction information in terms of the programme 
[12.2.8; 13.2.3; 17.1.1-2; 17.1.13]. 
 
23.2.6   Late supply of free issue in terms of the agreed programme [12.1.12] 
 
23.2.8 Late acceptance in terms of the agreed programme by the principal 
agent and/or agents of a design undertaken by a selected 
subcontractor where the contractor’s obligations have been met 
 
23.2.13 Any delay, impediment or prevention caused by or attributable to the 
employer, the principal agent and/or agents, or other direct 
contractors on the site 
 
23.3 Further circumstances for which the contractor may be entitled to a 
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revision of the date for practical completion are delays to practical 
completion due to any other cause beyond the contractor's reasonable 
control that could not have reasonably been anticipated and provided for. 
The contractor is entitled to an adjustment to the contract value 
[26.9.4] where such delay is caused by the default or prevention act of 
the employer and/or agents 
 
 
23.4 Should a listed event or circumstance occur [23.1-3] which could cause a 
delay to the date of practical completion, the contractor shall: 
 
23.4.1 Give the principal agent reasonable and timeous notice of such event 
or circumstance and take reasonable steps to avoid or reduce such 
delay 
 
23.4.2 Within ten (10) working days of becoming aware, or ought reasonably 
to have become aware of such event or circumstances, give notice to 
the principal agent of the intention to submit a claim for a revision to the 
date for practical completion, failing which the contractor shall forfeit 
such claim 
 
23.5 The contractor shall submit a claim for the revision of the date for 
practical completion to the principal agent within twenty (20) working 
days, or such extended period the principal agent may allow, from the 
end of the event or circumstance, failing which the contractor shall 
forfeit such claim 
 
23.6 Where the contractor requests a revision of the date for practical 
completion the claim shall in respect of each event or circumstance 
separately state: 
 
23.6.1 Particulars of such event or circumstance and the relevant clause [23.1-
3] on which the contractor relies 










23.6.2 The cause and effect of the delaying event or circumstance on the date 
of practical completion, illustrated by the impact and/or a change to 
the critical path on the programme by performing a time impact analysis 
 
23.6.3 The extension period claimed in working days, and the calculation 
thereof and the revised date for practical completion based on the 
extension period claimed 
 
24.0       PENALTY FOR LATE OR NON-COMPLETION 
  
24.1 Where the contractor fails to bring the works or a section thereof [CD] 
to practical completion by the date for practical completion [CD], or 
the revised date for practical completion, the contractor shall be 
liable to the employer for the penalty [CD] 
 
24.2 Where the employer elects to levy such penalty, the principal agent 
shall notify the contractor thereof and shall determine the amount due 
from the date for practical completion up to and including the earlier of: 
 
24.2.1 The actual [19.3.3] or deemed [19.4] date of practical completion of 
the works or a section thereof 
 
24.2.2 The date of termination [29.0] 
 
  




Option A* For the adjustment of preliminaries both the contract sum and the 
contract value (including tax) shall exclude the amount of 
preliminaries, all contingency sum(s) and any provision for Cost Price 
Adjustment Provisions:- 
 
- An amount which shall not be varied 
- An amount varied in proportion to the contract value as compared to 
the contract sum 
- An amount varied in proportion to the revised contract period as 
compared to the initial contract period, excluding revisions to the 
contract period to which the contractor is not entitled to adjustment 
of the contract value [23.1] 
 
The contractor shall provide a breakdown of charges (including tax) 
within 15 working days of the date of acceptance of tender and, where 
applicable, an apportionment of preliminaries per section: 
 
Where such information is not provided the following subdivision shall 
be deemed to apply: 
- 10% of the amount shall not be varied 
- 15% varied in proportion of the contract value to the contract sum 
- 75% varied in proportion to the revised contract period compared to 
the initial contract period as stated above 
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ANNEXURE C: GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Contra proferentum – A doctrine of contractual interpretation providing that, where a 
promise, agreement or term is ambiguous, the preferred meaning should be the one 
that works against the interests of the party who provided the wording. 
Eiusdem generis – An interpretational rule that where general words follow an 
enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, 
such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held 
as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or class as those 
specifically mentioned. 
Ex contractu – Indicates a consequence flowing from the contract. 
Interpellatio – A letter of demand sent by a creditor to a debtor demanding that a 
creditor perform his/her obligation by a specific time. 
Mora – When a party to a contract fails to perform his/her obligations on time, he/she 
is said to be in mora. 
Mora creditioris – Creditor fails to accept proper performance by the debtor or does 
not co-operate in order to enable debtor to perform. 
Mora debitoris – Debtor does not perform timeously in terms of the contract. 
Mora ex persona – When a contract does not contain an express or tacit stipulation 
with regard to the date when performance is due, a demand (interpellatio) becomes 
necessary to put the debtor in mora. This is referred to as mora ex persona. 
Mora ex re – When the contract fixes the time for performance, mora is said to arise 
ex re, and demand (interpellatio) is not necessary to place the debtor in mora. 
Mutatis mutandis – With the necessary changes. 
Obiter dictum – A judge's expression of opinion uttered in court or in a written 
judgment, but not essential to the decision and therefore not legally binding as a 
precedent. 
Pacta sunt servanda – The principle that agreements are binding and enforceable on 
the parties. 
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Ratio decidendi or ratio – The rationale (reason) for the court’s decision or the 
principle that the case establishes. 
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ANNEXURE D: CLAUSE COMPARISON 
 
 
CURRENT JBCC PBA CLAUSES 
  
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CURRENT JBCC PBA 
CLAUSES 
 
CONSTRUCTION PERIOD the period commencing on the 
intended date [CD] of possession of the site by the contractor 
and ending on the date of practical completion, excluding 
annual industry holiday periods”  
 
  
CONTRACT PERIOD*: The period commencing on the 
intended date [CD] of possession of the site by the contractor 




DATE FOR PRACTICAL COMPLETION*: The contractual 
completion date or dates stated in the contract data or 
revision thereof [23.0] on or before which the contractor 
agrees to bring the works or sections thereof to practical 
completion. The contractor will be liable for the determined 
penalty [24.0] in failure to achieve practical completion on or 
before such date. References to “date for practical 
completion” will be included in the definitions where the “date 





DATE OF PRACTICAL COMPLETION*: The construction 
completion date or dates, which is initially the intended or 
planned date or dates to bring the works or sections thereof 
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to practical completion and subsequently the actual or 
deemed date or dates on which the contractor achieved 
practical completion as stated in a certificate of practical 
completion. References to “date of practical completion” will 
be included in the definition where the “date of” is not bold in 
the standard JBCC text. 
 
 
PROGRAMME: A diagrammatic representation of the planned 
execution of units of work or activities indicating the dates for 




PROGRAMME*: A diagrammatic representation of the 
planned execution of units of work or activities indicating the 
dates for commencement and completion prepared and 
maintained by the contractor. The programme will be 
developed in the software as stated in the contract data or 
otherwise agreed by the parties. When reference is made to 
submit or update the programme it will mean in a soft and 
hard copy of it. The latest programme uploaded by the 
principal agent will supercede the previous programme. 
 
 
Contract Data - Option A : 
 
“For the adjustment of preliminaries both the contract sum and 
the contract value (including tax) shall exclude the amount of 
preliminaries, all contingency sum(s) and any provision for 
Cost Price Adjustment Provisions:- 
 
  
Option A* For the adjustment of preliminaries both the 
contract sum and the contract value (including tax) shall 
exclude the amount of preliminaries, all contingency sum(s) 
and any provision for Cost Price Adjustment Provisions:- 
 
- An amount which shall not be varied 
- An amount varied in proportion to the contract value as 
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- An amount which shall not be varied 
 
- An amount varied in proportion to the contract value as 
compared to the contract sum 
 
- An amount varied in proportion to the construction period as 
compared to the initial construction period (excluding revisions 
to the construction period to which the contractor is not 
entitled) to adjustment of the contract value in terms of the 
agreement 
 
The contractor shall provide a breakdown of charges (including 
tax) within 15 working days of the date of acceptance of tender 
and, where applicable, an apportionment of preliminaries per 
section: 
 
Where such information is not provided the following 
subdivision shall be deemed to apply: 
- 10% of the amount shall not be varied 
- 15% varied in proportion of the contract value to the contract 
sum 
- 75% varied in proportion to the revised contract construction 
period compared to the initial construction period …” 
 
compared to the contract sum 
- An amount varied in proportion to the revised contract period 
as compared to the initial contract period, excluding revisions 
to the contract period to which the contractor is not entitled to 
adjustment of the contract value [23.1] 
 
The contractor shall provide a breakdown of charges (including 
tax) within 15 working days of the date of acceptance of tender 
and, where applicable, an apportionment of preliminaries per 
section: 
 
Where such information is not provided the following 
subdivision shall be deemed to apply: 
- 10% of the amount shall not be varied 
- 15% varied in proportion of the contract value to the contract 
sum 
- 75% varied in proportion to the revised contract period 
compared to the initial contract period as stated above: 
 
12.2.6 “Prepare and submit to the principal agent within 
  
12.2.6* The contractor shall prepare and submit to the 
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fifteen (15) working days of receipt of construction 
information a programme for the works in sufficient detail to 
enable the principal agent to monitor the progress of the 
works”. 
 
principal agent within fifteen (15) working days of the receipt 
of the contract documents an initial programme in the detail 
as required below of carrying out the Works in order to meet 
the date for practical completion.  
 
12.2.6.1*  the initial programme and all subsequent updated 
programmes shall show the sequence of the execution of the 
works, the reciprocal obligations of the employer and the 
other information as including but not limited to: 
 
12.2.6.1.1* the date of possession of the site and/or access to 
any part of the site or works [23.2.1] 
 
12.2.6.1.2* outstanding construction information 
[23.2.5] 
 
12.2.6.1.3* Free issue [23.2.6] 
 
12.2.6.1.4*  the appointments of subcontractors [23.2.7] 
 
12.2.6.1.5*  acceptance of designs of selected 
subcontractors [23.2.8] 
 
12.2.6.1.6*  date for practical completion as a whole or 
dates for practical completion in sections [CD] 
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12.2.6.1.7* date of practical completion as a whole or 
dates of practical completion in sections [19.3.3] 
 
12.2.6.1.8*  critical path and float 
 
12.2.6.1.9* health and safety requirements  
 
12.2.6.1.10* approvals by authorities, employer or agents  
 
12.2.6.1.11* all contractual notices issued and claims 
submitted [23.0;26.0]  
 
12.2.6.2*  The contractor shall program the works by 
taking full cognisance and should comply with any 
programming requirements in relation to, inter alia sequencing, 
key dates, milestones, restrictions or constraints as included in 
the contract data. 
 
12.2.6.3*  The principal agent shall, within five (5) 
working days after the contractor has submitted an initial or 
updated programme, approve and agree on the specific dates 
for performance by the employer included in such 
programme or, rejecting same with reasons and instruct the 
contractor to amend such programme. Reasons for rejecting 
a programme are inter alia that it is not in accordance with the 
agreement or does not reflect the actual progress. The 
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principal agent’s failure to approve or reject with reasons the 
submitted programme,  
 
12.2.6.3.1* shall, in the event of the submitted 
programme being an adjusted programme, be deemed to 
have been approved; and 
 
12.2.6.3.2* shall, in the event of the submitted programme 
being an initial programme, not be deemed to constitute 
approval. However, the contractor shall have the right to 
suspend the works [6.4]  
 
12.2.6.4*  The programme shall be subject to review on 
a monthly basis. The contractor shall deliver to the principal 
agent an updated programme reflecting actual progress and 
updated dates in accordance with [12.2.6.1], even though it 
may reflect that the planned date(s) of practical completion 
will be later than the corresponding date(s) for practical 
completion. The fact that the contractor may be in culpable 
delay does not relieve him from submitting an updated 
programme every month, and in addition; 
 
12.2.6.4.1* when a specific event or circumstance occurs 
which may cause a delay to the date of practical completion 
[23.6.2]; 
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12.2.6.4.2* when a specific event or circumstance occur 
which may cause expense and/or loss or both [26.5]; 
 
12.2.6.4.3* with each claim [23.6.2; 26.5]; and 
 
12.2.6.4.4*     after each assessment or ruling [23.7; 26,7] 
 
12.2.6.5* where the parties fail to reach agreement on 
an updated programme within a further five (5) working days 
after the principal agent’s rejection of a programme 
[12.2.6.3], the programme shall be deemed to be a dispute 
[30.2] and referred to adjudication [30.6] 
 
 
19.1 The principal agent shall: 
19.1.1 Inspect the works at appropriate intervals to give the 
contractor interpretations and direction on the standard of 
work and the state of completion of the works required of the 













19.1.1* Inspect the works at appropriate intervals to give the 
contractor interpretations and direction on the standard of 
work, the state of completion of the works and the 
documentation to be prepared and submitted [12.2.19-20] as 
the criteria for  the contractor to achieve practical 
completion [CD] 
 
19.2.1 Inspect the works in advance of the revised date for 
  
19.2.1* Inspect the works in advance of the anticipated date 
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practical completion to confirm that the standard of work 
required and the state of completion of the works for practical 
completion [CD] has been achieved 
 
 
19.2.2 Give timeous notice to the principal agent of the 
anticipated date for the inspection for practical completion of 




of practical completion to confirm that the standard of work 
required and the state of completion of the works has been 
achieved and documentation [12.2.19-20] has been provided 
for practical completion [CD] to be certified 
 
19.2.2* Give timeous notice to the principal agent of the 
anticipated date of practical completion of the works, in 
order for the principal agent to inspect the works [19.1.3] so 
as to meet such date 
 
19.4   “Should the principal agent not issue a list for 
practical completion or the updated list within five (5) 
working days after the inspection period, [19.3] the 
contractor shall give notice to the employer and the 
principal agent. Should the principal agent not issue such 
list within a further five (5) working days of receipt of such 
notice, practical completion shall be deemed to have been 
achieved on the intended/revised date for practical 
completion and the principal agent shall issue the certificate 





19.4* Should the principal agent not issue a list for 
practical completion [19.3.1] after the contractor’s notice 
[19.2.2] and the inspection period [19.1.3] or the updated list 
[19.3.2] within five (5) working days after the contractor’s 
notice requesting a follow up inspection, the contractor shall 
give a further notice to the employer and the principal agent 
referring specifically to the previous notice. Should the 
principal agent not issue such list within five (5) working 
days of receipt of such further notice, practical completion 
shall be deemed to have been achieved on the anticipated 
date of practical completion as notified in the previous 
notice referred to and the principal agent shall issue the 
certificate of practical completion forthwith 
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19.6 Where the employer takes possession of the whole or a 
portion of the works by agreement with the contractor, 
practical completion shall be deemed to have occurred. The 
principal agent, after inspection of the works, [19.3.3] shall 
issue a certificate of practical completion to the contractor 
with a copy to the employer within five (5) working days 
certifying the date of possession of the works by the employer 
and the list for completion of items to be rectified and work to 
be completed within thirty (30) working days, or such 
additional period as the principal agent may allow 
 
  
19.6* Where the employer takes possession of the whole or 
a portion of the works by agreement the agreement will be 
amended to provide for the works to be completed in sections 
[20.0] and to include all the necessary contractual implications, 
inter alia, the definition of each section, the date for  
practical completion of each section and the penalty 
applicable for each section. 
 
   
19.8* Where the works or a part thereof includes 
mechanical and/or electrical systems that are put to use for the 
convenience of the employer with the permission of the 
contractor, the guarantee period for such systems shall 
commence on the date of practical completion [19.0]. The 
aforesaid actions shall not constitute the taking of possession 
[19.6; 8.1] and the risk and responsibility shall accordingly not 




23.2  “The contractor is entitled to a revision of the date for 
practical completion by the principal agent with an 
  
23.2* The contractor is entitled to a revision of the date for 
practical completion by the principal agent with an 
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adjustment to the contract value [26.0], for a delay to 



















23.2.5 Late or incorrect issue of construction information 
[5.5; 6.4; 13.2.3; 17.1.1-2] 
 
 
23.2.6 Late supply of free issue, materials and goods for 
which the employer is responsible [12.1.11]  
adjustment to the contract value [26.0], for a delay to 
practical completion caused by one or more of the events 
listed below. Such entitlement shall be subject to the 
entitlement provided [23.1]. Therefore if a concurrent delay to 
practical completion is caused by both a [23.1] and [23.2] 
event, then [23.1] shall apply and the contractor shall be 
entitled to a revision of the date for practical completion by 
the principal agent without an adjustment of the contract 
value.   
 
 
23.2.1*  Delayed possession of the site [sic 12.1.7] and/or 




23.2.3*:  contract instructions [17.1-2; 17.1.13] not 
occasioned by the contractor’s default 
 
 
23.2.5*  Incorrect issue of construction information and the 
late issue of outstanding construction information in terms of 
the programme [12.2.8; 13.2.3; 17.1.1-2; 17.1.13].  
 
23.2.6* Late supply of free issue in terms of the agreed 
programme [12.1.12] 
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23.2.8 Late acceptance by the principal agent and/or agents 
of a design undertaken by a selected subcontractor where 









23.2.8* Late acceptance in terms of the agreed programme 
by the principal agent and/or agents of a design undertaken 
by a selected subcontractor where the contractor’s 
obligations have been met 
 
 
23.2.13* Any delay, impediment or prevention caused 
by or attributable to the employer, the principal agent and/or 
agents, or other direct contractors on the site 
 
23.3 Further circumstances for which the contractor may be 
entitled to a revision of the date for practical completion and 
an adjustment of the contract value are delays to practical 
completion due to any other cause beyond the contractor’s 
reasonable control that could not have reasonably been 
anticipated and provided for. The principal agent shall adjust 




23.3* Further circumstances for which the contractor may be 
entitled to a revision of the date for practical completion are 
delays to practical completion due to any other cause 
beyond the contractor's reasonable control that could not 
have reasonably been anticipated and provided for. The 
contractor is entitled to an adjustment to the contract value 
[26.9.4] where such delay is caused by the default or 
prevention act of the employer and/or agents 
 
 
23.4 Should a listed circumstance occur [23.1-3] which could 




23.4* Should a listed event or circumstance occur [23.1-3] 
which could cause a delay to the date of practical completion, 
the contractor shall: 
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23.4.2  Within twenty (20) working days of becoming aware of 
such delay, give notice to the principal agent of the intention to 
submit a claim for revision to the date of practical completion, 
failing which the contractor shall forfeit such claim 
 
 
23.4.1*Give the principal agent reasonable and timeous notice 
of such event or circumstance and take reasonable steps to 
avoid or reduce such delay 
 
23.4.2*Within ten (10) working days of becoming aware, or 
ought reasonably to have become aware of such event or 
circumstances, give notice to the principal agent of the 
intention to submit a claim for a revision to the date for 
practical completion, failing which the contractor shall forfeit 
such claim 
 
23.5  The contractor shall submit a claim for the revision of 
the date of practical completion to the principal agent within 
forty (40) working days, or such extended period the principal 
agent may allow, from when the contractor is able to quantify 
the delay in terms of the programme 
 
  
23.5* The contractor shall submit a claim for the revision of 
the date for practical completion to the principal agent within 
twenty (20) working days, or such extended period the 
principal agent may allow, from the end of the event or 
circumstance, failing which the contractor shall forfeit such 
claim 
 
23.6   Where the contractor requests a revision of the date 
for practical completion the claim shall in respect of each 
circumstance separately state:  
 
23.6.1 The relevant clause [23.1-3] on which the contractor 
relies 
 
23.6.2  The cause and effect of the delay on the current date 
  
23.6. *Where the contractor requests a revision of the date for 
practical completion the claim shall in respect of each event or 
circumstance separately state: 
 
23.6.1* Particulars of such event or circumstance and the 
relevant clause [23.1-3] on which the contractor relies 
 
23.6.2* The cause and effect of the delaying event or 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
        Page 13 of 13 
for practical completion, where appropriate, illustrated by a 
change to the critical path on the current programme 
 
 
23.6.3 The extension period claimed in working days and the 
calculation thereof 
 
circumstance on the date of practical completion, illustrated by 
the impact and/or a change to the critical path on the 
programme by performing a time impact analysis 
 
23.6.3*The extension period claimed in working days and the 
calculation thereof  and the revised date for practical 
completion based on the extension of time period 
 
 
24.1 Where the contractor fails to bring the works or a 
section thereof [CD] to practical completion by the date for 
practical completion [CD], or the revised date for practical 
completion, the contractor shall be liable to the employer for 
the penalty [CD] 
 
  
24.1* Where the contractor fails to bring the works or a 
section thereof [CD] to practical completion by the date for 
practical completion [CD], or the revised date for practical 
completion, the contractor shall be liable to the employer for 
the penalty [CD] 
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